LITERARY CRITICISM - II

M.A., (English)
Semester – IV, Paper-I

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M.A. (English) – Literary Criticism - II

First Edition 2023

No. of Copies :

This book is exclusively prepared for the use of students of M.A. (English) Centre for Distance Education, Acharya Nagarjuna University and this book is meant for limited Circulation only.

FOREWORD

Since its establishment in 1976, Acharya Nagarjuna University has been forging ahead in the path of progress and dynamism, offering a variety of courses and research contributions. I am extremely happy that by gaining 'A' grade from the NAAC in the year 2016, Acharya Nagarjuna University is offering educational opportunities at the UG, PG levels apart from research degrees to students from over 443 affiliated colleges spread over the two districts of Guntur and Prakasam.

The University has also started the Centre for Distance Education in 2003-04 with the aim of taking higher education to the door step of all the sectors of the society. The centre will be a great help to those who cannot join in colleges, those who cannot afford the exorbitant fees as regular students, and even to housewives desirous of pursuing higher studies. Acharya Nagarjuna University has started offering B.A., and B.Com courses at the Degree level and M.A., M.Com., M.Sc., M.B.A., and L.L.M., courses at the PG level from the academic year 2003-2004 onwards.

To facilitate easier understanding by students studying through the distance mode, these self-instruction materials have been prepared by eminent and experienced teachers. The lessons have been drafted with great care and expertise in the stipulated time by these teachers. Constructive ideas and scholarly suggestions are welcome from students and teachers involved respectively. Such ideas will be incorporated for the greater efficacy of this distance mode of education. For clarification of doubts and feedback, weekly classes and contact classes will be arranged at the UG and PG levels respectively.

It is my aim that students getting higher education through the Centre for Distance Education should improve their qualification, have better employment opportunities and in turn be part of country's progress. It is my fond desire that in the years to come, the Centre for Distance Education will go from strength to strength in the form of new courses and by catering to larger number of people. My Congratulations to all the Directors, Academic Coordinators, Editors and Lesson-writers of the Centre who have helped in these endeavours.

Prof. P. RajaSekhar
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Acharya Nagarjuna University

M.A.(English)
Semester – IV, Paper-I
401EG21: LITERARY CRITICISM - II
(Modern and Contemporary Criticism)
SYLLABUS

UNIT- I

Peter Faulkner	:	Modernism
Tim Woods	:	Beginning Post Modernism (Chapter – 3)
Northrop Frye	:	Archetypes of Literature

UNIT-II

Frantz Fanon	:	The Wretched of the Earth (Chapter-3)
Edward Said	:	Orientalism (Introduction)
Jacques Derrida	:	Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences.

Unit – III

Elaine Showalter	:	Towards a Feminist Poetics.
M.M. Bakhtin	:	Introduction to Dialogic Imagination

Unit – IV

M. Hiriyanna	:	The Main Aspects of Indian Aesthetics
Arjun Dangle	:	Dalit Literature: Past, Present & Future

UNIT-V

Catherine Belsey	:	Towards Cultural History in Theory and Practice
Andrew Dix	:	Beginning Film Studies, Viva books,2010. Chapter 7: Star Studies, Chapter 8 : Ideology , Pp-192-267

SUGGESTED READINGS:

1. Peter Barry : Beginning Theory
2. Tim Woods : Beginning Post Modernism
3. K.M. Newton : Twentieth Century Literature Theory (1988)
4. K.M. Newton : Theory into Practice (1992)
5. Kiernan Ryan ed: New Historicism & Cultural Materialism (1996)
6. Wilfred L. Guerin: A Handbook of Critical Approaches to Literature (2005)
7. Arjun Dangle: Poisoned Bread (1994).

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LESSON 1
PETER FAULKNER : MODERNISM

OBJECTIVE

- To understand shift in the literary theory after World War I
- To decipher the influence of Symbolism
- To examine the qualities of spiritual lament in the form and subjects of literature
- To explore different schools of modernism

STRUCTURE

1.1.   INTRODUCTION

In *William Faulkner: The Making of a Modernist*, Daniel J. Singal, a professor of history at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, remarks that "intellectual historians have almost invariably steered clear" of Faulkner with the effect that "one subject remains largely unexplored—the structure and nature of his thought." This will come as a surprise to Faulkner's bibliographers, who are inundated each year with fresh historical, critical, textual, and biographical studies galore. Faulkner is very probably the most extensively analyzed and most frequently criticized of American writers. Practically every scrap of his literary expression has been subjected to repeated interpretation. But it *is* the case that most of the criticism of Faulkner has been produced by students of literature rather than of history. The boundary of these disciplines having been blurred, however, novels are now, for better or worse, the historian's domain and history the literary critics. Mr. Singal therefore intends to relate Faulkner's work "to the cultural and intellectual discourse of the era"— a project that necessarily involves, I should imagine, the novelist's relationship to the modernist movement in all its salient forms.

In any case, *William Faulkner: The Making of a Modernist* notes the mixture in Faulkner of traditional and youthful values (something true of all of us, I should think).

But he insists on there being "two William Faulkners," "two central selves--old-fashioned country gentleman and contemporary writer," a Victorian Faulkner and a modernist Faulkner. Singal, it must be said at once, doesn't care a rap for the conservative

Victorian self that stood for values such as honor and courage and compassion and pity, or for an art that pretended to communicate timeless truths. For him, there aren't any.

1.2.   ABOUT AUTHOR

Peter Faulkner is Reader in Modern English Literature, University of Exeter. He is currently editor of the Journal of the William Morris Society. Peter Preston is Senior Lecturer in Literature, University of Nottingham, and was formerly Honorary Secretary of the William Morris Society and Editor of its Newsletter.

1.3.   BEGINNING OF MODERNISM

Obviously, the term modernism presupposes an era that preceded it— pre*modernism*. We must also understand what modernism was reacting to—namely, *pre*modernism.

1.3.1. *Premodernism*

Before the 1600s, people in the West generally believed that God (or the transcendent/supernatural realm) furnished the basis for moral absolutes, rationality, human dignity, and truth. This is expressed by the noted Christian theologian Anselm (b. AD 1033), who said, "I believe that I may understand" (*credo ut intelligam*) he spoke of a "faith seeking understanding" (*fides quaerens intellectum*). That is, the starting point for knowledge and wisdom was *God*, who provided the lens through which one could properly interpret reality and human experience. By having faith in God, the world could be rightly understood.

1.3.2. *Modernism*

Then came philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650). As a Roman Catholic, he was troubled by the philosophical skepticism and (due to the Protestant Reformation) the theological uncertainty of his day. So he embarked on a "skeptical voyage" in the pursuit of absolutely certain knowledge. As part of his project, he determined to doubt everything: Maybe an evil genius was tinkering with his mind - or maybe everything is an illusion. But he concluded that at least he knew he was doubting, which is a form of thinking. He concluded: *I think; therefore I am* (or, in Latin, *cogito*, *ergo sum*). So without realizing it, Descartes' project removed God from center stage, replacing it with the human knower as the starting point. The effect would be momentous. The rationalism of the European Enlightenment (c. 1650-1800) reflected this shift. This period was both optimistic about human potential and reason, but was also skeptical about church authority/state churches and Christian doctrine ("dogma").

This was just one of many modernist projects that assumed that human dignity, truth, and reason could be preserved *without* God. Besides rationalism (with its emphasis on reason), there were Romanticism (with the emphasis on feeling), Marxism, Nazism, and other utopian schemes that sought to displace God as the starting point for understanding and living. The Jewish-Christian worldview that had deeply influenced the West was now being challenged.

1.4.   WHAT IS MODERNISM?

Broadly speaking, 'modernism' might be said to have been characterized by a

deliberate and often radical shift away from tradition, and consequently by the use of new and innovative forms of expression Thus, many styles in art and literature from the late 19th and early 20th centuries are markedly different from those that preceded them. The term 'modernism' generally covers the creative output of artists and thinkers who saw 'traditional' approaches to the arts, architecture, literature, religion, social organization (and even life itself) had become outdated in light of the new economic, social and political circumstances of a by now fully industrialized society.

Amid rapid social change and significant developments in science (including the social sciences), modernists found themselves alienated from what might be termed Victorian morality and convention. They duly set about searching for radical responses to the radical changes occurring around them, affirming mankind's power to shape and influence his environment through experimentation, technology and scientific advancement, while identifying potential obstacles to 'progress' in all aspects of existence in order to replace them with updated new alternatives.

All the enduring certainties of Enlightenment thinking, and the heretofore unquestioned existence of an all-seeing, all-powerful 'Creator' figure, were high on the modernists' list of dogmas that were now to be challenged, or subverted, perhaps rejected altogether, or, at the very least, reflected upon from a fresh new 'modernist' perspective.

Not that modernism categorically defied religion or eschewed all the beliefs and ideas associated with the Enlightenment; it would be more accurate to view modernism as a tendency to question, and strive for alternatives to, the convictions of the preceding age. The past was now to be seen and treated as different from the modern era, and its axioms and undisputed authorities held up for revision and enquiry.

The extent to which modernism is open to diverse interpretations, and even rife with apparent paradoxes and contradictions, is perhaps illustrated by the uneasy juxtaposition of the viewpoints declared by two of modernist poetry's most celebrated and emblematic poets: while Ezra Pound (1885-1972) was making his famous call to "make it new", his contemporary T. S. Eliot (1888-1965) was stressing the indispensable nature of tradition in art, insisting upon the artist's responsibility to engage with tradition. Indeed, the overtly complex, contradictory character of modernism is summed up by Peter Childs, who identifies "paradoxical if not opposed trends towards revolutionary and reactionary positions, fear of the new and delight at the disappearance of the old, nihilism and fanatical enthusiasm, creativity and despair" (M*odernism*, 2000).

1.5.   THE MODERN PERIOD

The modern period (known also as the 'modern era', or also 'modern times') is the period of history that succeeded the Middle Ages (which ended in approximately 1500 AD) As a historical term, it is applied primarily to European and Western history.

The modern era is further divided as follows:

- The 'early period', outlined above, which concluded with the advent of the Industrial Revolution in the mid 18th century.

- The 18th century Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution in Britain, can be

posited amid the dawning of an 'Age of Revolutions', beginning with those in America and France, and then pushed forward in other countries partly as a result of the upheavals of the Napoleonic Wars.

- Our present or contemporary era begins with the end of these revolutions in the 19th century, and includes World War I, World War II, and the Cold War.

The modern period has been a period of significant development in the fields of science, politics, warfare, and technology. It has also been an age of discovery and globalisation: it is during this time that the European powers and later their colonies, began their political, economic, and cultural colonisation of the rest of the world.

By the late 19th and early 20th century, modernist art, politics, science and culture had come to dominate not only Western Europe and North America, but almost every civilised area on the globe, including movements thought of as opposed to the West and globalisation. The modern era is closely associated with the development of individualism, capitalism, urbanisation and a belief in the positive possibilities of technological and political progress.

The brutal wars and other problems of this era, many of which come from the effects of rapid change and the connected loss of strength of traditional religious and ethical norms, have led to many reactions against modern development: optimism and belief in constant progress has been most recently criticised by 'postmodernism', while the dominance of Western Europe and North America over other continents has been criticised by postcolonial theory.

The concept of the modern world as distinct from an ancient or medieval one rests on a sense that 'modernity' is not just another era in history, but rather the result of a new type of change. This is usually conceived of as progress driven by deliberate human efforts to better their situation. Advances in all areas of human activity – politics, industry, society, economics, commerce, transport, communication, mechanisation, automation, science, medicine, technology, and culture – appear to have transformed an 'old world' into the 'modern' or 'new world'. In each case, the identification of the old Revolutionary change can be used to demarcate the old and old-fashioned from the modern.

Much of the modern world has replaced the Biblical-oriented value system, re-evaluated the monarchical government system, and abolished the feudal economic system, with new democratic and liberal ideas in the areas of politics, science, psychology, sociology, and economics.

1.6. MODERNISM

The first half of the nineteenth century saw an aesthetic turning away from the realities of political and social fragmentation, and so facilitated a trend towards Romanticism: emphasis on individual subjective experience, the sublime, the supremacy of Nature as a subject for art, revolutionary or radical extensions of expression, and individual liberty. By mid-century, however, a synthesis of these ideas with stable governing forms had emerged, partly in reaction to the failed Romantic and democratic Revolutions of 1848. Exemplified by 'practical' philosophical ideas such as positivism, and called by various names – in Great Britain it i s designated the 'Victorian era' – this stabilizing synthesis was rooted in the idea

that reality dominates over subjective impressions.

Central to this synthesis were common assumptions and institutional frames of reference, including the religious norms found in Christianity, scientific norms found in classical physics and doctrines that asserted that the depiction of external reality from an objective standpoint was not only possible but desirable. Cultural critics and historians label this set of doctrines Realism, though this term is not universal. In philosophy, the rationalist, materialist and positivist movements established a primacy of reason and system.

Against this current ran a series of ideas, some of them direct continuations of Romantic schools of thought. Notable among these were the agrarian and revivalist movements in plastic arts and poetry (e.g. the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood and the philosopher John Ruskin). Rationalism also drew responses from the anti-rationalists in philosophy: in particular, G. W. F. Hegel's dialectic view of civilization and history drew responses from Friedrich Nietzsche and Søren Kierkegaard, who were major influences on Existentialism. All of these separate reactions together began to be seen as offering a challenge to any comfortable ideas of certainty derived by civilization, history, or pure reason.

From the 1870s onward, the ideas that history and civilization were inherently progressive and that progress was always good came under increasing attack. The likes of the German composer Richard Wagner (1813-83) and the Norwegian dramatist Henrik Ibsen (1828-1906) had been reviled for their own critiques of contemporary civilization and for their warnings that accelerating 'progress' would lead to the creation of individuals detached from social values and isolated from their fellow men. Arguments arose that the values of the artist and those of society were not merely different, but that Society was antithetical to Progress, and could not move forward in its present form. Philosophers called into question the previous optimism. The work of the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) was labelled 'pessimistic' for its idea of the 'negation of the will', an idea that would be both rejected and incorporated by later thinkers such as Nietzsche (1844-1900).

Two of the most significant thinkers of the period were, in biology, Charles Darwin, and in political science, Karl Marx. Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection undermined the religious certainty of the general public, and the sense of human uniqueness of the intelligentsia. The notion that human beings were driven by the same impulses as 'lower animals' proved to be difficult to reconcile with the idea of an ennobling spirituality.

Marx argued there were fundamental contradictions within the capitalist system – and that, contrary to the libertarian ideal, the workers were anything but free. Both thinkers would spawn defenders and schools of thought that would become decisive in establishing modernism.

Separately, in the arts and letters, two ideas originating in France would have particular impact. The first was Impressionism, a school of painting that initially focused on work done, not in studios, but outdoors. Impressionist paintings demonstrated that human beings do not see objects, but instead see light itself. The school gathered adherents despite internal divisions among its leading practitioners, and became increasingly influential.

Initially rejected by the most important commercial show of the time, the government-sponsored Paris Salon, the Impressionists organised yearly group exhibitions in

commercial venues during the 1870s and 1880s, timing them to coincide with the official Salon. A significant event of 1863 was the *Salon des Refusés*, created by Emperor Napoleon III to display all of the paintings rejected by the Paris Salon. While most were in standard styles, but by inferior artists, the work of Manet attracted tremendous attention, and opened commercial doors to the movement.

The second school was Symbolism, marked by a belief that language is expressly symbolic in its nature, and that poetry and writing should follow connections that the sound and texture of the words create. The poet Stéphane Mallarmé would be fo particular importance to what would occur afterwards.

At the same time social, political, and economic forces were at work that would become the basis to argue for a radically different kind of art and thinking. Chief among these was steam-powered industrialization, which produced buildings that combined art and engineering in new industrial materials such as cast iron to produce railroad bridges and glass-and-iron train sheds – or the Eiffel Tower, which broke all previous limitations on how tall man-made objects could be – and at the same time offered a radically different environment in urban life.

The miseries of industrial urbanism, and the possibilities created by scientific examination of subjects, brought changes that would shake a European civilization which had, until then, regarded itself as having a continuous and progressive line of development from the Renaissance. With the telegraph offering instant communication at a distance, the experience of time itself was altered.

In the 1890s a strand of thinking began to assert that it was necessary to push aside previous norms entirely, instead of merely revising past knowledge in light of current techniques. It was argued that, if the nature of reality itself was in question, and if restrictions which had been in place around human activity were falling, then art, too, would have to radically change. Thus, in the first fifteen years of the twentieth century a series of writers, thinkers, and artists made the break with traditional means of organising literature, painting, and music. This wave of the modern movement broke with the past in the first decade of the twentieth century, and tried to redefine various art-forms in a radical manner.

Composers such as Schoenberg, Stravinsky, and George Antheil represent modernism in music. Artists such as Gustav Klimt, Picasso, Matisse, Mondrian, and the movements Les Fauves, Cubism and the Surrealists represent various strains of Modernism in the visual arts, while architects and designers such as Le Corbusier, Walter Gropius, and Ludwig Mies van der Rohe brought modernist ideas into everyday urban life. Several figures outside of artistic modernism were influenced by artistic ideas; for example, John Maynard Keynes was friends with Virginia Woolf and other writers of the London-based Bloomsbury group.

On the eve of the First World War a growing tension and unease with the social order, seen in the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the agitation of 'radical' parties, also manifested itself in artistic works in every medium, which radically simplified or rejected previous practice. In 1913 – the year of Edmund Husserl's *Ideas*, Ezra Pound's founding of Imagism, and the New York Armory Show – Stravinsky (1882-1971) composed *The Rite of Spring* for a ballet, choreographed by Vaslav Nijinsky, that depicted human sacrifice. Meanwhile, young painters such as Picasso and Matisse were causing a shock with their rejection of traditional perspective as the means of structuring paintings.

These developments began to give a new meaning to what was termed 'Modernism': it now embraced disruption, rejecting or moving beyond simple Realism in literature and art, and rejecting or dramatically altering tonality in music. This set modernists apart from 19th century artists, who had tended to believe in 'progress'. Writers like Dickens and Tolstoy, painters like Turner, and musicians like Brahms were not 'radicals' or 'Bohemians', but were instead valued members of society who produced art that added to society, even if it were, at times, critiquing less desirable aspects of it. Modernism, while it was still progressive, increasingly saw traditional forms and traditional social arrangements as hindering progress, and therefore the artist was recast as a revolutionary, overthrowing rather than enlightening.

Modernist philosophy and art were still viewed as being part, and only a part, of the larger social movement. Artists such as Klimt and Cézanne, and composers like Mahler and Richard Strauss were 'the terrible moderns' – those farther to the avant-garde were more heard of than heard. Polemics in favour of geometric or purely abstract painting were largely confined to 'little magazines' (like *The New Age* in the UK) with tiny circulations. Modernist primitivism and pessimism were controversial, but were not seen as representative of the Edwardian mainstream, which was more inclined towards a Victorian faith in progress and liberal optimism.

However, the Great War and its subsequent events were the cataclysmic upheavals that late 19th century artists had been worrying about: firstly, the failure of the previous status quo seemed self-evident to a generation that had seen millions die fighting over scraps of earth – prior to the war, i t had been argued that no one would fight such a war, since the cost was too high; secondly, the birth of a machine age changed the conditions of life and, finally, the immensely traumatic nature of the experience dashed basic assumptions – Realism seemed to be bankrupt when faced with the fundamentally fantastic nature of trench warfare, as exemplified by books such as Erich Maria Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front*.

Moreover, the view that mankind was making slow and steady moral progress came to seem ridiculous in the face of the senseless slaughter of the War. The First World War, at once, fused the harshly mechanical geometric rationality of technology with the nightmarish irrationality of myth.

Thus in the 1920s, modernism, which had been such a minority taste before the war, came to define the age, and was seen in Europe in such critical movements as Dada, and then in constructive movements such as Surrealism, as well as in smaller movements such as the Bloomsbury Group. Each of these 'modernisms', as some observers label led them at the time, stressed new methods to produce new results. Again, Impressionism was a precursor: breaking with the idea of national schools, artists and writers adopted ideas of international movements. Surrealism, Cubism, Bauhaus, and Leninism are all examples of movements that rapidly found adopters far beyond their original geographic base.

Exhibitions, theatre, cinema, books and buildings all served to cement the public perception that the world was changing. Hostile reaction often followed, as paintings were spat upon, riots were organised at the opening of works, and political figures denounced modernism as unwholesome and immoral. At the same time, the 1920s were known as the 'Jazz Age', and the public showed considerable enthusiasm for cars, air travel, the telephone, and other technological advances.

While some writers attacked the madness of the new modernism, others described it

as soulless and mechanistic. But nevertheless, by 1930, modernism had won a place in the establishment, including the political and artistic establishment, although by this time modernism itself had changed. There was a general reaction in the 1920s against the pre-1918 modernism, which had emphasized its continuity with a past while rebelling against it, and against the aspects of that period which seemed excessively mannered, irrational, and emotionalistic.

Modernism had by this stage entered popular culture, too. With the increasing urbanization of populations, it was beginning to be looked to as the source for ideas to deal with the challenges of the day. Popular culture, which was not derived from high culture but instead from its own realities (particularly mass production) fuelled much modernist innovation. Modern ideas in art appeared in commercials and logos, the famous London Underground logo, designed by Edward Johnston (see above), being an early example of the need for clear, easily recognizable and memorable visual symbols.

One of the most visible changes of this period, in fact, is the adoption of objects of modern production into daily life. Electricity, the telephone, the motorcar – and the need to work with them, repair them and live with them – created the need f or new forms of manners, and social life. The kind of disruptive moment which only a few knew in the 1880s, had by now become a common occurrence.

Many modernists believed that by rejecting tradition they could discover radically new ways of making art. Arnold Schoenberg believed that by rejecting traditional tonal harmony, the hierarchical system of organising works of music which had guided music-making for at least a century and a half, he had discovered a wholly new way of organising sound. Abstract artists, taking as their examples the Impressionists, as well as Paul Cézanne and Edward Munch, began with the assumption that colour and shape formed the essential characteristics of art, not the depiction of the natural world. Kandinsky, Mondrian, and Malevich all believed in redefining art as the arrangement of pure colour. The use of photography, which had rendered much of the representational function of visual art obsolete, strongly affected this aspect of modernism. However, these artists also believed that by rejecting the depiction of material objects they helped art move from a materialist to a spiritualist phase of development.

Other modernists, especially those involved in design, had more pragmatic views. Modernist architects and designers believed that new technology rendered old styles of building obsolete. Le Corbusier thought that buildings should function as 'machines for living in', analogous to cars, which he saw as machines for travelling in. Just as cars had replaced horses, so modernist design should reject the old styles and structures inherited from Ancient Greece or from the Middle Ages. In some cases form superseded function and, following this machine aesthetic, modernist designers typically rejected decorative motifs in design, preferring to emphasise the materials used and pure geometrical forms. The skyscraper, such as Mies van der Rohe's 1950s Seagram Building in New York, became the archetypal modernist building. Modernist design of houses and furniture also typically emphasized simplicity and clarity of form, open-plan interiors, and the absence of clutter.

Many aspects of modernist design still persist within the mainstream of contemporary architecture today, though its previous dogmatism has given way to a more playful use of decoration, historical quotation, and spatial drama.

In other arts such pragmatic considerations were less important. In literature and visual art some modernists sought to defy expectations mainly in order to make their art more vivid, or to force the audience to question their own preconceptions. This aspect of modernism has often seemed a reaction against consumer culture, which developed in Europe and North America in the late 19th century. Whereas most manufacturers would try to make products that will be marketable by appealing to preferences and prejudices, high modernists rejected such consumerist attitudes in order to undermine conventional thinking. The art critic Clement Greenberg expounded this theory of modernism in his essay *Avant-Garde and Kitsch*, in which he labelled the products of consumer culture 'kitsch', because their design aimed simply to have maximum appeal, with any 'difficult' features removed. For Greenberg, modernism thus formed a reaction against the development of such examples of modern consumer culture as commercial popular music, Hollywood, and advertising. Greenberg associated this with the revolutionary rejection of capitalism.

Some modernists did see themselves as part of a revolutionary culture – one that included political revolution. Others rejected conventional politics as well as artistic conventions, believing that a revolution of political consciousness had greater importance than a change in political structures. Many modernists saw themselves as apolitical. Others, such as T. S. Eliot, rejected mass popular culture from a conservative position. Indeed, one could argue that modernism in literature and art functioned to sustain an elite culture that excluded the majority of the population.

1.7. MODERNIST LITERATURE

Modernism as a literary movement reached its height in Europe between 1900 and the mid-1920s. 'Modernist' literature addressed aesthetic problems similar to those examined in non-literary forms of contemporaneous Modernist art, such as painting. Gertrude Stein's abstract writings, for example, have often been compared to the fragmentary and multi-perspectival Cubism of her friend Pablo Picasso. The general thematic concerns of Modernist literature are well-summarised by the sociologist Georg Simmel: "The deepest problems of modern life derive from the claim of the individual to preserve the autonomy and individuality of his existence in the face of overwhelming social forces, of historical heritage, of external culture, and of the technique of life" (*The Metropolis and Mental Life*, 1903).

The Modernist emphasis on radical individualism can be seen in the many literary manifestos issued by various groups within the movement. The concerns expressed by Simmel above are echoed in Richard Huelsenbeck's *First German Dada Manifesto* of 1918: "Art in its execution and direction is dependent on the time in which it lives, and artists are creatures of their epoch. The highest art will be that which in its conscious content presents the thousand fold problems of the day, the art which has been visibly shattered by the explosions of last week. The best and most extraordinary artists will be those who every hour snatch the tatters of their bodies out of the frenzied cataract of life, who, with bleeding hands and hearts, hold fast to the intelligence of their time."

The cultural history of humanity creates a unique common history that connects previous generations with the current generation of humans, and the Modernist re-contextualization of the individual within the fabric of this received social heritage can be seen in the 'mythic method' which T.S. Eliot expounded in his discussion of James Joyce's *Ulysses*: "In using the myth, in manipulating a continuous parallel between contemporaneity and antiquity, Mr. Joyce is pursuing a method which others must pursue after him. It is

simply a way of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and a significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history" (*Ulysses, Order and Myth*, 1923).

Modernist literature involved such authors as Knut Hamsun (whose novel *Hunger* (1890) is considered to be the first 'modernist' novel), Virg inia Woolf, T. S. Eliot, Gertrude Stein, H.D. (Hilda Doolittle), Dylan Thomas, Paul Laurence Dunbar, Ezra Pound, Mina Loy, James Joyce, Hugh MacDiarmid, William Faulkner, Jean Toomer, Ernest Hemingway, Rainer Maria Rilke, Franz Kafka, Robert Musil, Joseph Conrad, Andrei Bely, W. B. Yeats, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Luigi Pirandello, D. H. Lawrence, Katherine Mansfield, Jaroslav Hašek, Samuel Beckett, Menno ter Braak, Marcel Proust, Mikhail Bulgakov, Robert Frost, Boris Pasternak, Djuna Barnes, and others.

Modernist literature attempted to move from the bonds of Realist literature and to introduce concepts such as disjointed timelines. Modernism was distinguished by an emancipatory metanarrative. In the wake of Modernism, and post-enlightenment, metanarratives tended to be emancipatory, whereas beforehand this was not a consistent characteristic. Contemporary metanarratives were becoming less relevant in light of the implications of World War I, the rise of trade unionism, a general social discontent, and the emergence of psychoanalysis. The consequent need for a unifying function brought about a growth in the political importance of culture.

Modernist literature can be viewed largely in terms of its formal, stylistic and semantic movement away from Romanticism, examining subject matter that is traditionally mundane – a prime example being *The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock* by T. S. Eliot (1915). Modernist literature often features a marked pessimism, a clear rejection of the optimism apparent in Victorian literature in favour of portraying alienated or dysfunctional individuals within a predominantly urban and fragmented society. Many Modernist works, like Eliot's *The Waste Land* (1922), are marked by the absence of any central, heroic figure at all, as narrative and narrator are collapsed into a collection of disjointed fragments and overlapping voices.

Modernist literature, moreover, often moves beyond the limitations of the Realist novel with a concern for larger factors such as social or historical change, an this is particularly prominent in 'stream of consciousness' writing. Examples can be seen in the work of, among others, two exact contemporaries, Virginia Woolf and James Joyce (1882-1941).

1.8.   CONCLUSION

Some modernists did see themselves as part of a revolutionary culture – one that included political revolution. Others rejected conventional politics as well as artistic conventions, believing that a revolution of political consciousness had greater importance than a change in political structures. Many modernists saw themselves as apolitical. Others, such as T. S. Eliot, rejected mass popular culture from a conservative position. Indeed, one could argue that modernism in literature and art functioned to sustain an elite culture that excluded the majority of the population.

1.9.   SAMPLE QUESTIONS

1. Define What is Modernist Literature ? Explain about the modernist Literature movement?
2. Explain the reasons for beginning of the Modernism Movement?

1.10.   GLOSSARY

1. Adherents = supporter
2. Apparent = evident
3. Assert = declare
4. Bankrupt = broke
5. Conservative = conventional
6. Decisive = important
7. Demarcate = separate
8. Denounce = condemn
9. Embarked = get on , go aboard
10. Emblematic = symbolic
11. Paradoxes = inconsistency
12. Transcendent = inspirational
13. Skepticism = disbelief
14. Slaughter = kill
15. Traumatic = shocking

Dr. Janaiah Saggurthi

LESSON 2
BEGINNING POST MODERNISM
---Tim Woods

OBJECTIVE

- To explain Postmodernism is an intellectual movement
- To make pulis to understand the post modernism as foundation for making sense of reality and human experience.
- To understand the fragmented perspectives

STRUCTURE

2.1 INTRODUCTION

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a particular interest in the relationship of ethics to literature, as well as representations of history and memory in twentieth-century literature. He has supervised research degrees in a range of subjects including Ngugi wa Thiong'o and African fiction, contemporary British Poetry, contemporary American Poetry, Religion and the Metaphysics of Postmodernism, contemporary American Fiction, Emmanuel Levinas, Postmodernism and Nihilism, and Cyberpunk Fiction, and would welcome doctoral applications in any of these areas. He is currently writing a book on post-apartheid South African Literature, and researching American poetry in 1950s and 1960s New England.

2.2   WHAT IS POST MODERNISM?

French postmodernist Jean-François Lyotard famously claimed modernism's end symbolized by Auschwitz, asking, "Where, after the met narratives, can legitimacy reside?" What is postmodernism then? "Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward met narratives." That is, postmodernism is deeply skeptical about (or suspicious of) big explanatory systems or stories. It is also critical of any view that claims to be neutral, unbiased, or rational. Christian philosopher Merold Westphal observes that modernism was characterized by the quest for (a) absolute certainty (think of Descartes) and (b) totalism - that all-embracing system ("meta narrative").   Modernists attempted to create "grand stories"-without reference to God-to ground human dignity, freedom, morality, and progress.

While modernism sought totalizing systems and absolute certainty, postmodernism now calls them into question in a two-fold manner. To counter totalism, postmodernism asserts that our interests and desires often use "reason" to promote their fulfillment; "truth" is simply whatever promotes my (or my group's) will or interests. There is a "political agenda" in whatever we claim to be true. Knowledge is not neutral. (This observation utilizes the "hermeneutics of suspicion.") In response to the unbiased certainty, postmodernism emphasizes that our ideas and judgments are embedded within a historical-cultural context; so we can never fully remove ourselves from it by pure reflection. (This has been called the "hermeneutic of finitude.")

2.3 BEGINNING OF POST MODERNISM

Obviously, the term postmodernism presupposes an era that preceded it—*modernism*. But we must also understand what modernism was reacting to—namely, pre modernism.

2.4.1   *Pre modernism*

Before the 1600s, people in the West generally believed that God (or the transcendent/supernatural realm) furnished the basis for moral absolutes, rationality, human dignity, and truth. This is expressed by the noted Christian theologian Anselm (b. AD 1033), who said, "I believe that I may understand" (*credo ut intelligam*) he spoke of a "faith seeking understanding" (*fides quaerens intellectum*). That is, the starting point for knowledge and wisdom was *God*, who provided the lens through which one could properly interpret reality and human experience. By having faith in God, the world could be rightly understood.

2.3.2. *Modernism*

Then came philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650). As a Roman Catholic, he was troubled by the philosophical skepticism and (due to the Protestant Reformation) the

theological uncertainty of his day. So he embarked on a "skeptical voyage" in the pursuit of absolutely certain knowledge. As part of his project, he determined to doubt everything: Maybe an evil genius was tinkering with his mind - or maybe everything is an illusion. But he concluded that at least he knew he doubted, which is a form of thinking. He concluded: *I think; therefore I am* (or, in Latin, *cogito*, *ergo sum*). So without realizing it, Descartes' project removed God from center stage, replacing it with the human knower as the starting point. The effect would be momentous. The rationalism of the European Enlightenment (c. 1650-1800) reflected this shift. This period was both optimistic about human potential and reason, but was also skeptical about church authority/state churches and Christian doctrine ("dogma").

This was just one of many modernist projects that assumed that human dignity, truth, and reason could be preserved *without* God. Besides rationalism (with its emphasis on reason), there were Romanticism (with the emphasis on feeling), Marxism, Nazism, and other utopian schemes that sought to displace God as the starting point for understanding and living. The Jewish-Christian worldview that had deeply influenced the West was now being challenged.

2.4.2 *Postmodernism*

Then, in the wake of two World Wars, a postmodern climate started to permeate the West. Confidence in human progress and autonomy was shattered on the rocks of Auschwitz and the Soviet gulags. The systems or "grand stories" ("meta narratives") of Nazism, Marxism, scientism, or rationalism ended up oppressing "the other"—that is, those marginalized by these systems such as Jews, capitalists, etc. These systems proved to be total failures. So with postmodernism, not only was *God* excluded as a foundation for making sense of reality and human experience; we cannot speak of any universal truth, reason, or morality. We just have fragmented perspectives.

If the French Revolution and the storming of the Bastille in Paris (1789) stands as a picture of the shift to modernism, the fall of the Berlin Wall exactly 200 years later (1989) symbolizes the failure of modernism and rise of postmodernism.

2.4 WHAT ARE SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF POSTMODERNISM?

We can only take a glance at some of the chief characteristics of postmodern thought. Anti-dualistic: Post moderns assert that Western philosophy created dualisms (true/false, right/wrong) and thus excluded certain perspectives from consideration. On the other hand, postmodernism values and promotes pluralism and diversity (rather than black vs. white, West vs. East, male vs. female). It claims to seek the interests of "the other" - those marginalized and oppressed by modernist ideologies and the political/social structures that support them.

2.4.1. *Questioning texts*

Postmoderns also maintain that texts—historical, literary, or otherwise—have no inherent authority or objectivity in revealing the author's intent, nor can they tell us "what really happened." Rather, these texts reflect the peculiarities of the writer's particular bias, culture, and era. Australian historian Keith Windschuttle has noted that for the past 2400 years, critics assumed that truth was still within the historian's grasp, but "the newly dominant

theorists within the humanities and social sciences assert that it is impossible to tell the truth about the past or to use history to produce knowledge in any objective sense at all."

2.4.2. *The linguistic turn*

Postmodernism argues that language shapes our thinking and that there can be no thought without language. So language literally creates truth. As Richard Rorty argues, "Where there are no sentences there is no truth." So truth is created rather than discovered. Thus, as Friedrich Nietzsche argued, "There are no eternal facts, just as there are no absolute truths."

2.4.3. *Truth as perspectival*

Furthermore, truth is a matter of perspective or context rather than being something universal. We do not have access to reality —to the way things are—but only to what appears to us.

Since we cannot remove ourselves from our context to have a "God's-eye view" of things, we must acknowledge that our thinking is shaped by forces beyond our control. We are like Truman Burbank in The Truman Show. He is the unknowing star of a production in a sheltered environment ("Seahaven"), where 5,000 cameras monitor his every move; everyone but Truman is acting. Likewise, we simply find ourselves thrown into a context with no way of getting outside it.

2.5 SOME ASSOCIATED USEFUL IDEAS

Postmodernism also introduces a goodly number of concepts that can be helpful in promoting a more vibrant intellectual awareness. For example, the following terms:

2.5.1. *Discourse*.

 This suggests not only verbal conversation, but addresses the kinds of messages being sent, received, and propagated in formal and informal contexts. Media of all types are part of our cultural discourse, and this includes advertisements, entertainment, and the quality of images and sounds, as well as rational exposition or discussion. It's what's being talked about, the action reflection of "common sense" (or commonly-held non-sense). The term's value is that it recognizes the general category that includes many types of communications, interactions, and even modes of thought.

2.5.2. *Marginalization*.

This term recognizes that mainstream discourse often "behaves" as if certain ideas, issues, or sub-groups of people simply don't exist, or hardly exist. In the mid-1950s, the mainstream media marginalized African Americans or Hispanics except in a few servant or character roles. Gays and lesbians have been largely marginalized, as have the aged and the disabled, although this is becoming less prevalent. By noting this term, it suggests that we should continue to wonder what aspects of life are subject to varying degrees of denial and repression.

2.5.3. *Narrative*.

This term recognizes the subtle story-like form of much of our social constructions. In modernity, much was spoken of as dry fact, but there was a kind of denial of the idea that facts didn't in fact stand alone, but were pulled out selectively to support this or that general interpretation, this or that story, which in turn tended to support certain beliefs and the established status of certain groups. Narrative is a less grandiose term than "myth," but really it serves almost the same function. Individuals, groups and nations all have their selected histories, the stories which tend to justify or create a coherent meaning for their existence. In this process of narrative, elements that don't fit are often ignored or actively repressed. Some narratives thus foster the marginalization of those sub-groups or issues that suggest a different interpretation. For example, in the modern, mid- 20th Century, the cowboys were good guys and the Indians were bad guys. The idea that the caucasians of European descent were less than noble in their treatment of the Indians was marginalized until around the 1960s. It wasn't part of the narrative.

2.5.4. *Meta-narrative*

This term recognizes that sets of beliefs and stories are often embedded in even more fundamental sets of beliefs and stories. The histories of some group, their pioneering efforts, might be set within a broader frame of the belief in progress, exploration, and the superiority of Christian culture over "heathen" indigenous culture.

2.6 WHAT ARE SOME POSITIVE IMPLICATIONS OF POSTMODERNISM?

While some of the more prominent postmodernist writers are overly obscure and excessively intellectually- game-playing, and some of their positions more extreme, for me the challenge was to access what was really relatively valid about this viewpoint. Ken Wilber (2000) described the situation well, and I recommend his treatment of the subject. Another implication is that postmodernism is a theoretical or philosophical justification for encouraging people to think and imagine creatively, as discussed in my talk and now the paper on this website on creative mythmaking.

In 1996 I wrote a paper that spoke to some implications of this new worldview for those who are conducting psychotherapy, though in retrospect, many of these principles could be applied to many other life roles. They are noted elsewhere on this website: Implications of Postmodernism for Psychotherapy

2.7. WHAT DOES POSTMODERNISM SPEAK TO OR CONTRAST ITSELF WITH?

Two themes stand out. One is the idea that there is an objective, "out-there" absolute truth, that is valid for all times and places. The other, related historically, is the acceptance of the ideals and modes of thought of modernity. Post-modernism wants to move beyond these world-views.

2.7.1. *Modernity*:

The main elements of the culture of modernity characterize Euro-American civilization from around 1700 to the late 1960s, and still represent the dominant ethos today,

although the postmodernist sensibility and the postmodern condition rapidly are becoming more recognized.

Modernity arose as a relatively more rational and progressive idealism that contrasted itself with a superstition-riddled and socially rigidified traditionalism of the medieval and late Renaissance period. It prided itself as being more possessed of truth than that earlier era. Its success was reinforced by the advances in technology in industrialization and arms, transportation and communication, which made colonialism possible and brought great wealth based on exploitation of indigenous peoples and ecosystems.

The ideals of progress, and especially tendencies in Westernized cultures (including, now most industrialized countries of the East) to believe in many of the ideals of capitalism.

Although colonialism is now in disrepute, the "White Man's Burden" was a major myth that justified extensive economic and social exploitation of those less well-technologically-endowed, under the guise of bringing the advantages of "civilization" and the benefits of "true religion." The pervasive senses of ethnocentrism, nationalism, racism superiority, the separation of business and ethics, and the blind belief in science as a near-religion, all are part of the mainstream of modernity. Modernity was also largely patriarchial, although its most flagrant forms have become less respectable, they still are pervasive.

There are many modern ideas that most people who think of themselves as postmodernist would go along with, but not uncritically. There remains that sense of questioning, probing, and consideration of the limits of these ideas.

2.8 SOME FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

What is Postmodernism?

Postmodernism is an intellectual movement that has emerged since around 1960s. Its essential idea involves the denial of any objective and absolute truth. Rather, ideas are viewed as being social constructions. It is a broad movement with many different writers, often disagreeing among themselves. There is no manifesto or consensus, but the ideas noted above may be discerned as a common thread. There are also several stances, some being more dramatic or extreme and others more modest and moderate. In another sense, postmodernism is an intellectual response to the postmodern condition.

What is the postmodern condition?

This term refers to the way the world has been changing in the last third of the 20th Century and continuing into the present and foreseeable future. The rate of change has increased so that the search for stability becomes an increasingly elusive phantom. The major factors contributing to the postmodern condition include the impact of electronic communications–especially television and the internet, inexpensive phone accessibility, etc; less expensive and more prevalent modes of transportation, associated with greater mobility, migration among nations, travel, and intercultural contact; urbanization, sub-urbanization, and a new form of re-rural-ization, leading again to more moving away from communities of birth and religion and towards more multi-faceted new collectives. This also involves a diffusion of traditional values and identities.

"Without quite noticing it, we have moved into a new world, one created by the cumulative effect of pluralism, democracy, religious freedom, consumerism, mobility, and increasing access to news and entertainment. This is the world described as "postmodern" to denote its difference from the world most of us were born into." (O'Hara & Anderson, 1991).

A number of writers have commented on what the postmodern condition does to the individual (psychologically) and the community (sociologically), as noted in the references at the end of this file.

Where did postmodernism come from?

Its roots are multiple, including trends in literary criticism, anthropology, linguistics, psychoanalysis, psychology, philosophy, feminism, the arts, etc. Several names have been more prominently associated with this movement, such as Jacques Derrida, Lyotard, Michel Foucault, but many people find these writers a bit extreme and obscure. I suspect that some precursors may also be found in the previous intellectual fashion, existentialism.

One of the earliest statements that suggests a postmodernist view is from Friederich Nietzsche, who said, "All knowledge is perspective." This means that any fact or belief is embedded within a frame of reference. A related, earlier, precursor is Socrates' dictum, "Know thyself," because, simply, knowing thyself isn't all that easy. People fool themselves, and they do so in order to serve not only vanity, but also social and economic position. One of my favorite quotes is from the comedian, Robin Williams, who played an extra-terrestrial visiting Earth in a television sit-com of the mid-1970s, "Mork & Mindy." At one point he shook his head and said, "Reality?! What a concept!"

Why is Postmodernism Important to Know About?

I think at its best (in a more moderate stance) postmodernism is a more systematic way to practice intellectual humility, to bring attention to the limits of certain kinds of thinking, and thereby counter certain absolutist claims of extremists and dogmatists in all fields. This philosophy allows for a challenging of the tendencies to rely on the authority of what has already been created--what Moreno called the "cultural conserve," and to dare to engage in the act of creativity--and its associated activity, creative mythmaking (see the link to creative mythmaking on this website.)

What does philosophy say about this?

There is a sub-field within philosophy called "epistemology," which explores the question, "How do we know what we know?" Alternative questions have to do with, "Might we be deceiving ourselves?" or "Could this be illusion?"

That last question also overlaps a bit with metaphysics, which involves the questions, "What is real, in contrast to what is un-real?" "What exists?" "Why is there anything other than nothing?"

Philosophy grows, and the aforementioned fields of psychology, psychoanalysis, anthropology, comparative religions, feminism, linguistics, etc.-- all have served as the kind of intellectual microscopes that have made it possible to probe certain seemingly obvious terms–God, goodness, evil, truth, error, etc.–and what is found is a welter of often

inconsistent ideas at different levels of consciousness. Since part of the challenge of philosophy is to seek to find a rational way to coordinate different ideas, this more careful exploration has forced the evolution of the field to a point of more complexity.

But how can anyone doubt truth?

Well, truth is a bit like the apparent solidity of objects. If you get up close enough, many objects are more porous than they appear, and at the atomic level, there is apparently a great predominance of space with active energies operating within that space, sort of like the way propellers seem to generate the appearance of discs. Similarly, when any truth is probed carefully, it becomes more porous, relative to circumstance, frame of reference, and constructed often largely in terms of language. Those truths that seem more rooted in basic fact often are in themselves lacking in much significance–the meaning is then superimposed, and depending on the meaning-makers, there may be a number of possible interpretations.

This attitude seems darn-near wicked!

Yes, the challenging of absolute truth, objective truth (i.e. out-there, for all peoples and all times in history), strikes to the heart of much of the meta-narrative of our Western culture. (In contrast, there are aspects of religious thought of the East–of Hinduism and Buddhism, for example–that see much of the world as illusory, that don't share in this "common sense" view of the fact-icity of the world.)

To challenge truth is to challenge much of religion in the West, which threatens a sense not only of personal faith, but collective morality. (Many religious people strongly feel that religion is a necessary requirement for morality, and that the godless cannot be trusted or respected. Only the fear of ultimate God-imposed punishment keeps people in line.

Obviously, this common view that projects its own unconscious immorality and conflict on others. Anyone who knows a goodly number of agnostics and atheists knows that the vast majority of them are as moral as most "believers.")

"Relativism" is a term attributed to many "secular" nonbelievers, and it seems to suggest a lack of moral grounding, conviction, an overly "permissive" attitude that makes excuses for criminals and other types of wrongdoers.

In fact, there do seem to be a few who use relativism as an intellectual cop-out from their own challenge of finding their deeper values. (That takes thought, and it's nice to have an excuse to avoid thinking–in this case, the wrong understanding that contemporary philosophy's challenging of absolutism makes the personal challenge of clarifying, prioritizing, and deciding a "fruitless" endeavor. This is only true if it is imagined that this kind of intellectual engagement must result in ultimately "true" conclusions. However, in fact, it is quite possible to live a life in which the mind continually strains toward "more" truth, knowing that "ultimate" truth may be far beyond anyone's reach, or in truth, may be a misleading goal.)

Most people who have entertained a moderate use of postmodernist concepts feel no obligation to be absolutist about the impossibility of being absolutist. (This is recognized as a paradox.) Pure and extreme positions are almost by definition less responsible, intellectually, than viewpoints that recognize that there can be alternative viewpoints. In other ways, there

are ways of being quite responsible in using postmodernist ideas as tools rather than as ideologies.

Relativism in itself is no answer, you see. It is only a door to finding ways to wrestle more vigorously with a wide range of problems, primarily ethical and political. (See my webpage on current ethical issues.) Even fundamentalists in the Bible belt, I think, would find it impossible to build full consensus on all of these issues, because there would even then be many different interpretations of various Biblical passages. Even if I were to concede that ultimate truth might be found in the Bible, I would deny the capacity of humans to discover that truth for all situations and all peoples and all times, because people inject their own biases and use scripture as a rationalization.

2.9 CONCLUSION

'Postmodernism' has been an umbrella term encompassing art, dance, painting, music, architecture, literature, etc. However, this paper confines itself to its cultural and philosophical status and its application in literature. Basically, postmodernism has concerned itself with the present human conditions at large and the postmodern condition is described as a situation where the individual sits powerless, without the agency to strive and have a meaningful life. As a cultural phenomenon 'postmodernism' ruled the academia (the humanities) as the darling for a quarter of a century and it was a great debate whether this notion has already outlived itself. The emergence of postmodernism thus needs to be discussed to arrive at a conclusion regarding its almost mystical 'demise'. 'Postmodernism' as a term entered the lexicon with the historian Arnold Toynbee's *A Study of History* (1947).

The prefix 'post-' suggests its connection with modernism. Modernism governed the European culture during the first half of the twentieth century, spanning across architecture, music, philosophy, and literature. People like T. S. Eliot, James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, Marcel Proust, Ezra Pound, Bertolt Brecht, Franz Kafka, Pabelo Picasso contributed to this movement, which had conspicuously left Victorianism behind. Movements that were either born or derived inspiration out of this paradigm shift could be named as 'Postmodernism'

2.10 SAMPLE QUESTIONS

1. What is Post-Modernism? What are some characteristics of postmodernism?
2. What is Post-Modernism? Explain Some Associated Useful Ideas of It.?

2.11. GLOSSARY

1. Embedded = fixed
2. Incredulity = disbelief
3. Coherent = logical
4. Consensus = agreement
5. Cumulative = increasing
6. Pervasive = persistent
7. Skeptical = cynical
8. Unbiased = impartial

Dr. Janaiah Saggurthi

LESSON 3
HERMAN NORTHROP FRYE: ARCHETYPES OF LITERATURE

OBJECTIVE

- To make the pupils to understand The Literary criticism from Author's goal of literary criticism point of view.
- One of the major drawbacks to conceptualizing literary works; in relation to the totality of literary works and pre-literary myths, is that literature is severed from the real, material world.

STRUCTURE

3.1   Introduction
3.2   Biographical sketch
    3.2.1. Early life and education
    3.2.2. Academic and writing career
    3.2.3. Contribution to Literary Criticism
    3.2.4. Criticism as a science
    3.2.5. Frye's conceptual framework for literature
3.3.   The order of words
3.4.   A theory of the imagination
3.5.   Frye's critical method
3.6.   Archetypal criticism as "a new poetics"
3.7.   Influences: Vico and Blake
3.8.   Contribution to the theorizing of Canada
3.9.   Origins
3.10. Major Tenets
3.11. Theory's Strengths/Advantages
3.12. Theory's Weaknesses/Limitations
3.13. Summary
3.14. Conclusion
3.15. Glossary

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Herman Northrop Frye, (July 14, 1912 – January 23, 1991) was a Canadian literary critic and literary theorist, considered one of the most influential of the 20th century. Frye gained international fame with his first book, *Fearful Symmetry* (1947), which led to the reinterpretation of the poetry of William Blake. His lasting reputation rests principally on the theory of literary criticism that he developed in *Anatomy of Criticism* (1957), one of the most important works of literary theory published in the twentieth century. The American critic Harold Bloom commented at the time of its publication that *Anatomy* established Frye as "the foremost living student of Western literature." Frye's contributions to cultural and social criticism spanned a long career during which he earned widespread recognition and received many honours.

3.2 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

3.2.1 Early life and education

Born in Sherbrook, Quebec but raised in Moncton, New Brunswick, Frye was the third child of Herman Edward Frye and of Catherine Maud Howard. His much older brother, Howard, died in World War I; he also had a sister, Vera. Frye went to Toronto to compete in a national typing contest in 1929. He studied for his undergraduate degree atVictoria College in the University of Toronto, where he edited the college literary journal, *Acta Victoriana*. He then studied theology at Emmanuel College (like Victoria College, a constituent part of the University of Toronto). After a brief stint as a student minister in Saskatchewan, he was ordained to the ministry of the United Church of Canada. He then studied at Merton College, Oxford, before returning to Victoria College, where he spent the remainder of his professional career.

3.2.2. Academic and writing career

Frye rose to international prominence as a result of his first book, *Fearful Symmetry*, published in 1947. Until then, the prophetic poetry of William Blake had long been poorly understood, and considered by some to be delusional ramblings. Frye found in it a system of metaphor derived from *Paradise Lost* and the Bible. His study of Blake's poetry was a major contribution. Moreover, Frye outlined an innovative manner of studying literature that was to deeply influence the study of literature in general. He was a major influence on Harold Bloom, Margaret Atwood, and others. In 1974–1975 Frye was the Norton professor at Harvard University. Northrop Frye did not have a Ph.D.

The intelligence service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police spied on Frye, watching his participation in the anti-Vietnam War movement, an academic forum about China, and activism to end South African apartheid.

3.2.3. Contribution to Literary Criticism

The insights gained from his study of Blake set Frye on his critical path and shaped his contributions to literary criticism and theory. He was the first critic to postulate a systematic theory of criticism, "to work out," in his own words, "a unified commentary on the theory of literary criticism" (*Stubborn Structure* 160). In so doing, he shaped the discipline of criticism.

Inspired by his work on Blake, Frye developed and articulated his unified theory ten years after *Fearful Symmetry*, in the *Anatomy of Criticism* (1957). He described this as an attempt at a "synoptic view of the scope, theory, principles, and techniques of literary criticism" (*Anatomy* 3). He asked, "what if criticism is a science as well as an art?", Thus, Frye launched the pursuit which was to occupy the rest of his career that of establishing criticism as a "coherent field of study which trains the imagination quite as systematically and efficiently as the sciences train the reason" (Hamilton 34).

3.2.5. Criticism as a science

As A. C. Hamilton outlines in *Northrop Frye: Anatomy of his Criticism*, Frye's assumption of coherence for literary criticism carries important implications. Firstly and most

fundamentally, it presupposes that literary criticism is a discipline in its own right, independent of literature. Claiming with John Stuart Mill that "the artist is not heard but overheard," Frye insists that the axiom of criticism must be, not that the poet does not know what he is talking about, but that he cannot talk about what he knows. To defend the right of criticism to exist at all, therefore, is to assume that criticism is a structure of thought and knowledge existing in its own right, with some measure of independence from the art it deals with (*Anatomy* 5).

This "declaration of independence" (Hart xv) is necessarily a measured one for Frye. For coherence requires that the autonomy of criticism, the need to eradicate its conception as "a parasitic form of literary expression a second-hand imitation of creative power" (*Anatomy* 3), sits in dynamic tension with the need to establish integrity for it as a discipline.

For Frye, this kind of coherent, critical integrity involves claiming a body of knowledge for criticism that, while independent of literature, is yet constrained by it: "If criticism exists," he declares, "it must be an examination of literature in terms of a conceptual framework derivable from an inductive survey of the literary field" itself (*Anatomy* 7).

3.2.5. Frye's conceptual framework for literature

In seeking integrity for criticism, Frye rejects what he termed the deterministic fallacy. He defines this as the movement of "a scholar with a special interest in geography or economics to express that interest by the rhetorical device of putting his favorite study into a causal relationship with whatever interests him less" (*Anatomy* 6). By attaching criticism to an external framework rather than locating the framework for criticism within literature, this kind of critic essentially "substitutes a critical attitude for criticism." For Frye critical integrity means that "the axioms and postulates of criticism have to grow out of the art it deals with" (*Anatomy* 6).

Taking his cue from Aristotle, Frye's methodology in defining a conceptual framework begins inductively, "following the natural order and beginning with the primary facts" (*Anatomy* 15). The primary facts, in this case, are the works of literature themselves. And what did Frye's inductive survey of these "facts" reveal? Significantly, they revealed "a general tendency on the part of great classics to revert to [primitive formulas]" (*Anatomy* 17). This revelation prompted his next move, or rather, 'inductive leap':

I suggest that it is time for criticism to leap to a new ground from which it can discover what the organizing or containing forms of its conceptual framework are. Criticism seems to be badly in need of a coordinating principle, a central hypothesis which, like the theory of evolution in biology, will see the phenomena it deals with as parts of a whole (*Anatomy* 16).

Arguing that "criticism cannot be a systematic [and thus scientific] study unless there is a quality in literature which enables it to be so," Frye puts forward the hypothesis that "just as there is an order of nature behind the natural sciences, so literature is not a piled aggregate of 'works,' but an order of words" (*Anatomy* 17). This order of words constitutes criticism's conceptual framework, its coordinating principle.

3.3 THE ORDER OF WORDS

The recurring primitive formulas Frye noticed in his survey of the "greatest classics" provide literature with an order of words, a "skeleton" which allows the reader "to respond imaginatively to any literary work by seeing it in the larger perspective provided by its literary and social contexts" (Hamilton 20). Frye identifies these formulas as the "conventional myths and metaphors" which he calls "archetypes" (*Spiritus Mundi* 118). The archetypes of literature exist, Frye argues, as an order of words, providing criticism with a conceptual framework and a body of knowledge derived not from an ideological system but rooted in the imagination itself. Thus, rather than interpreting literary works from some ideological 'position' what Frye calls the "superimposed critical attitude" (*Anatomy* 7) criticism instead finds integrity within the literary field itself.

Criticism for Frye, then, is not a task of evaluation that is, of rejecting or accepting a literary work but rather simply of recognizing it for what it is and understanding it in relation to other works within the 'order of words' (Cotrupi 4). Imposing value judgments on literature belongs, according to Frye, "only to the history of taste, and therefore follows the vacillations of fashionable prejudice" (*Anatomy* 9). Genuine criticism "progresses toward making the whole of literature intelligible" (*Anatomy* 9) so that its goal is ultimately knowledge and not evaluation. For the critic in Frye's mode, then, a literary work should be contemplated as a pattern of knowledge, an act that must be distinguished, at least initially, from any direct experience of the work, Thus criticism begins when reading ends: no longer imaginatively subjected to a literary work, the critic tries to make sense out of it, not by going to some historical context or by commenting on the immediate experience of reading but by seeing its structure within literature and literature within culture (Hamilton 27).

3.4 A THEORY OF THE IMAGINATION

Once asked whether his critical theory was Romantic, Frye responded, "Oh, it's entirely Romantic, yes" (Stingle 1). It is Romantic in the same sense that Frye attributed Romanticism to Blake: that is, "in the expanded sense of giving a primary place to imagination and individual feeling" (Stingle 2). As artifacts of the imagination, literary works, including "the pre-literary categories of ritual, myth, and folk-tale" (*Archetypes* 1450) form, in Frye's vision, a potentially unified imaginative experience. He reminds us that literature is the "central and most important extension" of mythology: "every human society possesses a mythology which is inherited, transmitted and diversified by literature" (*Words with Power* xiii).

Mythology and literature thus inhabit and function within the same imaginative world, one that is "governed by conventions, by its own modes, symbols, myths and genres" (Hart 23). Integrity for criticism requires that it too operates within the sphere of the imagination, and not seek an organizing principle in ideology. To do so, claims Frye, leaves out the central structural principles that literature derives from myth, the principles that give literature its communicating power across the centuries through all ideological changes. Such structural principles are certainly conditioned by social and historical factors and do not transcend them, but they retain a continuity of form that points to an identity of the literary organism distinct from all its adaptations to its social environment (*Words with Power* xiii).

Myth therefore provides structure to literature simply because literature as a whole is "displaced mythology" (Bates 21). Hart makes the point well when he states that "For Frye,

the story, and not the argument, is at the centre of literature and society. The base of society is mythical and narrative and not ideological and dialectical". This idea, which is central in Frye's criticism, was first suggested to him by Giambattista Vico.

3.5 FRYE'S CRITICAL METHOD

Frye uses the terms 'centripetal' and 'centrifugal' to describe his critical method. Criticism, Frye explains, is essentially centripetal when it moves inwardly, towards the structure of a text; it is centrifugal when it moves outwardly, away from the text and towards society and the outer world. Lyric poetry, for instance, like Keats's "Ode on a Grecian Urn", is dominantly centripetal, stressing the sound and movement and imagery of the ordered words. Rhetorical novels, like *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, are dominantly centrifugal, stressing the thematic connection of the stories and characters to the social order. The "Ode" has centrifugal tendencies, relying for its effects on elements of history and pottery and visual aesthetics. *Cabin* has centripetal tendencies, relying on syntax and lexical choice to delineate characters and establish mood. But the one veers inward, the other pushes outward. Criticism reflects these movements, centripetally focusing on the aesthetic function of literature, centrifugally on the social function of literature.

While some critics or schools of criticism emphasize one movement over the other, for Frye, both movements are essential: "criticism will always have two aspects, one turned toward the structure of literature and one turned toward the other cultural phenomena that form the social environment of literature" (*Critical Path* 25). He would therefore agree, at least in part, with the New Critics of his day in their centripetal insistence on structural analysis. But for Frye this is only part of the story: "It is right," he declares, "that the first effort of critical apprehension should take the form of a rhetorical or structural analysis of a work of art. But a purely structural approach has the same limitation in criticism that it has in biology." That is, it doesn't develop "any explanation of how the structure came to be what it was and what its nearest relatives are. Structural analysis brings rhetoric back to criticism, but we need a new poetics as well." (*Archetypes* 1447).

3.6 ARCHETYPAL CRITICISM AS "A NEW POETICS"

For Frye, this "new poetics" is to be found in the principle of the mythological framework, which has come to be known as 'archetypal criticism'. It is through the lens of this framework, which is essentially a centrifugal movement of backing up from the text towards the archetype, that the social function of literary criticism becomes apparent.

Essentially, "what criticism can do," according to Frye, "is awaken students to successive levels of awareness of the mythology that lies behind the ideology in which their society indoctrinates them" (Stingle 4). That is, the study of recurring structural patterns grants students an emancipatory distance from their own society, and gives them a vision of a higher human state the Longinian sublime that is not accessible directly through their own experience, but ultimately transforms and expands their experience, so that the poetic model becomes a model to live by. In what he terms a "kerygmatic mode," myths become "myths to live by" and metaphors "metaphors to live in," which ". . . not only work for us but constantly expand our horizons, [so that] we may enter the world of [kerygma or transformative power] and pass on to others what we have found to be true for ourselves" (*Double Vision* 18).

Because of its important social function, Frye felt that literary criticism was an essential part of a liberal education, and worked tirelessly to communicate his ideas to a wider audience.

"For many years now," he wrote in 1987, "I have been addressing myself primarily, not to other critics, but to students and a non specialist public, realizing that whatever new directions can come to my discipline will come from their needs and their intense if unfocused vision" (*Auguries* 7). It is therefore fitting that his last book, published posthumously, should be one that he describes as being "something of a shorter and more accessible version of the longer books, *The Great Code* and *Words with Power*," which he asks his readers to read sympathetically, not "as proceeding from a judgment seat of final conviction, but from a rest stop on a pilgrimage, however near the pilgrimage may now be to its close" (*Double Vision* Preface).

3.7 INFLUENCES: VICO AND BLAKE

Vico, in *The New Science*, posited a view of language as fundamentally figurative, and introduced into Enlightenment discourse the notion of the role of the imagination in creating meaning. For Vico, poetic discourse is prior to philosophical discourse; philosophy is in fact derivative of poetry. Frye readily acknowledged the debt he owed to Vico in developing his literary theory, describing him as "the first modern thinker to understand that all major verbal structures have descended historically from poetic and mythological ones" (*Words with Power* xii).

However, it was Blake, Frye's "Virgilian guide" (Stingle 1), who first awakened Frye to the "mythological frame of our culture" (Cotrupi 14). In fact, Frye claims that his "second book [*Anatomy*] was contained in embryo in the first [*Fearful Symmetry*]" (*Stubborn Structure* 160). For it was in reflecting on the similarity between Blake and Milton that Frye first stumbled upon the "principle of the mythological framework," the recognition that "the Bible was a mythological framework, cosmos or body of stories, and that societies live within a mythology" (Hart 18). Blake thus led Frye to the conviction that the Bible provided Western societies with the mythology which informed all of Western literature. As Hamilton asserts, "Blake's claim that 'the Old and New Testaments are the Great Code of Art' became the central doctrine of all [Frye's] criticism". This 'doctrine' found its fullest expression in Frye's appropriately named *The Great Code*, which he described as "a preliminary investigation of Biblical structure and typology" whose purpose was ultimately to suggest "how the structure of the Bible, as revealed by its narrative and imagery, was related to the conventions and genres of Western literature" (*Words with Power* xi).

3.8 CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORIZING OF CANADA

Frye's international reputation allowed him to champion Canadian literature at a time when to do so was considered provincial. Frye argued that regardless of the formal quality of the writing, it was imperative to study Canadian literary productions in order to understand the Canadian imagination and its reaction to the Canadian environment. During the 1950s, Frye wrote annual surveys of Canadian poetry for the *University of Toronto Quarterly*, which led him to observe recurrent themes and preoccupations in Canadian poetry. Subsequently, Frye elaborated on these observations, especially in his conclusion to Carl F. Klinck's *Literary History of Canada* (1965). In this work, Frye presented the idea of the "garrison mentality" as the attitude from which Canadian literature has been written. The

garrison mentality is the attitude of a member of a community that feels isolated from cultural centres and besieged by a hostile landscape. Frye maintained that such communities were peculiarly Canadian, and fostered a literature that was formally immature, that displayed deep moral discomfort with "uncivilized" nature, and whose narratives reinforced social norms and values.

Frye collected his disparate writings on Canadian writing and painting in The Bush Garden: Essays on the Canadian Imagination (1971). He coined phrases like "the Garrison Mentality", a theme that summarizes Canadian Literature. Margaret Atwood adopted his approach and elaborated on this in her book Survival (1972). Frye also aided James Polk in compiling *Divisions on a Ground: Essays on Canadian Culture* (1982). In the posthumous *Collected Works of Northrop Frye*, his writings on Canada occupy the thick 12th volume.

Based on his observations of Canadian literature, Frye concluded that, by extension, Canadian identity was defined by a fear of nature, by the history of settlement and by unquestioned adherence to the community. However, Frye perceived the ability and advisability of Canadian (literary) identity to move beyond these characteristics. Frye proposed the possibility of movement beyond the literary constraints of the garrison mentality: growing urbanization, interpreted as greater control over the environment, would produce a society with sufficient confidence for its writers to compose more formally advanced detached literature.

3.9 ORIGINS

Anthropological and psychological studies of the late 19th- and early 20th-century sparked the beginning of this criticism. Information provided from the findings of past cultures influenced many prominent writers. Also, myths from the Greek and Roman eras were thought of as profound and, as a result, the desire to incorporate such ideas in writing was instigated. Archetypal criticism came into prominence in the 1930s and 1940s, continued to flourish in the 1950s and 1960s.

Term comes from "arch," both an adjective and a prefix, and "type," a noun. "Arch" as an adjective means literally "chief" or "principal." As a prefix, it refers to "highest" or "most important." Consider words like "archangel" or "archbishop." "Type," from the Latin "typus," means an "image" or "impression." It refers to a general character, trait, or structure commonly held in a certain group or class; it is an embodiment or example, a model with ideal features. A type may also be a figure, representation, or symbol of something to come.

Consider words like "typical" or "typify." In Mormonism we talk of "types and shadows." By narrow definition, an archetype is an original model or type after which similar things are patterned; a prototype; an ideal example. The term and idea come primarily from Swiss psychologist Carl Jung, who also studied myth and religion.

According to Jung, all humans share what he called a "collective unconscious." This "unconscious" is a collection of memories and images comprising a racial past of pre-human experiences, the memories from which have been erased. Archetypal images, then, stimulate or trigger these memories in all of us; that is why they are so powerful and universal.

Extended definition: Archetypes (a.k.a. dominants, primordial images, mythological images) structural components of the collective unconscious. Also a universal thought form (idea) that contains a large element of emotion. Origin: a permanent deposit in the mind of an experience that has been constantly repeated for many generations. Archetypes interpenetrate and interfuse with one another. They are experienced via myths, dreams, visions, rituals, neurotic and psychotic symptoms, and works of art (which contain a great deal of archetypal material). There are presumed to be numerous archetypes in the collective unconscious. Some of the ones that have been identified: birth, rebirth, death, power, magic, unity, the hero, the child, God, the demon, the old wise man, the earth mother, and the animal.

3.10 MAJOR TENETS

Archetypal criticism is concerned with the way cycles and reiterating patterns of tradition, culture, inborn images, and beliefs affect literary works. It operates with the idea that certain symbols represent the same ideas no matter the time or place. Authors focus on symbols to utilize in literary works in order to strike readers' unconscious. Such symbols recur often enough in literature to be recognizable as an element of one's literary experience as a whole. It also deals with symbolism of nature and the cosmos. There is universality in literature, anthropology, psychology.

3.11 THEORY'S STRENGTHS/ADVANTAGES

Archetypal criticism focuses on certain symbols and their meanings. Almost all literature is written to convey events which mean something. Archetypal criticism looks for these meanings, as well as what the symbols in the story stand for. It acts as a powerful tool in teaching and in expressing universal feelings, beliefs, and ideas. Very closely linked with psychological theories and criticism. Explains why literature touches deep inside the heart of the reader.

3.12 THEORY'S WEAKNESSES/LIMITATIONS

Many critics are leery of the actual value of the archetypal approach; they seem to think it is reductionistic, formulaic. It generally excludes other sources or criticisms. Others believe that literary individuality is ignored with so much emphasis on cycles and patterns.

Not all literature contains symbolism; some is simply written for enjoyment. Some critics argue the theory is unnecessary because archetypal approaches to literature can also be covered in psychology, anthropology, comparative religion, and other fields. Symbols can elicit multiple meanings; one might interpret a literary work that is entirely different from the author's intentions. This criticism has been used less frequently in recent years.

As used in literature, an archetype is a recurrent, universal pattern that evokes a deep, emotional response in virtually all readers as it strikes a chord in their unconscious memory.

Archetypal critics look for such patterns in literature, relying on archeology, anthropology, psychology, history, and religion to identify and explain the total human experience. Archetypes can be: Symbols, Images, Characters, Plot structures. They are revealed in: Myths, Religions and Folklore, Dreams and Fantasies, Literature, Drama, Film Etc.

3.13 SUMMARY

In this essay, Frye outlines a theory of the arts in general and literature in particular which would be developed more fully in his celebrated <u>Anatomy of Criticism</u> (1957). His inspiration is undoubtedly to some degree at least Jungian (evinced, for example, in his use of key concepts such as 'archetype'). However, his approach is also significantly different in that where Jung's seems to be predominately author-oriented (what M. H. Abrams terms the 'expressive' pole of criticism) in so far as it is the collective unconscious of all humanity which unwittingly speaks, as it were, through the author and, by extension, his/her work, Frye's is arguably formalist, (i.e. oriented towards what Abrams terms the 'objective' pole).

As such, Frye contends, in a vein similar to the New Critics (whose heyday stretched from the 1930s through at least the 1940s and 1950s), that literary criticism must be put on a systematic and scientific basis. He dismisses as "pseudo-criticism" all criticism with "centrifugal" tendencies, that is, which diverts our attention away from the literary work itself. He counts in this regard

- literary criticism that masquerades as "casual value-judgments" , ones that are not "based on literary experience but are derived from religious or political prejudice" (he is evidently thinking here of what the New Critic John Crowe Ransom calls the 'moralistic' approach to literary criticism practiced by the Humanists and the Marxists alike);

- Literary criticism of the sort advocated by I. A. Richards that focuses on the "impact of literature on the reader" (the so-called 'affective fallacy' against which Wimsatt and Beardsley famously warned); and

- Literary criticism that focuses on the author as the source of the literary work (the so-called 'intentional fallacy' against which Wimsalt and Beardsley also famously warned). He dismisses in this regard all "sentimental judgments" that are "based either on non-existent categories or antitheses ('Shakespeare studied life, Milton books') or on a visceral reaction to the writer's personality"

Evidently, Frye shares much in these three respects with the New Critics and their opposition to moralistic, affective (reader-oriented) and intentional (author-oriented) approaches to criticism. In their place, Frye advocates a "rhetorical or structural analysis of a work of art", an approach that is "centripetal" in thrust, rather than 'centrifugal.'

Another huge influence on Frye in this regard is Aristotle's philosophy and literary theory. Aristotle famously argued that to understand any natural or humanly-made phenomenon, it is necessary to ascertain the four conditions (causes) necessary to its existence: the *material cause* (the material of which something is made – in the case of art, the words and actions of humans and their natural and social environments represented), the *efficient cause* (the divine or human agent responsible for its existence – the artist or author), the *formal cause* (what it is meant to be, what shape it is meant to have), and the *final cause* (to what end it exists, its ultimate purpose). Frye is uneasy with emphasizing the first two of these causes because each tends to be centrifugal, that is, to lead the critic away from the literary work per se. For example, the "material cause of the work of art", for Frye consists in the "social conditions and cultural demands which produced it". The quest to understand the material cause of literary works leads the critic outside of his own discipline (i.e. the study of

literature) and into the province of biography, socio-political history and literary history.

Similarly, the quest to understand the "efficient cause" of the literary work leads the critic to focus on the relationship between the writer and his / her work, rather than the work itself. Alluding evidently to Freudian psychoanalysis, Frye cites in this regard what he terms the "fallacy of premature teleology", the view that the "critic should not look for more in the poem than the poet may safely be assumed to have been conscious of putting there".

Frye asserts that a "kind of literary psychology connecting the poet with the poem" is unavoidable for revealing the "failures in his expression, the things in him which are still attached to his work" as well as his "private mythology, his own peculiar formation of symbols, of much of which he is unconscious". However, Frye is of the view that criticism should not degenerate into mere biography for the simple reason that this leads one away from the work in order to focus on the individual responsible for it.

Perhaps most importantly, Frye is uneasy with any approach to literary criticism that stresses the work's connection to the *individual* author precisely because of the fact that "so many poets use so many of the same images". In short, he is of the view that no literary work is explicable with reference solely to the author's personal life for the simple reason that literature, for Frye, is less a solipsistic than a collective phenomenon. Gesturing towards Jungian Analytical Psychology, Frye's point is that the literary work does not derive its significance solely from the personal life of the poet.

The sea, for example, is what he terms an "*archetypal* symbol" (my emphasis;, the significance of which resonates in the work of more than one poet. Indeed, he points out, any "profound masterpiece seems to draw us to a point at which we can see an enormous number of converging patterns of significance" in a single work. Frye's view is, in short, that the "unity of the work of art has not been produced solely by the unconditioned will of the artist".

This is because the artist is only the human medium through which the finished artistic product assumes a particular shape or "form".

Frye's real interest, like Aristotle's, is in the "formal cause" of literature, that is, the particular literary forms available to and unthinkingly utilised by a writer intent upon representing a particular subject-matter. For Frye the question of determining the formal cause of the poem is, hence, a "problem deeply involved with the question of genres" or 'kinds' of literature. Frye dismisses in this respect two "fallacious" conceptions of genre:

a) the "Pseudo-Platonic" (the view that genres exist "prior to and independently of creation"), and
b) the "pseudo-biological" (which conceives genres as so many "evolving species").

A Platonic view of genre necessarily involves a deductive approach to the study of genre whereby one postulates the traits peculiar to a particular form and then searches for actual examples which prove its existence. Frye adopts, by contrast, an inductive approach (one undoubtedly inspired by Aristotle): he examines a whole range of literature in order to ascertain those features of particular works by which they may be sorted into various categories.

To understand the formal cause of a particular genre, Frye advocates in place of historical and biographical approaches what he terms a "literary anthropology". This kind of criticism is one "concerned with the way that literature is informed by pre-literary categories such as ritual, myth and folktale". The "relation between these categories and literature", he argues in a way that is reminiscent of Eliot's argument in "Tradition and the Individual Talent," is "by no means purely one of descent". That is, we should not think solely in temporal terms that more sophisticated forms of literature are the complicated derivations or descendants of more primitive and simple pre-literary forms (myth, folktale, etc.). Rather, literature is best understood as "not only complicating itself in time, but as spread out in conceptual space from some unseen centre" to form what Eliot termed a 'simultaneous whole' and which Structuralists of a later era would call a 'synchronic system.' Accordingly, Frye asserts that the study of literature must proceed on the basis of the "assumption of total coherence", that is, the acceptance of the existence of a "coordinating principle, a central hypothesis which will see the phenomena as parts of a whole".

Though Frye's point of view in all this is similar to that of the New Critics in some respects (e.g. a tendency towards formalism), it differs significantly in others. For example, unlike the New Critics, Frye believes that the literary work should not be studied in isolation of other works for the simple reason that all pre-literary and literary works form a cohesive and systemic whole in relation to which the individual work must be studied in terms of what it shares with other works. In a nutshell, Frye's argument is that there are certain recurrent narrative patterns (what Frye calls *mythoi*) which both pre-literary and literary forms share.

The fundamental meaning of all fictions for Frye consists in what are sometimes called 'pre-generic plot-structures' as a result of which we understand *why* a particular story has 'turned out' as it has when we have identified the archetypal myth, or pre-generic plot structure, of which the story is an exemplification. Another important difference between Frye's archetypal criticism and the New Criticism advocated by Ransom and Brooks is related to this point. Where the latter focus on lyric poems (poetry that describes subjective states of consciousness), Frye's methodology seems to lend itself to forms of literature that involve the telling or presentation of some sort of story: prose or poetic narratives and drama.

Accordingly, where the New Critics limit themselves primarily to the examination of the relationship between what Ransom describes as the 'logical structure' (the paraphrasable core of the poem) and the 'local texture' (the precise diction, patterns of imagery, etc.), Frye places at least as much emphasis on plot-structure as local texture in an effort to arrive at an understanding of the archetypal form inherent in the text in question.

The goal of literary criticism is, for Frye to discern the "archetypal form (sometimes Frye refers simply to the 'archetype') which the author merely "recreated" in his / her individual work. The best way of detecting the *archetypal* form of a particular literary work is to proceed, according to Frye, inductively. He proposes that one start with the "intricate verbal texture" and patterns of imagery to be found in the text to hand, before moving on from there to the "network of psychological relationships" between characters and the sequence of actions in which they are involved (the plot). This is where an Aristotelian approach to analysing plot-structure is extremely useful. One starts with emotions inspired in the audience (sadness or joy or a mixture of the two) in an effort to understand whether one is dealing with tragedy or comedy or a mixture of the two (tragicomedy) and works backward from there to an understanding of exactly how the sequence of events which constitute the plot are ordered and ultimately to the nature of the genre in question. One asks oneself such

questions in this regard as: is there a narrator or persona? Are characters present in the work?

Are we dealing, hence, with lyric, epic or dramatic poetry? Etc. We must, in other words, follow the sequence of events dictated by the particular form of narrative in question in an effort to detect the pattern or structure inherent therein: "We hear or listen to a narrative, but when we grasp a writer's total pattern we 'see' what he means", Frye writes. It is but a short step from an understanding of the narrative structure of the work to hand to an appreciation of the archetypal form which informs the work in question.

However, the "meaning" of a literary work must be viewed as a function of what he describes as the "integrity" of the writer's "completed form". That is, one cannot ignore local texture (the pattern of imagery in the work) in favour of plot nor plot in favour of local texture. (Frye criticises in this respect what he calls the "representational fallacy", to wit, the view of narrative as a "sequential representation of events in an outside 'life,' and of meaning as a reflection of some external 'idea'. Frye argues that we must see narrative as the "linear movement" or artificially ordered sequence of actions performed by characters. Similarly, an image "is not merely the verbal replica of an eternal object, but any unit of a verbal structure seen as part of a total pattern or rhythm". In other words, one should not seek to understand a literary work as if it were a reflection of real life.)

For Frye, the narrative and imagery patterns detectable in this way in literary works can be traced first to myths and thence to those human rituals, in the form of harvest songs, sacrifices and folk customs, etc., handed down from time immemorial. These rituals are themselves responses to or attempts to render intelligible natural cycles such as the solar cycle of the day, the seasonal cycle of the year and the organic cycle of human life. That is, such rituals represent an effort on the part of humans to 'humanise' natural phenomena, in other words, to make some sense out of events in the physical world over which humans in fact have little control and which are in and of themselves perhaps inherently unintelligible.

As such, rituals are "deliberate expression of a will to synchronize human and natural energies". These rituals are themselves at some point formalised into 'myths' which are, consequently, essentially narratives constructed around a central human protagonist the pattern of whose actions reflect or correspond to the natural cycles.

Frye points out that all literary genres are initially "derived from" and thus variations on the "quest-myth". All myths are basically concerned, that is, with some kind of quest to accomplish some sort of goal. Each genre gestures towards a particular kind of human quest, that is, one involving the protagonist in a specific pattern of actions. In other words, the hero may triumph (comedy), fail or be killed (tragedy), be reborn (romance) and/or be the object of criticism rather than adulation (satire). Each pattern of actions and thus each genre are traceable and thus correspond to a particular cycle, especially of the seasons: comedy-summer / midday; tragedy – autumn / dusk; satire – winter / night; and romance -spring / morning. Literary history, he contends, may be divided into particular stages in which any one of the genres/archetypal forms listed above predominate.

Moreover, Frye goes so far as to argue that all art caters to a single impulse. The "final cause" or ultimate purpose of literature is the "resolution of the antithesis" between day and night, light and darkness, summer and winter, life and death, etc. which informs all myth.

All art functions to effect the "mingling of the sun and the hero, the realizing of a world in which the inner desire and the outward circumstance coincide". The "central myth of art must be the vision of an omnipotent personal community beyond an indifferent nature", man triumphant over a nature subservient to his will, Frye contends.

In summary, for Frye, literature is not mimetic. Literary writers reflect not reality but, rather, regurgitate in complex ways in their individual works those simple pre-literary mythical narratives that are central to the cultural heritage of humanity. The human actions depicted therein are ultimately grounded in those personifications which humans have come to attach to natural events and phenomena in an effort to humanise an inherently intransigent and unintelligible natural world. It must be noted, however, that it is not for the most part a question of the writer consciously deciding to write a particular narrative corresponding to a specific genre. The choice of narrative form originates in the collective unconscious of mankind: when one wants to treat a particular aspect of human existence, particular forms suggest themselves automatically.

For example, tragic human experiences necessitate the utilisation by the writer of the appropriate genre, in this case, tragedy. Frye seems to say that one's range of choices in this regard as a writer is not delimited by the range of narrative forms at the disposal of a given culture: the process which Frye describes is one that is universal to all humankind. Although the specifics and the particularities may differ from culture to culture, any given story is ultimately reducible to its archetypal core which is, from Frye's viewpoint, the true significance or meaning of the work in question.

All humans everywhere, from his point of view, have had to contend with the same natural facts which they have attempted to render intelligible and to overcome in remarkably similar ways. In short, Frye's argument is that the different forms taken by literary works pre-exist the intentional or unintentional choices made by their writers. In other words, writers (for the most part unthinkingly) utilise certain pre-existent literary forms (or genres) that are universally appropriate to and thus indispensable in the treatment of the subject-matter (that is, the particular aspect of human experience) which they want to deal with. Frye proposes that the totality of literary works therefore constitutes a 'self-contained literary universe' which has been created over centuries by the workings of the human imagination. The ultimate goal (final cause) in so doing, Frye suggests, is to 'humanise' the alien and indifferent world of nature, to render it, in appearances at least, malleable to human will. That is, literature plays an essential role in refashioning the material universe into an alternative universe that is humanly intelligible and viable, one adapted to essential human needs and concerns.

3.14 CONCLUSION

However, one of the major drawbacks to conceptualising literary works in this way, that is, in relation to the totality of literary works and pre-literary myths, is that literature is severed from the real, material world. (Frye's is an 'objective' or text-oriented approach, to use Abrams' terminology, that shares many of the limitations of other 'objective' approaches such as that practised by the New Critics.) Frye's model of literature is a fascinating one but is of little use to materialist critics such as Marxists, Feminists or Post-colonial critics. His methodology casts little, if any, light on the role played by class, gender or race in literary production.

3.15. GLOSSARY

1. Ascertain = determine
2. Axiom = saying
3. Descendants = offspring
4. Fallacious = untrue
5. Platonic = spiritual
6. Presumed = supposed
7. Phenomena = observable fact
8. Primordial = prehistoric
9. Recurring = chronic
10. Revert = go back to your old ways, regress
11. Unwittingly = without knowing

Dr. Janaiah Saggurthi

LESSON 4
FRANTZ OMAR FANON'S -"THE PITFALLS OF NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS, (FROM THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH)

OBJECTIVE

The objectives of the lesson are
- To understand Post-colonial Theory
- To understand the contribution of Franz Fanon to Post-Colonial Theory
- To understand decolonization theory from social and psychological angles.
- To understand demographic nature and contribution to national decolonization.

STRUCTURE

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Frantz Omar Fanon (20 July 1925 – 6 December 1961) was a Martinique-born Afro-Caribbean psychiatrist,philosopher, revolutionary, and writer whose works are influential in the fields of post-colonial studies, critical theory, and Marxism. As an intellectual, Fanon was a political radical, and a Marxist humanist concerned with the psychopathology of colonization, and the human, social, and cultural consequences of decolonization.

In the course of his work as a physician and psychiatrist, Fanon supported the Algerian War of Independence from France, and was a member of the Algerian National Liberation Front. For more than four decades, the life and works of Frantz Fanon have inspired national liberation movements in Palestine, Sri Lanka, the U.S. and South Africa.

4.2 BIOGRAPHY

4.2.1 Martinique and the Second World War

Frantz Fanon was born on the Caribbean island of Martinique, which was then a French colony and is now a French department. His father was a descendant of enslaved

Africans; his mother was said to be an "illegitimate" child of African, Indian and European descent, whose white ancestors came from Strasbourg in Alsace. Fanon's family was socio-economically middle-class. They could afford the fees for the Lycée Schoelcher, then the most prestigious high school in Martinique, where Fanon had the writer Aimé Césaire as one of his teachers.

After France fell to the Nazis in 1940, Vichy French naval troops were blockaded on Martinique. Forced to remain on the island, French sailors took over the government from the Martiniquan people and established a collaborationist Vichy regime. In the face of economic distress and isolation under the blockade, they instituted an oppressive regime; Fanon described them as taking off their masks and behaving like "authentic racists." Residents made many complaints of harassment and sexual misconduct by the sailors. The abuse of the Martiniquan people by the French Navy influenced Fanon, reinforcing his feelings of alienation and his disgust with colonial racism. At the age of eighteen, Fanon fled the island as a "dissident" (the coined word for French West Indians joining Gaullist forces), traveling to British-controlled Dominica to join the Free French Forces.

He enlisted in the Free French army and joined an Allied convoy that reached Casablanca. He was later transferred to an army base at Béjaïa on the Kabylie coast of Algeria. Fanon left Algeria from Oran and served in France, notably in the battles of Alsace. In 1944 he was wounded at Colmar and received the Croix de guerre. When the Nazis were defeated and Allied forces crossed the Rhine into Germany along with photo journalists, Fanon's regiment was "bleached" of all non-white soldiers. Fanon and his fellow Afro-Caribbean soldiers were sent to Toulon (Provence). Later, they were transferred to Normandy to await repatriation.

In 1945, Fanon returned to Martinique. He lasted a short time there. He worked for the parliamentary campaign of his friend and mentor Aimé Césaire, who would be a major influence in his life. Césaire ran on the communist ticket as a parliamentary delegate from Martinique to the first National Assembly of the Fourth Republic. Fanon stayed long enough to complete his baccalaureate and then went to France, where he studied medicine and psychiatry.

Fanon was educated in Lyon, where he also studied literature, drama and philosophy, sometimes attending Merleau-Ponty's lectures. During this period, he wrote three plays, which are lost. After qualifying as a psychiatrist in 1951, Fanon did a residency in psychiatry at Saint-Alban-sur-Limagnole under the radical Catalan psychiatrist François Tosquelles. He invigorated Fanon's thinking by emphasizing the role of culture in psychopathology.

After his residency, Fanon practised psychiatry at Pontorson, near Mont Saint-Michel, for another year and then (from 1953) in Algeria. He was chef de service at the Blida–Joinville Psychiatric Hospital in Algeria. He worked there until being deported in January 1957.

4.2.2   France

In France while completing his residency, Fanon wrote and published his first book, Black Skin, White Masks (1952), an analysis of the negative psychological effects of colonial subjugation upon Black people. Originally, the manuscript was the doctoral dissertation, submitted at Lyon, entitled "Essay on the Disalienation of the Black"; the

rejection of the dissertation prompted Fanon to publish it as a book. For his doctor of philosophy degree, he submitted another dissertation of narrower scope and different subject. Left-wing philosopher Francis Jeanson, leader of the pro-Algerian independence Jeanson network, read Fanon's manuscript and insisted upon the new title; he also wrote the epilogue. Jeanson was a senior book editor at Éditions du Seuil, in Paris.

When Fanon submitted the manuscript of Black Skin, White Masks (1952) to Seuil, Jeanson invited him for an editor–author meeting; he said it did not go well as Fanon was nervous and over-sensitive. Despite Jeanson praising the manuscript, Fanon abruptly interrupted him, and asked: "Not bad for a nigger, is it?" Jeanson was insulted, became angry, and dismissed Fanon from his editorial office. Later, Jeanson said he learned that his response to Fanon's discourtesy earned him the writer's lifelong respect. Afterward, their working and personal relationship became much easier. Fanon agreed to Jeanson's suggested title, Black Skin, White Masks.

4.2.3 Algeria

Fanon left France for Algeria, where he had been stationed for some time during the war. He secured an appointment as a psychiatrist at Blida-Joinville Psychiatric Hospital. He radicalized his methods of treatment, particularly beginning socio-therapy to connect with his patients' cultural backgrounds. He also trained nurses and interns. Following the outbreak of the Algerian revolution in November 1954, Fanon joined the Front de Libération Nationale, after having made contact with Dr Pierre Chaulet at Blida in 1955.

In The Wretched of the Earth (1961, Les damnés de la terre), published shortly before Fanon's death, the writer defends the right of a colonized people to use violence to gain independence. In addition, he delineated the processes and forces leading to national independence or neocolonialism during the decolonization movement that engulfed much of the world after WWII. In defence of the use of violence by colonized peoples, Fanon argued that human beings who are not considered as such (by the colonizer) shall not be bound by principles that apply to humanity in their attitude towards the colonizer. His book was censored by the French government.

Fanon made extensive trips across Algeria, mainly in the Kabyle region, to study the cultural and psychological life of Algerians. His lost study of "The marabout of Si Slimane" is an example. These trips were also a means for clandestine activities, notably in his visits to the ski resort of Chorea which hid an FLN base. By summer 1956 he wrote his "Letter of resignation to the Resident Minister" and made a clean break with his French assimilationist upbringing and education. He was expelled from Algeria in January 1957, and the "nest of fellag has [rebels]" at Blida hospital was dismantled.

Fanon left for France and travelled secretly to Tunis. He was part of the editorial collective of El Moud jahid, for which he wrote until the end of his life. He also served as Ambassador to Ghana for the Provisional Algerian Government (GPRA). He attended conferences in Accra, Conakry, Addis Ababa, Leopoldville, Cairo and Tripoli. Many of his shorter writings from this period were collected posthumously in the book Toward the African Revolution. In this book Fanon reveals war tactical strategies; in one chapter he discusses how to open a southern front to the war and how to run the supply lines.

4.2.4   Death

On his return to Tunis, after his exhausting trip across the Sahara to open a Third Front, Fanon was diagnosed with leukemia. He went to the Soviet Union for treatment and experienced some remission of his illness. On his return to Tunis he dictated his testament The Wretched of the Earth. When he was not confined to his bed, he delivered lectures to ALN (Armée de Libération Nationale) officers at Ghardimao on the Algero-Tunisian border. He made a final visit to Sartre in Rome. In 1961 the CIA arranged a trip to the U.S. for further leukemia treatment.

He died in Bethesda, Maryland, on 6 December 1961, under the name of Ibrahim Fanon. He was buried in Algeria, after lying in state in Tunisia. Later his body was moved to a martyrs' (chouhada) graveyard at Ain Kerma in eastern Algeria. Frantz Fanon was survived by his French wife Josie (née Dublé), their son Olivier Fanon, and his daughter (from a previous relationship) Mireille Fanon-Mendès France. Josie took her own life in Algiers in 1989. Mireille became a professor at Paris Descartes University and a visiting professor at the University of California, Berkeley, in international law and conflict resolution. She has also worked for UNESCO and the French National Assembly, and she serves as president of the Frantz Fanon Foundation. Olivier married Valérie Fanon-Raspail, who manages the Fanon website.

4.3 WORKS

Although Fanon wrote Black Skin, White Masks while still in France, most of his work was written in North Africa. It was during this time that he produced works such as L'An Cinq, de la Révolution Algérienne in 1959 (Year Five of the Algerian Revolution, later republished as Sociology of a Revolution and later still as A Dying Colonialism).

Fanon's original title was "Reality of a Nation"; however, the publisher, François Maspero, refused to accept this title.

Fanon is best known for the classic analysis of colonialism and decolonization, The Wretched of the Earth. The Wretched of the Earth was first published in 1961 by Éditions Maspero, with a preface by Jean-Paul Sartre.[15] In it Fanon analyzes the role of class, race, national culture and violence in the struggle for national liberation. Both books established Fanon in the eyes of much of the Third World as the leading anti-colonial thinker of the 20th century.

Fanon's three books were supplemented by numerous psychiatry articles as well as radical critiques of French colonialism in journals such as Esprit and El Moudjahid.

The reception of his work has been affected by English translations which are recognized to contain numerous omissions and errors, while his unpublished work, including his doctoral thesis, has received little attention. As a result, Fanon has often been portrayed as an advocate of violence (it would be more accurate to characterize him as a dialectical opponent of nonviolence) and his ideas have been extremely oversimplified. This reductionist vision of Fanon's work ignores the subtlety of his understanding of the colonial system. For example, the fifth chapter of Black Skin, White Masks translates, literally, as "The Lived Experience of the Black" ("L'expérience vécue du Noir"), but Markmann's translation is "The

Fact of Blackness", which leaves out the massive influence of phenomenology on Fanon's early work.

For Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth, the colonizer's presence in Algeria is based on sheer military strength. Any resistance to this strength must also be of a violent nature because it is the only "language" the colonizer speaks. Thus, violent resistance is a necessity imposed by the colonists upon the colonized. The relevance of language and the reformation of discourse pervade much of his work, which is why it is so interdisciplinary, spanning psychiatric concerns to encompass politics, sociology, anthropology, linguistics and literature.

His participation in the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale from 1955 determined his audience as the Algerian colonized. It was to them that his final work, Les damnés de la terre (translated into English by Constance Farrington as The Wretched of the Earth) was directed. It constitutes a warning to the oppressed of the dangers they face in the whirlwind of decolonization and the transition to a neo-colonialist, globalized world.

4.4 INFLUENCES

Fanon was influenced by a variety of thinkers and intellectual traditions including Jean-Paul Sartre, Lacan, Négritude and Marxism. Aimé Césaire was a particularly significant influence in Fanon's life. Césaire, a leader of the Négritude movement, was teacher and mentor to Fanon on the island of Martinique. Fanon referred to Césaire's writings in his own work. He quoted, for example, his teacher at length in "The Lived Experience of the Black Man", a heavily anthologized essay from Black Skins, White Masks.

4.5 LEGACY

Fanon has had an influence on anti-colonial and national liberation movements. In particular, Les damnés de la terre was a major influence on the work of revolutionary leaders such as Ali Shariati in Iran, Steve Biko in South Africa, Malcolm X in the United States and Ernesto Che Guevara in Cuba. Of these only Guevara was primarily concerned with Fanon's theories on violence; for Shariati, Biko and also Guevara the main interest in Fanon was "the new man" and "black consciousness" respectively.

Bolivian indianist Fausto Reinaga also had some Fanon influence and he mentions The Wretched of the Earth in hismagnum opus La Revolución India, advocating for decolonisation of native South Americans from European influence.

Fanon's influence extended to the liberation movements of the Palestinians, the Tamils, African Americans and others. His work was a key influence on the Black Panther Party, particularly his ideas concerning nationalism, violence and the lumpen-proletariat. More recently, radical South African poor people's movements, such as Abahlali base Mjondolo (meaning 'people who live in shacks' in Zulu), have been influenced by Fanon's work. His work was a key influence on Brazilian educationist Paulo Freire, as well.

Fanon has also profoundly affected contemporary African literature. His work serves as an important theoretical gloss for writers including Ghana's Ayi Kwei Armah, Senegal's Ken Bugul and Ousmane Sembène, Zimbabwe's Tsitsi Dangarembga, and Kenya's Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o. Ngũgĩ goes so far to argue in Decolonizing the Mind (1992) that

it is "impossible to understand what informs African writing" without reading Fanon's Wretched of the Earth. Fanon has also influenced the formation in 2013 of a new South African political party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) by the former president of the ANC Youth League, Julius Malema.

The Caribbean Philosophical Association offers the Frantz Fanon Prize for work that furthers the decolonization and liberation of mankind. Fanon's writings on black sexuality in Black Skin, White Masks have garnered critical attention by a number of academics and queer theory scholars. Interrogating Fanon's perspective on the nature of black homosexuality and masculinity, queer theory academics have offered a variety of critical responses to Fanon's words, negotiating his position within postcolonial studies with his influence on the formation of contemporary black queer theory.

4.6 SUMMARY

In the colonial countries where a real struggle for freedom has taken place, where the blood of the people has flowed and where the length of the period of armed warfare has favored the backward surge of intellectuals toward bases grounded in the people, we can observe a genuine eradication of the superstructure built by these intellectuals from the bourgeois colonialist environment. The colonialist bourgeoisie, in its narcissistic dialogue, expounded by the members of its universities, had in fact deeply implanted in the minds of the colonized intellectual that the essential qualities remain eternal in spite of all the blunders men may make: the essential qualities of the West, of course. The native intellectual accepted the cogency of these ideas, and deep down in his brain you could always find a vigilant sentinel ready to defend the Greco-Latin pedestal. Now it so happens that during the straggle for liberation, at the moment that the native intellectual comes into touch again with his people, this artificial sentinel is turned into dust. All the Mediterranean values—the triumph of the human individual, of clarity, and of beauty—become lifeless, colorless knickknacks.

All those speeches seem like collections of dead words; those values which seemed to uplift the soul are revealed as worthless, simply because they have nothing to do with the concrete conflict in which the people is engaged.

History teaches us clearly that the battle against colonialism does not run straight away along the lines of nationalism. For a very long time the native devotes his energies to ending certain definite abuses: forced labor, corporal punishment, inequality of salaries, limitation of political rights, etc. This fight for democracy against the oppression of mankind will slowly leave the confusion of neo-liberal universalism to emerge, sometimes laboriously, as a claim to nationhood. It so happens that the unpreparedness of the educated classes, the lack of practical links between them and the mass of the people, their laziness, and, let it be said, their cowardice at the decisive moment of the struggle will give rise to tragic mishaps.

National consciousness, instead of being the all-embracing crystallization of the innermost hopes of the whole people, instead of being the immediate and most obvious result of the mobilization of the people, will be in any case only an empty shell, a crude and fragile travesty of what it might have been. The faults that we find in it are quite sufficient explanation of the facility with which, when dealing with young and independent nations, the nation is passed over for the race, and the tribe is preferred to the state. These are the cracks in the edifice which show the process of retrogression that is so harmful and prejudicial to national effort and national unity. We shall see that such retrograde steps with all the

weaknesses and serious dangers that they entail are the historical result of the incapacity of the national middle class to rationalize popular action, that is to say their incapacity to see into the reasons for that action.

This traditional weakness, which is almost congenital to the national consciousness of underdeveloped countries, is not solely the result of the mutilation of the colonized people by the colonial regime. It is also the result of the intellectual laziness of the national middle class, of its spiritual penury, and of the profoundly cosmopolitan mold that its mind is set in.

The national middle class who takes over power at the end of the colonial regime is an underdeveloped middle class. It has practically no economic power, and in any case it is in no way commensurate with the bourgeoisie of the mother country which it hopes to replace. In its narcissism, the national middle class is easily convinced that it can advantageously replace the middle class of the mother country. But that same independence which literally drives it into a corner will give rise within its ranks to catastrophic reactions, and will oblige it to send out frenzied appeals for help to the former mother country. The university and merchant classes which make up the most enlightened section of the new state are in fact characterized by the smallness of their number and their being concentrated in the capital, and the type of activities in which they are engaged: business, agriculture, and the liberal professions. Neither financiers nor industrial magnates are to be found within this national middle class.

The national bourgeoisie of underdeveloped countries is not engaged in production, nor in invention, nor building, nor labor; it is completely canalized into activities of the intermediary type. Its innermost vocation seems to be to keep in the running and to be part of the racket. The psychology of the national bourgeoisie is that of the businessman, not that of a captain of industry; and it is only too true that the greed of the settlers and the system of embargoes set up by colonialism have hardly left them any other choice. Under the colonial system, a middle class which accumulates capital is an impossible phenomenon. Now, precisely, it would seem that the historical vocation of an authentic national middle class in an underdeveloped country is to repudiate its own nature in so far it as it is bourgeois, that is to say in so far as it is the tool of capitalism, and to make itself the willing slave of that revolutionary capital which is the people.

In an underdeveloped country an authentic national middle class ought to consider as its bounden duty to betray the calling fate has marked out for it, and to put itself to school with the people: in other words to put at the people's disposal the intellectual and technical capital that it has snatched when going through the colonial universities. But unhappily we shall see that very often the national middle class does not follow this heroic, positive, fruitful, and just path; rather, it disappears with its soul set at peace into the shocking ways shocking because anti-national of a traditional bourgeoisie, of a bourgeoisie which is stupidly, contemptibly, cynically bourgeois.

Fanon shows clearly that this irrepressible violence is neither sound and fury, nor the resurrection of savage instincts, nor even the effect of resentment: it is man recreating himself. I think we understood this truth at one time, but we have forgotten it—that no gentleness can efface the marks of violence; only violence itself can destroy them. The native cures himself of colonial neurosis by thrusting out the settler through force of arms. When his rage boils over, he rediscovers his lost innocence and he comes to know himself in that he himself creates his self. Far removed from his war, we consider it as a triumph of barbarism; but of its own volition it achieves, slowly but surely, the emancipation of the rebel, for bit by

bit it destroys in him and around him the colonial gloom. Once begun, it is a war that gives no quarter. You may fear or be feared; that is to say, abandon yourself to the disassociations of a sham existence or conquer your birthright of unity. When the peasant takes a gun in his hands, the old myths grow dim and the prohibitions are one by one forgotten. The rebel's weapon is the proof of his humanity.

In Resistance in African Literature, Neil Lazarus suggested that one of Fanon's most telling theoretical contributions is his insistence on what he terms the "pitfalls of national consciousness." Nationalism, as Fanon argues in The Wretched of the Earth, often fails at achieving liberation across class boundaries because its aspirations are primarily those of the colonized bourgeoisie--a privileged middle class who perhaps seeks to defeat the prevailing colonial rule only to usurp its place of dominance and surveillance over the working-class "lumpenproletariat."

During the last century, the middle classes looked on the workers as covetous creatures, made lawless by their greedy desires; but they took care to include these great brutes in our own species, or at least they considered that they were free men—that is to say, free to sell their labor. In France, as in England, humanism claimed to be universal. In the case of forced labor, it is quite the contrary. There is no contract; moreover, there must be intimidation and thus oppression grows. Our soldiers overseas, rejecting the universalism of the mother country, apply the "numerous clauses" to the human race: since none may enslave, rob, or kill his fellow man without committing a crime, they lay down the principle that the native is not one of our fellow men. Our striking power has been given the mission of changing this abstract certainty into reality: the order is given to reduce the inhabitants of the annexed country to the level of superior monkeys in order to justify the settler's treatment of them as beasts of burden. Violence in the colonies does not only have for its aim the keeping of these enslaved men at arm's length; it seeks to dehumanize them.

Everything will be done to wipe out their traditions, to substitute our language for theirs and to destroy their culture without giving them ours. Sheer physical fatigue will stupefy them.

Starved and ill, if they have any spirit left, fear will finish the job; guns are leveled at the peasant; civilians come to take over his land and force him by dint of flogging to till the land for them. If he shows fight, the soldiers fire and he's a dead man; if he gives in, he degrades himself and he is no longer a man at all; shame and fear will split up his character and make his inmost self fall to pieces. The business is conducted with flying colors and by experts; the "psychological services" weren't established yesterday; nor was brainwashing.

And yet, in spite of all these efforts, their ends are nowhere achieved: neither in the Congo, where Negroes' hands were cut off, nor in Angola, where until very recently malcontents' lips were pierced in order to shut them with padlocks. I do not say that it is impossible to change a man into an animal: I simply say that you won't get there without weakening him considerably. Blows will never suffice; you have to push the starvation further, and that's the trouble with slavery.

A new generation came on the scene, which changed the issue. With unbelievable patience, its writers and poets tried to explain to us that our values and the true facts of their lives did not hang together, and that they could neither reject them completely nor yet assimilate them. By and large, what they were saying was this: "You are making us into

monstrosities; your humanism claims we are at one with the rest of humanity but your racist methods set us apart." Very much at our ease, we listened to them all; colonial administrators are not paid to read Hegel, and for that matter they do not read much of him, but they do not need a philosopher to tell them that uneasy consciences are caught up in their own contradictions.

They will not get anywhere; so, let us perpetuate their discomfort; nothing will come of it but talk. If they were, the experts told us, asking for anything at all precise in their wailing, it would be integration. Of course, there is no question of granting that; the system, which depends on overexploitation, as you know, would be ruined. But it's enough to hold the carrot in front of their noses, they'll gallop all right.

Fanon's work which predates poststructuralist understandings of deconstruction that emerged in the last 1960's nonetheless resembles Derrida's work in that it points out that the problems with characterizing colonialism as a binary opposition of colonizer and colonized.

Instead, as Fanon would suggest, colonialism may only be understood as a complicated network of complicities and internal power imbalances between factions within the broader categories of colonizer and colonized--not least, of course, the way in which nationalist leaders often replicate the systems of coercion and domination that shape colonial rule.

In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon blames the failings of nationalism on the "intellectual laziness of the middle class". The native bourgeoisie rises to power only insofar as it seeks to replicate the bourgeoisie of the "mother country" that sustains colonial rule. In the following passage, Fanon suggests that the opportunist native bourgeoisie mistakenly attempts to survey and control the colonized masses to the same extent as the colonial bourgeoisie it attempts to displace:

The national middle class who takes over power at the end of the colonial regime is an underdeveloped middle class. It has practically no economic power, and in any case it is in no way commensurate with the bourgeoisie of the mother country which it hopes to replace. In its narcissism, the national middle class is easily convinced that it can advantageously replace the middle class of the mother country. But that same independence which literally drives it into a corner will give rise within its ranks to catastrophic reactions, and will oblige it to send out frenzied appeals for help to the former mother country.

One consequence of the native bourgeoisie's economic dependence upon the colonial bourgeoisie is the problem of representation--specifically the relationship between leader and led that so often serves ironically as a synechdoche for the relationship between colonizer and colonized. Notice, in other words, how the power struggle ostensibly between colonized subjects and empire gets displaced upon power relationships within the colonized body politic itself! An important point of comparison here is C.L.R James, the Trinidadian Marxist whose The Black Jacobins documents the San Domingo revolution an entirely proletarian uprising that followed closely upon the French revolution at the end of the eighteenth century. Toussaint L'ouveture, the heroic leader of that path breaking model for Third World revolution, nonetheless encountered a post-independence questioning of his seemingly self-serving political ambitions and his inadequate consideration of the interests of the newly independent proletariat. In accordance with James, then, Fanon suggests in The Wretched of the Earth the ways in which intellectual leaders often betray the national working-class:

Before independence, the leader generally embodies the aspirations of the people for independence, political liberty, and national dignity. but as soon as independence is declared, far from embodying in concrete form the needs of the people in what touches bread, land, and the restoration of the country to the sacred hands of the people, the leader will reveal his inner purpose: to become the general president of that company of profiteers impatient for their returns which constitutes the national bourgeoisie.

The behavior of the national landed proprietors is practically identical with that of the middle classes of the towns. The big farmers have, as soon as independence is proclaimed, demanded the nationalization of agricultural production. Through manifold scheming practices they manage to make a clean sweep of the farms formerly owned by settlers, thus reinforcing their hold on the district. But they do not try to introduce new agricultural methods, or to farm more intensively, or to integrate their farming systems into a genuinely national economy.

In fact, the landed proprietors will insist that the state should give them a hundred times more facilities and privileges than were enjoyed by the foreign settlers in former times.

The exploitation of agricultural workers will be intensified and made legitimate. Using two or three slogans, these new colonists will demand an enormous amount of work from the agricultural laborers, in the name of the national effort of course. There will be no modernization of agriculture, no planning for development, and no initiative; for initiative throws these people into a panic since it implies a minimum of risk, and completely upsets the hesitant, prudent, landed bourgeoisie, which gradually slips more and more into the lines laid down by colonialism. In the districts where this is the case, the only efforts made to better things are due to the government; it orders them, encourages them, and finances them.

The landed bourgeoisie refuses to take the slightest risk, and remains opposed to any venture and to any hazard. It has no intention of building upon sand; it demands solid investments and quick returns. The enormous profits which it pockets, enormous if we take into account the national revenue, are never reinvested. The money-in-the-stocking mentality is dominant in the psychology of these landed proprietors. Sometimes, especially in the years immediately following independence, the bourgeoisie does not hesitate to invest in foreign banks the profits that it makes out of its native soil. On the other hand large sums are spent on display: on cars, country houses, and on all those things which have been justly described by economists as characterizing an underdeveloped bourgeoisie.

We have said that the native bourgeoisie which comes to power uses its class aggressiveness to corner the positions formerly kept for foreigners. On the morrow of independence, in fact, it violently attacks colonial personalities: barristers, traders, landed proprietors, doctors, and higher civil servants. It will fight to the bitter end against these people "who insult our dignity as a nation." It waves aloft the notion of the nationalization and Africanization of the ruling classes. The fact is that such action will become more and more tinged by racism, until the bourgeoisie bluntly puts the problem to the government by saying "We must have these posts." They will not stop their snarling until they have taken over everyone.

The working class of the towns, the masses of unemployed, the small artisans and craftsmen for their part line up behind this nationalist attitude; but in all justice let it be said, they only follow in the steps of their bourgeoisie. If the national bourgeoisie goes into

competition with the Europeans, the artisans and craftsmen start a fight against non-national Africans. In the Ivory Coast, the anti-Dahoman and anti-Voltaic troubles are in fact racial riots. The Dahoman and Voltaic peoples, who control the greater part of the petty trade, are, once independence is declared, the object of hostile manifestations on the part of the people of the Ivory Coast. From nationalism we have passed to ultra-nationalism, to chauvinism, and finally to racism. These foreigners are called on to leave; their shops are burned, their street stalls are wrecked, and in fact the government of the Ivory Coast commands them to go, thus giving their nationals satisfaction.

From time to time, however, the leader makes an effort; he speaks on the radio or makes a tour of the country to pacify the people, to calm them and bemuse them. The leader is all the more necessary in that there is no party. During the period of the struggle for independence there was one right enough, a party led by the present leader. But since then this party has sadly disintegrated; nothing is left but the shell of a party, the name, the emblem, and the motto. The living party, which ought to make possible the free exchange of ideas which have been elaborated according to the real needs of the mass of the people, has been transformed into a trade union of individual interests. Since the proclamation of independence the party no longer helps the people to set out its demands, to become more aware of its needs and better able to establish its power.

Today, the party's mission is to deliver to the people the instructions which issue from the summit. There no longer exists the fruitful give-and-take from the bottom to the top and from the top to the bottom which creates and guarantees democracy in a party. Quite on the contrary, the party has made itself into a screen between the masses and the leaders. There is no longer any party life, for the branches which were set up during the colonial period are today completely demobilized.

The observations that we have been able to make about the national bourgeoisie bring us to a conclusion which should cause no surprise. In underdeveloped countries, the bourgeoisie should not be allowed to find the conditions necessary for its existence and its growth. In other words, the combined effort of the masses led by a party and of intellectuals who are highly conscious and armed with revolutionary principles ought to bar the way to this useless and harmful middle class.

The theoretical question that for the last fifty years has been raised whenever the history of underdeveloped countries is under discussion whether or not the bourgeois phase can be skipped ought to be answered in the field of revolutionary action, and not by logic.

The bourgeois phase in underdeveloped countries can only justify itself in so far as the national bourgeoisie has sufficient economic and technical strength to build up a bourgeois society, to create the conditions necessary for the development of a large-scale proletariat, to mechanize agriculture, and finally to make possible the existence of an authentic national culture.

The struggle against the bourgeoisie of underdeveloped countries is far from being a theoretical one. It is not concerned with making out its condemnation as laid down by the judgment of history. The national bourgeoisie of underdeveloped countries must not be opposed because it threatens to slow down the total, harmonious development of the nation. It must simply be stoutly opposed because, literally, it is good for nothing.

The fact is that the settler wanted the native to be enthusiastic. By a sort of process of mystification which constitutes the most sublime type of separation from reality, he wanted to persuade the slave that the land that he worked belonged to him, that the mines where he lost his health were owned by him. The settler was singularly forgetful of the fact that he was growing rich through the death throes of the slave. In fact what the settler was saying to the native was "Kill yourself that I may become rich." Today, we must behave in a different fashion. We ought not to say to the people: "Kill yourselves that the country may become rich." If we want to increase the national revenue, and decrease the importing of certain products which are useless, or even harmful, if we want to increase agricultural production and overcome illiteracy, we must explain what we are about.

The people must understand what is at stake. Public business ought to be the business of the public. So the necessity of creating a large number of well-informed nuclei at the bottom crops up again. Too often, in fact, we are content to establish national organizations at the top and always in the capital: the Women's Union, the Young People's Federation, Trade Unions, etc. But if one takes the trouble to investigate what is behind the office in the capital, if you go into the inner room where the reports ought to be, you will be shocked by the emptiness, the blank spaces, and the bluff. There must be a basis; there must be cells that supply content and life. The masses should be able to meet together, discuss, propose, and receive directions.

The citizens should be able to speak, to express themselves, and to put forward new ideas. The branch meeting and the committee meeting are liturgical acts. They are privileged occasions given to a human being to listen and to speak. At each meeting, the brain increases its means of participation and the eye discovers a landscape more and more in keeping with human dignity.

4.7 CONCLUSION

The living expression of the nation is the moving consciousness of the whole of the people; it is the coherent, enlightened action of men and women. The collective building up of a destiny is the assumption of responsibility on the historical scale. Otherwise there is anarchy, repression, and the resurgence of tribal parties and federalism. The national government, if it wants to be national, ought to govern by the people and for the people, for the outcasts and by the outcasts. No leader, however valuable he may be, can substitute himself for the popular will; and the national government, before concerning itself about international prestige, ought first to give back their dignity to all citizens, fill their minds and feast their eyes with human things, and create a prospect that is human because conscious and sovereign men dwell therein.

4.8 SAMPLE QUESTIONS

1) Describe Fanon's anti-colonial and national liberation movements' views in 'The Pitfalls of National Consciousness'?

2) Colonialism is an unhealthy condition for the Nations, because it deprives of economic and social security, education, and a chance at a better life- Discuss?

4.9 GLOSSARY

1. Afford = have enough money
2. Blockade = barrier
3. Coercion = compulsion
4. Cogency = clarity, logic
5. Commensurate = proportionate
6. Dint = impression
7. Expound = explain
8. Flogging = beating
9. Frenzied = harried, confused
10. Garnered = collect
11. Knickknacks = ornaments
12. Monstrosity = atrocity
13. Narcissistic = self-absorbed
14. Pervade = pass through
15. Prejudicial = harmful
16. Proletariat = waged people
17. Retrograde = traditional
18. Sustain = maintain

Dr. Janaiah Saggurthi

EDWARD WADIE SAID : ORIENTALISM (INTRODUCTION)

OBJECTIVE

The objective of the lesson is
- To understand the contribution of Edward Said to the emergence of Post Colonial Theory
- To study Orientalism
- To deduce the Psychological imperialism in the western thought

STRUCTURE

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Orientalism is a 1978 book by Edward W. Said, a critical study of the cultural representations that are the bases of Orientalism, the West's patronizing perceptions and fictional depictions of "The East" — the societies and peoples who inhabit the places of Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East. Orientalism, Western scholarship about the Eastern World, was and remains inextricably tied to the imperialist societies who produced it, which makes much Orientalist work inherently political and servile to power, and thus intellectually suspect.

In the Middle East, the social, economic, and cultural practices of the ruling Arab élites indicate they are imperial satraps who have internalized the romanticized "Arab Culture" created by British and American Orientalists; the examples include critical analyses of the colonial literature of Joseph Conrad, which conflates a people, a time, and a place into a narrative of incident and adventure in an exotic land.

The critical application of post-structuralism in the scholarship of Orientalism influenced the development of literary theory, cultural criticism, and the field of Middle Eastern studies, especially regarding how academics practice their intellectual enquiry when examining, describing, and explaining the Middle East. The scope of Said's scholarship

established Orientalism as a foundation text in the field of Post-colonial Culture Studies, which examines the denotations and connotations of Orientalism, and the history of a country's post-colonial period.

As a public intellectual, Edward Said debated Orientalism with historians and scholars of area studies, notably, the Orientalist and historian Bernard Lewis, who said that the thesis of Orientalism was "anti–Western". For subsequent editions of Orientalism, Said wrote an "Afterword" (1995) and a "Preface" (2003) addressing criticisms of the content, substance, and style of the work as cultural criticism.

5.2 AUTHORS BIOGRAPHY

Edward Wadie Said (1 November 1935 – 25 September 2003) was a Palestinian literary theoretician, professor of English, history and comparative literature at Columbia University, and a public intellectual who was a founder of post-colonial studies. A Palestinian Arab born in Jerusalem in the days of Mandatory Palestine, Edward W. Said was an American citizen by way of his father, Wadir Said, a U.S. Army-veteran of the First World War; having moved from Jerusalem as a young boy, Said would later advocate for the political and human rights of the Palestinian people.

As a cultural critic, Said is known for his 1978 book *Orientalism*, a critical analysis of the culturally inaccurate representations that are the bases of Orientalism the Western study of the Eastern world that presents how Westerners perceive and represent Orientals.

Said argued that because Orientalist scholarship was and remains inextricably tied to the imperialist societies that produced it, much of the work is inherently political and servile to power, and so is intellectually suspect. The thesis of *Orientalism* is the politics of discourse applied to the Middle East, namely that the Orientalist discourse arises from a particular culture defined by the presuppositions of that political culture which, in turn, shape the political culture and the political culture of the subject area.

The analytical model of *Orientalism* much influenced the humanities (e.g., literary theory and literary criticism)[11] and especially the field of Middle Eastern studies, where it transformed the academic discourse of the researchers how they examine, describe and define the cultures of the Middle East. Some academic historians disagreed with his thesis, especially the Anglo–American Orientalist and historian Bernard Lewis. *Orientalism* derived from Said's knowledge of colonial literature (such as that of Joseph Conrad), the literary theories of R. P. Blackmur and Raymond Williams, the post- structuralist theories of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, and the critical works of Giambattista Vico, Antonio Gramsci and Theodor Adorno. Educated in the Western canon at a British school in Egypt and in the U.S., Said wrote in his autobiography *Out of Place*(1999) that he applied his education and cultural heritages to narrowing the perceptual gaps of political and cultural understanding between The West and the Middle East, improving Western understanding of the conflict telling how a decade-long membership in the Palestinian National Council made him a controversial public intellectual.

Drawing from the experiences of his family as Palestinian Christians in the Middle East at the time of the establishment of the State of Israel, Said argued for the establishment of a Palestinian state to ensure equal political and human rights for the Palestinians in Israel, including the right of return, by way of U.S. political pressure upon Israel to recognize, grant

and respect human rights. In that vein, Said also criticized the political and cultural policies of the Arab and Muslim regimes who acted against the national interests of their peoples.

Edward Said died of leukemia in late September 2003, yet remained intellectually active late in life. In a September 2001 interview, Said summarized his oppositional role to the *status quo*, the remit of which is "to sift, to judge, to criticize, to choose, so that choice and agency return to the individual." He stated his ideal community does not exalt "commodified interests and profitable commercial goals", but values "survivability and sustainability in a human and decent way", while acknowledging that "those are difficult goals to achieve. But I think they are achievable."

5.3 WHAT IS ORIENTALISM?

According to historian Edward Said (pronounced 'Sai-eeed'), your whole approach is *biased*. After all, the Middle East built many of castles and actually surpassed Europe in every intellectual field, yet most Westerners immediately go to tamed monkeys and belly dancers. This bias was called *Orientalism* by Said in a book of the same name, and would be figuratively earth-shattering in the fields that studied anything related to the Middle East, and, to a lesser degree, South Asia.

5.4 INFLUENCE OF ORIENTALISM

5.4.1 Post-colonial Culture Studies

As a work of cultural criticism, Orientalism (1978) is the foundation document of the field of Post-colonialism, because the thesis proved historically factual, true, and accurate for the periods studied; and for the How? and the Why? of the cultural representations of "Orientals", "The Orient", and "The Eastern world" as presented in the mass communications media of the Western world.

Post-colonial theory studies the power and the continued dominance of Western ways of intellectual enquiry and the production of knowledge in the academic, intellectual, and cultural spheres of the de- colonised country. Said's survey concentrated upon the British and the French varieties of Orientalism that supported the British Empire and the French Empire as commercial enterprises constructed from colonialism, and gave perfunctory coverage, discussion, and analyses of German Orientalist scholarship. Such disproportional investigation provoked criticism from opponents and embarrassment for supporters; in the magazine article "Orientalism Reconsidered" (1985), Said said that no-one opponent provided a rationale, by which limited coverage of German Orientalism limits either the scholarly value or the practical application of Orientalism as cultural study. In the Afterword to the 1995 edition of Orientalism, Said presented follow-up refutations of the criticisms that the Orientalist and historian Bernard Lewis made against the book's first edition (1978).

5.4.2 Literary Criticism

In the fields of literary criticism and of cultural studies, the notable Indian scholars of post-colonialism were Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics, 1987) whose essay Can the Subaltern Speak? (1988) also became a foundation text of Post-colonial culture stuies, Homi K. Bhabha (Nation and Narration, 1990), Ronald Inden (Imagining India, 1990), Gyan Prakash ("Writing Post–Orientalist Histories of the Third World: Perspectives from Indian Historiography", 1990), Nicholas Dirks(Castes of

Mind, 2001), and Hamid Dabashi (Iran: A People Interrupted, 2007). In White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (1990), Robert J. C. Young reported Post-colonial explanations of the "How?" and the "Why?" of the nature of the post-colonial world, the peoples, and their discontents; which verify the efficacy of the critical method applied in Orientalism (1978), especially in the field of Middle Eastern studies.

In the late 1970s, the survey range of Orientalism (1978) did not include the genre of Orientalist painting or any other visual arts, despite the book-cover featuring a detail-image of The Snake Charmer (1880), a popular, 19th-century Orientalist painting to which the writer Linda Nochlin applied Said's method of critical analysis "with uneven results". In the field of epistemological studies, Orientalism is an extended application of methods of critical analysis developed by the philosopher Michel Foucault. The anthropologist Talal Asad said that the book Orientalism is: not only a catalogue of Western prejudices about and misrepresentations of Arabs and Muslims" [but an investigation and analysis of the] authoritative structure of Orientalist discourse the closed, self-evident, self-confirming character of that distinctive discourse, which is reproduced, again and again, through scholarly texts, travelogues, literary works of imagination, and the obiter dicta of public men-of-affairs.

The historian Gyan Prakash said that Orientalism describes how "the hallowed image of the Orientalist, as an austere figure, unconcerned with the world and immersed in the mystery of foreign scripts and languages, has acquired a dark hue as the murky business of ruling other peoples, now forms the essential and enabling background of his or her scholarship" about the Orient; without colonial imperialism, there would be no Orientalism.

5.4.3   Oriental Europe

In Eastern Europe, Milica Bakić-Hayden developed the concept of Nesting Orientalisms (1992), based upon and derived from the work of the historian Larry Wolff (Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment, 1994), and the ideas Said presented in Orientalism (1978). The Bulgarian historian Maria Todorova (Imagining the Balkans, 1997) presented her ethnologic concept of Nesting Balkanisms (Ethnologia Balkanica,1997), which is a thematically extended and theoretically derived from Milica Bakić-Hayden's concept of Nesting Orientalisms. In the article "A Stereotype, Wrapped in a Cliché, inside a Caricature: Russian Foreign Policy and Orientalism" (2010), James D. J. Brown said that stereotyped, Western representations of Russia, derive from the literature of "Russian studies", which is not much afflicted with misconceptions of Russia-as-the-Other, but does display the characteristics of Orientalism the exaggeration of difference, the presumption of Western superiority, and the application of clichéd analytical models. That overcoming such intellectual malaise requires that scholars choose to break free of their 'mind-forg′d manacles' and reflect deeply upon the basic assumptions of their scholarship.

5.5 POLITICS

After the 1967 Six Day War, Said entered the public sphere to counter what he perceived as the stereotyped misrepresentations in which the U.S. news media explained the Arab–Israeli wars; he claimed this reportage was divorced from the historical realities of the Middle East, in general, and Palestine and Israel, in particular. To address, explain, and correct the issue, Said published "The Arab Portrayed" in 1968, a descriptive essay about

images of "the Arab" that are meant to evade specific discussion of the historical and cultural realities of the peoples who live in the Middle East, featured in journalism and scholarship.

In the essay "Zionism from the Standpoint of its Victims" (1979), Said argued in favour of the political legitimacy and philosophic authenticity of the Zionist claims and right to a Jewish homeland; and for the inherent right of national self-determination of the Palestinian people. Said's books about Israel and Palestine include *The Question of Palestine* (1979), *The Politics of Dispossession* (1994), and *The End of the Peace Process* (2000).

In 1985, Said suffered personal consequences for his political activism when the Jewish Defense League (JDL) traduced Said's public statements about the state and nature of Arab–Israeli relations, and officially said that Said was a Nazi, because of his anti–Zionism statements, which the JDL viewed as anti-Semitism; an arsonist set fire to his office at Columbia University, and he and his family were continually subjected to intimidations and "innumerable death threats".

5.6 PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL

From 1977 until 1991, Said was an independent member of the Palestinian National Council (PNC). In 1988, he was a proponent of the two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (1948), and voted for the establishment of the State of Palestine at a meeting of the Palestinian National Council meeting in Algiers. In 1993, Said quit his membership to the Palestinian National Council, to protest the internal politics that lead to the signing of the Oslo Accords (Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, 1993), because he thought the accord terms unacceptable, and because they had been rejected by the Madrid Conference of 1991 Said was displeased that the Oslo Accords would not produce an independent Palestine, and that they were politically inferior to a plan that Yasir Arafat had rejected a plan which Said had presented to Arafat on behalf of the U.S. government in the late 1970s.

Especially troublesome to Said was his belief that Yasir Arafat had betrayed the right of return of the Palestinian refugees to their houses and properties in the Green Line territories of pre–1967 Israel, and that Arafat ignored the growing political threat of the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories that had been established since the conquest of Palestine in 1967. By 1995, in response to Said's political criticisms, the Palestinian Authority (PA) banned the sale of Said's books; however, the PA lifted the book-ban when Said publicly praised Yasir Arafat for rejecting Prime Minister Ehud Barak's offers at the Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David (2000) in the U.S.

In the mid-1990s, Said wrote the Foreword to the history book *Jewish History, Jewish Religion: The Weight of Three Thousand Years* (1994), by Israel Shahak, which presents the cultural proposition that Israel's mistreatment of the Palestinians is rooted in a Judaic requirement (of permission) for Jews to commit crimes, including murder, against Gentiles (non-Jews). In his Foreword, Said said that *Jewish History, Jewish Religion* is "nothing less than a concise history of classic and modern Judaism, insofar as these are relevant to the understanding of modern Israel"; and praised the historian Shahak for describing contemporary Israel as a nation subsumed in a "Judeo–Nazi" cultural ambience that allowed the dehumanization of the Palestinian Other:

In all my works, I remained fundamentally critical of a gloating and uncritical nationalism. My view of Palestine remains the same today: I expressed all sorts of reservations about the insouciant nativism, and militant militarism of the nationalist consensus; I suggested, instead, a critical look at the Arab environment, Palestinian history, and the Israeli realities, with the explicit conclusion that only a negotiated settlement, between the two communities of suffering, Arab and Jewish, would provide respite from the unending war.   — *"Orientalism: an Afterword" (Raritan, Winter 1995)*

In 1998, Said made *In Search of Palestine* (1998), a BBC documentary film about Palestine past and Palestine present, in which he returned to the country from which he had emigrated to the U.S. in 1947. In the company of his son, Wadie, Said revisited his places of boyhood, and confronted the Israeli injustices (social and cultural) meted out to ordinary Palestinians in the contemporary West Bank. Despite the social and cultural prestige usual to BBC cinema products in the U.S., the documentary was never broadcast by any American television company.

5.7 MUSIC

Besides having been a public intellectual, Edward Said was an accomplished pianist, worked as the music critic for *The Nation* magazine, and wrote four books about music: *Musical Elaborations* (1991); *Parallels and Paradoxes: Explorations in Music and Society* (2002), with Daniel Barenboim as co-author; *On Late Style: Music and Literature Against the Grain* (2006); and *Music at the Limits* (2007) in which final tome he spoke of finding musical reflections of his literary and historical ideas in bold compositions and strong performances.

Elsewhere in the musical world, the composer Mohammed Fairouz acknowledged the deep influence of Edward Said upon his works; compositionally, Fairouz's *First Symphony* thematically alludes to the essay "Homage to a Belly-Dancer" (1990), about Tahia Carioca, the Egyptian terpsichorean, actress, and political militant; and a piano sonata titled R*eflections on Exile* (1984),which thematically refers to the emotions inherent to being an exile.

In 1999, Edward W. Said and Daniel Barenboim co-founded the West-Eastern Divan Orchestra, which is composed of young Israeli, Palestinian, and Arab musicians. They also established The Barenboim–Said Foundation in Seville, to develop education-through-music projects. Besides managing the West–Eastern Divan Orchestra, the Barenboim–Said Foundation assists with the administration of the Academy of Orchestral Studies, the Musical Education in Palestine Project, and the Early Childhood Musical Education Project,in Seville.

5.8 OVER VIEW

Orientalism is the source of the inaccurate, cultural representations that are the foundations of Western thought and perception of the Eastern world, specifically about the region of the Middle East. The principal characteristic of Orientalism is a "subtle and persistent Eurocentric prejudice against Arab–Islamic peoples and their culture", which prejudice derives from Western images (representations) that reduce the Orient to the fictional essences of "Oriental peoples" and "the places of the Orient"; such cultural representations dominate the communications (discourse) of Western peoples with non–Western peoples.

In practice, the imperial and colonial enterprises of the West are facilitated by collaborating régimes of Europeanized Arab élites who have internalized the fictional, romanticized representations of Arabic culture the Orientalism invented by Anglo–American Orientalists. As such, Orientalist stereotypes of the cultures of the Eastern world have served, and continue to serve, as implicit justifications for the colonial ambitions and the imperial endeavours of the U.S. and the European powers. In that vein, about contemporary Orientalist stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims, Said :

So far as the United States seems to be concerned, it is only a slight overstatement to say that Moslems and Arabs are essentially seen as either oil suppliers or potential terrorists.

Very little of the detail, the human density, the passion of Arab–Moslem life has entered the awareness of even those people whose profession it is to report the Arab world. What we have, instead, is a series of crude, essentialized caricatures of the Islamic world, presented in such a way as to make that world vulnerable to military aggression.

The thesis of Orientalism (1978) proposes that much of the Western study of Islamic civilization was an exercise in political intellectualism; a psychological exercise in the self-affirmation of "European identity"; not an objective exercise of intellectual enquiry and the academic study of Eastern cultures. Therefore, Orientalism was a method of practical and cultural discrimination that was applied to non-European societies and peoples in order to establish European imperial domination. In justification of empire, the Orientalist claims to know more essential and definitive knowledge about the Orient than do the Orientals. That Western writings about the Orient, the perceptions of the East presented in Orientalism, cannot be taken at face value, because they are cultural representations based upon fictional, Western images of the Orient. That the history of European colonial rule and political domination of Eastern civilizations, distorts the intellectual objectivity of even the most knowledgeable, well-meaning, and culturally sympathetic Western Orientalist; thus did the term "Orientalism" become a pejorative word regarding non–Western peoples and cultures:

I doubt if it is controversial, for example, to say that an Englishman in India, or Egypt, in the later nineteenth century, took an interest in those countries, which was never far from their status, in his mind, as British colonies. To say this may seem quite different from saying that all academic knowledge about India and Egypt is somehow tinged and impressed with, violated by, the gross political fact and yet that is what I am saying in this study of Orientalism.

Said that the Western world dominated the Eastern world for more than 2,000 years, since Classical antiquity (8th c. BC – AD 6th c.), the time of the play The Persians (472 BC), by Aeschylus, which celebrates a Greek victory (Battle of Salamis, 480 BC) against the Persians in the course of the Persian Wars (499–449 BC) imperial conflict between the Greek West and the Persian East. Europe's long, military domination of Asia (empire and hegemony) made unreliable most Western texts about the Eastern world, because of the implicit cultural bias that permeates most Orientalism, which was not recognized by most Western scholars. In the course of empire, after the physical-and-political conquest, there followed intellectual conquest of a people, whereby Western scholars appropriated for themselves (as European intellectual property) the interpretation and translation of Oriental languages, and the critical study of the cultures and histories of the Oriental world. In that way, by using Orientalism as the intellectual norm for cultural judgement, Europeans wrote the history of Asia, and invented the "exotic East" and the "inscrutable Orient", which are

cultural representations of peoples and things considered inferior to the peoples and things of the West.

The thesis of Orientalism concluded that "Western knowledge of the Eastern world", i.e. Orientalism, fictionally depicts the Orient as an irrational, weak, and feminized, non-European Other, which is negatively contrasted with the rational, strong, and masculine West.

Such a binary relation, in a hierarchy of weakness and strength, derives from the European psychological need to create a difference of cultural inequality, between West and East, which is attributable to "immutable cultural essences" inherent to Oriental peoples and things. The binary relationship of strong-West-and-weak-East reinforces the cultural stereotypes invented with literary, cultural, and historical texts that are more fictitious than factual, which give the reader of Orientalist texts (history, travelogue, anthropology, etc.) a limited understanding of life in the Middle East, because Orientalism conflates the different societies of the Eastern world, into the homogeneous world of "the Orient".

The greatest intellectual impact of Orientalism (1978) was upon the fields of literary theory, cultural studies, and human geography, by way of which originated the field of Post-colonial studies. Edward Said's method of post- structuralist analysis derived from the analytic techniques of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault; and the perspectives to Orientalism presented by Abdul Latif Tibawi, Anouar Abdel-Malek, Maxime Rodinson, and Richard William Southern.

The historical impact of Orientalism (1978) was in explaining the How? and the Why? of imperial impotence, because, in the late 1970s, to journalists, academics, and Orientalists, the Yom Kippur war (6–25 October 1973) and the OPEC petroleum embargo (October 1973 – March 1974) were recent modern history. The Western world had been surprised, by the pro-active and decisive actions of non–Western peoples, whom the ideology of Orientalism had defined as weak societies and impotent countries; the geopolitical reality of their actions, of military and economic warfare, voided the fictional nature of Orientalist representations, attitudes, and opinions about the non-Western Other self

5.9 COMPLETE SUMMARY ON ORIENTALISM

In his introduction to the term "Orientalism," Edward Said begins by paraphrasing the writing of a French journalist's view of the present-day Orient in order to express the major common Western misconception about the East. This misconception exists in the Western mind, according to Said, as if it were irrelevant that the Orient itself was actually sociologically affected. He then goes on to describe the basis of Orientalism, as it is rooted in the Western consciousness.

Said uses the phrase "The Other" to describe the Western fascination with the Orient. This is a reference to Jacques Lacan's terminology, which describes the mirror stage of development. This is the stage in growth during which children supposedly learn their own identity by successfully separating their own being from a mirror image of themselves. In this context, someone only finds an idea of themselves through a contrast with an "Other." It is in this circumstance that our desires and expectations of being complete are projected onto this entity. This is a fitting comparison to Said's topic, considering the emphasis he puts on "the Orient's special place in the Western experience." Said suggests that the Orient does not mean the same to American as it does to the European countries, which fits logically into the equation (Europe as the analog of the child that derives its feeling of self from an "Other").

This makes historical sense, since the Orient was adjacent to Europe's earliest civilizations and the cultural exchange has always existed.

The first designation Said uses for the topic is the academic interpretation. He lends this to the field of work of anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient. This definition is generally too indistinct as compared to the introductory designation. Although it incorporates the multiple discourses of knowledge, it fails to distinguish the Orient as existing comparatively instead of just being the subject of examination. The second definition draws attention to this distinction and clarifies Orientalism, while also extending its breadth to all that is not considered West (The Middle East, India, Russia, etc.). Said notes that there has been a fair amount of interchange over the last few centuries over these two theoretical fields of coming to terms with the Orient. Said then proposes a third definition of Orientalism, using an analysis substantially more applicable in the historical context. Orientalism as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient, as the Western authority has done. He professes to be motivated here by Foucault's notion of a discourse. Michel Foucault's theories that have come to bear on this discussion are his ideas of the critical relationship under which the ontology of subject and object come to be known and how these associations may come to constitute knowledge.

According to Foucault, the problem is not isolating any empirical conditions that may bring about this subjectivity, but to determine what the subject is and to what conditions it is subject. Said's application of this theory fits his third definition well, and provides a strong platform for the rest of his argument. The Orient has, for much of history, been the active object to the European missionary and scientist positions. He then lists his findings about the recent history of the Orient's relationship with the West. Said suggests that the balance of power from Franco-British involvement to a largely American involvement has not had so great an effect Orientalism as would be expected. This is because the Orient is not nearly as sterile as effective Western domination would bring about; it is a thriving entity just like those cultures that have power over it. Additionally, his observations make sense in the scope of colonialism, since certain sections of the Orient have been excluded from the whole at certain times (The Middle East or India).

In his qualifications for interpreting Orientalism, Said includes several points of interest and clarification. He agrees with Disraeli, in saying that the East is more than just an idea with no corresponding reality. In fact, this is concurrent with the fact that many Western scholars have dedicated their entire lives to studying the Orient. Secondly, Said reinforces that it is irresponsible to discount the control that the West exercised over these societies. The study of Orientalism could not exist had the East not been the victim of Western power and domination. Next, Said differentiates between the types of society and how cultural influence is derived. He cites Antonio Gramsci as distinguishing between civil and political society, and the different configurations and responsibilities therein. According to Gramsci, a political society is one in which the citizen is directly dominated and imposed on by the state, who create and maintain the social institutions. Civil society, however, is made up of citizens voluntarily affiliating themselves with certain social responsibilities. Only under this type of society does the derivation of cultural enterprise instantiate itself.

Gramsci's main argument as that in any form of society that is not totalitarian, certain types of culture will thrive. It is this societal happening that he calls hegemony, which Said explains is the phenomenon that necessitates interest in cultural 'otherness' such as Orientalism. After listing the three aspects of his contemporary reality, Said discusses and attempts to address three realities that would bring the puzzle of Orientalism closer to a

solution. In differentiating between pure and political knowledge, he mentions the difficulty of distrusting political knowledge in the realm of a subject that is so interconnected with politics and international awareness. It seems to come through in the writing that Said is finding it hard to address a problem that is so deeply involved in imperialism, yet not trustworthy of political knowledge. This sharp paradox problematizes his attempt to understand Orientalism in its historical situation.

The second step is the proposition of his methodological devices, which are in answer to the evident absence of the "problematic" in this study. Said uses these devices to examine the authority that is descriptive of the West's relationship with the Orient. The first device is strategic location, which describes an author's position in his study with regard to the Orient.

Every person who writes about the Orient must associate themselves with either the Orient or the West (Their strategic location), therefore adding certain connotations and themes to their interpretations. Strategic formation, the second device, incorporates the study of the Orient and the way in which different intellectual standpoints gain acceptance and credibility. Just as everyone must be either associated with the West or the East, anyone who considers the Orient in their thoughts must create a basis for whatever argument or position they assume. The intellectual basis of their position is composed of referential knowledge that relates to other works (Their strategic formation). At the end of this section, he reminds the reader that information that is popularly disseminated by a culture is only a representation of truth, not reality itself. He uses this clarification to elucidate the use of language as being culturally, not universally, expressive.

The final reality that must be addressed to bring a greater understanding of Orientalism is what Said calls the personal dimension. He quotes Gramsci as saying "The starting point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and knowing thyself." This quote applies directly to the subject matter at hand, and also to Said's analysis of it. He mentions his upbringing, the pertinence of which relates back to the aforementioned methodological devices considering his particular background and previous knowledge of those who are involved in the Orient. Some elements of his personal reflection on Orientalism are the long history of prejudice against people of Arab and Islamic descent, the struggle between the Arabs and the Israelis, and its effects on American population. The one-sidedness of this struggle has to do mainly with the largely liberal American identification with Zionism and the reinforcement of stereotypes of the Orient in the electronic and popular media.

In his concluding remarks, Said delves further into the reasoning behind the futility of a positive view of Arab life in the West. His remaining comments include that his experiences as a person of Arab descent are what motivated him to write about Orientalism in the first place. For someone who is so directly and negatively affected by Western perceptions of the Arab world and the Orient altogether, his analysis is a fairly objective and sophisticated view of Orientalism. Perhaps it is because of his experiences with lifelong stereotypes and the apparent dichotomy of Western and Eastern approaches to the subject.

His final comment is somewhat of a plea to the reader in the hopes that if a greater understanding of the topic is derived from reading, then an unlearning of the processes of cultural domination can conceivably begin.

5.10 CONCLUSION

Edward Said was proud of the achievements of those from the lands of his ancestors, and felt that while it was bad enough for the everyday person in the West to think of belly dancers and squeaking monkeys when they thought of places like Baghdad or Cairo, it was a completely different thing for the so-called experts to have any of that in their mind. Said never denied that those things existed, but instead argued that too much of a big deal was made about them.

The thing that Said was able to point out was that the West was sneaky about how it poked at these institutions. Whereas a European king who spent too much time partying might be portrayed as having too many mistresses, an Ottoman or Arab ruler was accused of spending too much time in the harem.*The word difference is very subtle*, but Said posits that it carries very big connotations. One invokes the idea that the king is discreet, whereas we get the image of the Ottoman or Arab ruler being fed grapes by hand while being waved with giant ostrich feathers.

Yet the real danger was not just that it was outsiders who were starting to think this way. The elites of Middle Eastern society tended to read English, German, and French texts to learn about their pasts, so now their perceptions were being affected by these biases. In short, the most powerful people in the Middle East were starting to think that their ancestors were something to be ashamed of, despite the overwhelming evidence around them! Said knew that for the rising power of Arab nationalism to be successful, people would have to be able to reach back and be proud of what they found.

5.11 GLOSSARY

1. Castle = stronghold
2. Consensus = harmony
3. Despotism = dictatorship
4. Derivation = origin
5. Disseminated = spread
6. Elucidate = make clear
7. Excluded = barred
8. Hegemony =supremacy, domination
9. Inaccurate = inexact
10. Misconception = false impression
11. Moderate = reasonable
12. Orient = familiarize
13. Proponent = supporter
14. Squeak = cry
15. Substantially = significantly, considerably
16. Territories = regions

5.12   SAMPLE QUESTIONS

1) What is Orientalism? The historical impact of Orientalism?
2) Said identifies a series of assumptions that are made by the West about the Orient- Explain?

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LESSON 6
JACQUES DERRIDA: STRUCTURE SIGN AND PLAY IN THE DISCOURSE OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (PART-1)

OBJECTIVE

In this lesson students study the life and works of Jacques Derrida and look in detail. Pupils can see how Jacques Derrida developed his own unique, spare and clean style in Literature.

STRUCTURE

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Jacques Derrida (July 15, 1930 – October 8, 2004) was an Algerian-born French philosopher, known as the founder of deconstruction. His voluminous work has had a profound impact upon literary theory and continental philosophy. His best known work is Of Grammatology. His parents named him Jackie, supposedly after a Hollywood actor, though he would later adopt a more "correct" version of his first name when he moved to Paris. His youth was spent in El-Biar, Algeria.

6.2 EARLY WORKS

At the very beginning of his philosophical career Derrida was concerned to elaborate a critique of the limits of phenomenology. His first lengthy academic manuscript, written as a dissertation for his diplôme d'études supérieures and submitted in 1954, concerned the work of Edmund Husserl. In 1962 he published Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, which contained his own translation of Husserl's essay. Many elements of Derrida's thought were already present in this work. In the interviews collected in Positions (1972), Derrida said: "In this essay the problematic of writing was already in place as such, bound to the irreducible structure of 'deferral' in its relationships to consciousness, presence, science, history and the history of science, the disappearance or delay of the origin, etc. this essay can be read as the other side (recto or verso, as you wish) of Speech and Phenomena."

Derrida first received major attention outside France with his lecture, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," delivered at Johns Hopkins University in 1966 (and subsequently included in Writing and Difference). The conference at which this paper was delivered was concerned with structuralism, then at the peak of its influence in France, but only beginning to gain attention in the United States. Derrida differed from other participants by his lack of explicit commitment to structuralism, having already been critical of the movement. He praised the accomplishments of structuralism but also maintained reservations about its internal limitations, thus leading to the notion that his thought was a form of post-structuralism. Near the beginning of the essay, Derrida argued:

…the entire history of the concept of structure, before the rupture of which we are speaking, must be thought of as a series of substitutions of centre for centre, as a linked chain of determinations of the centre. Successively, and in a regulated fashion, the centre receives different forms or names. The history of metaphysics, like the history of the West, is the history of these metaphors and metonymies. Its matrix is the determination of Being as presence in all senses of this word. It could be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the centre have always designated an invariable presence – eidos, archē, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject), alētheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and so forth.

6.3 STRUCTURE, SIGN AND PLAY" IN WRITING AND DIFFERENCE

The effect of Derrida's paper was such that by the time the conference proceedings were published in 1970, the title of the collection had become The Structuralist Controversy. The conference was also where he met Paul de Man, who would be a close friend and source of great controversy, as well as where he first met the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, with whose work Derrida enjoyed a mixed relationship.

6.3.1   1967–1972

Derrida's interests traversed disciplinary boundaries, and his knowledge of a wide array of diverse material was reflected in the three collections of work published in 1967: Of Grammatology, Writing and Difference, and Speech and Phenomena. These three books contained readings of the work of many philosophers and authors, including Husserl, linguist de Saussure, Heidegger, Rousseau, Lévinas, Hegel, Foucault, Bataille, Descartes, anthropologist Lévi-Strauss, paleontologist Leroi-Gourhan, psychoanalyst Freud, and writers such as Jabès and Artaud. Derrida frequently acknowledged his debt to Husserl and

Heidegger, and stated that without them he would have not said a single word. Among the questions asked in these essays are "What is 'meaning,' what are its historical relationships to what is purportedly identified under the rubric 'voice' as a value of presence, presence of the object, presence of meaning to consciousness, self-presence in so called living speech and in self-consciousness?"

This collection of three books published in 1967 elaborated Derrida's theoretical framework. Derrida attempts to approach the very heart of the Western intellectual tradition, characterizing this tradition as "a search for a transcendental being that serves as the origin or guarantor of meaning." The attempt to "ground the meaning relations constitutive of the world in an instance that itself lies outside all relationality" was referred to by Heidegger as "logocentrism," and Derrida argues that the philosophical enterprise is essentially logocentric, and that this is a paradigm inherited from Judaism and Hellenism. He in turn describes logocentrism as phallocratic, patriarchal and masculinist.

Derrida contributed to "the understanding of certain deeply hidden philosophical presuppositions and prejudices in Western culture", arguing that the whole philosophical tradition rests on arbitrary dichotomous categories (such as sacred/profane, sign/signifier, mind/body), and that any text contains implicit hierarchies, "by which an order is imposed on reality and by which a subtle repression is exercised, as these hierarchies exclude, subordinate, and hide the various potential meanings." Derrida refers to his procedure for uncovering and unsettling these dichotomies as deconstruction.

The next five years of lectures and essay-length work were gathered into two 1972 collections, Dissemination and Margins of Philosophy, and in the same year a collection of interviews, entitled Positions, was also published.

6.3.2. 1972–1980

Starting in 1972, Derrida produced on average more than a book per year. Derrida continued to produce important works, such as Glass and The Post-Card: From Socrates to Freud and beyond. A sequence of encounters with analytical philosophy is collected in Limited, Inc. Derrida wrote "Signature Event Context," an essay on J. L. Austin, in the early 1970s; following an aggressive critique of this text by John Searle, Derrida wrote a long (and no less aggressive) defense of his earlier argument. Derrida received increasing attention in the United States after 1972. For a considerable period, however, Derrida's work influenced American literary critics and theorists much more than it did philosophers.

6.4. OF SPIRIT

On March 14, 1987, Derrida presented at the CIPH conference titled "Heidegger: Open Questions" a lecture which was published in October 1987 as Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question. It follows the shifting role of Geist (spirit) through Heidegger's work, noting that, in 1927, "spirit" was one of the philosophical terms that Heidegger set his sights on dismantling. But with his Nazi political engagement in 1933, Heidegger came out as a champion of the "German Spirit," and only withdrew from an exalting interpretation of the term in 1952. Derrida's book reconnects in a number of respects with his long engagement of Heidegger (such as "The Ends of Man" in Margins of Philosophy and the essays marked under the heading Geschlecht). Derrida reconsiders three other fundamental and recurring

elements of Heideggerian philosophy: the distinction between human and animal, technology, and the privilege of questioning as the essence of philosophy.

Of Spirit is an important contribution to the long debate on Heidegger's Nazism and appeared at the same time as the French publication of a book by an unknown Chilean writer, Victor Farías, who charged that Heidegger's philosophy amounted to a wholehearted endorsement of the Nazi Sturmabteilung (SA) faction. Derrida responded to Farías in an interview, "Heidegger, the Philosopher's Hell" and a subsequent article, "Comment donner raison? How to Concede, with Reasons?" He noted that Farías was a weak reader of Heidegger's thought, adding that much of the evidence Farías and his supporters touted as new had long been known within the philosophical community.

But Of Spirit was also one of Derrida's first publications on the relationship between philosophy and nationalism, on which he had been teaching in the mid-1980s. This strand of questions would become increasingly important in his later work.

6.5. 1990s: POLITICAL AND ETHICAL THEMES

Some have argued that Derrida's work took a "political turn" around 1994, heralded by the publication of Specters of Marx and Politics of Friendship. Others, however, including Derrida himself, have argued that much of the philosophical work done in his "political turn" can be dated to earlier essays.

Those who argue Derrida engaged in an "ethical turn" refer to works such as The Gift of Death as evidence that he began more directly applying deconstruction to the relationship between ethics and religion. In this work, Derrida interprets passages from the Bible, particularly on Abraham and the Sacrifice of Isaac, and from Søren Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling. Derrida's contemporary readings of Emmanuel Lévinas, Walter Benjamin, Carl Schmitt, Jan Patočka, on themes such as law, justice, responsibility, and friendship, had a significant impact on fields beyond philosophy. Derrida delivered a eulogy at Lévinas' funeral, later published as Adieu à Emmanuel Lévinas, an appreciation and exploration of Levinas's moral philosophy. Here, Derrida followed Bracha L. Ettinger's interpretation of Lévinas' notion of femininity and transformed his own earlier reading of this subject accordingly. Derrida did not move away from readings of literature; indeed, he continued to write extensively on Maurice Blanchot, Paul Celan, and others.

6.6 LACK OF PHILOSOPHICAL CLARITY

Though Derrida addressed the American Philosophical Association on several occasions [citation needed] and was highly regarded by contemporary philosophers like Richard Rorty, Alexander Nehamas, and Stanley Cavell, his work has been regarded by other Anglophone philosophers, such as John Searle and W. V. Quine, as pseudophilosophy or sophistry. John Searle, a frequent critic of Derrida dating back to their exchange on speech act theory in Limited Inc (where Derrida strongly accused Searle of intentionally misreading and misrepresenting him), exemplify this view in his comments on deconstruction in the New York Review of Books, February 2, 1994, for example:

…anyone who reads deconstructive texts with an open mind is likely to be struck by the same phenomena that initially surprised me: the low level of philosophical argumentation, the deliberate obscurantism of the prose, the wildly exaggerated claims, and the constant

striving to give the appearance of profundity by making claims that seem paradoxical, but under analysis often turn out to be silly or trivial.

Foucault who is often considered as Derrida's contemporary, also revealed his dissatisfaction of Derrida's style of writing in a conversation with Searle. According to Foucault, Derrida practices the method of obscurantisme terroriste (terrorism of obscurantism). Searle quotes Foucault's explanation of the term as the following:
He writes so obscurely you can't tell what he's saying, that's the obscurantism part, and then when you criticize him, he can always say, "You didn't understand me; you're an idiot." That's the terrorism part.

A controversy surrounding Derrida's work in philosophy and as a philosopher arose when the University of Cambridge awarded him an honorary doctorate, despite opposition from members of its philosophy faculty and a letter of protest signed by eighteen professors from other institutions, including W. V. Quine, David Armstrong, Ruth Barcan Marcus, and René Thom. In their letter they claimed that Derrida's work "does not meet accepted standards of clarity and rigor" and described Derrida's philosophy as being composed of "tricks and gimmicks similar to those of the Dadaists." The letter also stated that "Academic status based on what seems to us to be little more than semi-intelligible attacks upon the values of reason, truth, and scholarship is not, we submit, sufficient grounds for the awarding of an honorary degree in a distinguished university."

6.7 INTENTIONAL OBFUSCATION

Noam Chomsky has expressed the view that Derrida uses "pretentious rhetoric" to obscure the simplicity of his ideas. He groups Derrida within a broader category of the Parisian intellectual community which he has criticized for, on his view, acting as an elite power structure for the well educated through "difficult writing" and obscurantism. Chomsky has indicated that he may simply be incapable of understanding Derrida, but he is suspicious of this possibility.

I've always found it difficult to read Derrida. Not so much for the density of his thought and the heavy, redundant, and repetitive style in which it is developed, but for an entirely circumstantial reason. Educated in Borges's thought from the age of fifteen, I must admit that many of Derrida's novelties struck me as being rather tautological. I could not understand why he took so long in arriving at the same luminous perspectives which Borges had opened up years earlier. His famed "deconstruction" impressed me for its technical precision and the infinite seduction of its textual sleights-of-hand, but it was all too familiar to me: I had experienced it in Borges avant la lettre. Critical obituaries of Derrida were published in The New York Times ("Jacques Derrida, Abstruse Theorist, Dies at 74") and The Economist. Both of these obituaries were criticised by academics supportive of Derrida; other obituaries were less critical.

In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Richard Rorty argues that Derrida (especially in his book, The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond) purposefully uses words that cannot be defined (e.g. Différance), and uses previously definable words in contexts diverse enough to make understanding impossible, so that the reader will never be able to contextualize Derrida's literary self. Rorty, however, argues that this intentional obfuscation is philosophically grounded. According to Rorty, this technique precludes any metaphysical

accounts of Derrida's work. And since his work itself ostensibly contains no metaphysics, Derrida has consequently escaped metaphysics altogether.

6.8 CHARGES OF NIHILISM

Some critics charge that the deconstructive project is "nihilistic". They claim Derrida's writing attempts to undermine the ethical and intellectual norms vital to the academy, if not Western civilization itself. Derrida is accused of creating a blend of extreme skepticism and solipsism that effectively denies the possibility of knowledge and meaning, which these critics believe is harmful.

Derrida, however, felt that deconstruction was enlivening, productive, and affirmative, and that it does not "undermine" norms but rather places them within contexts that reveal their developmental and effective features.[citation needed]

Perhaps most persistent among these critics is Richard Wolin, who has argued that Derrida's work, as well as that of Derrida's major inspirations (e.g., Bataille, Blanchot, Lévinas, Heidegger, Nietzsche), leads to a corrosive nihilism. For example, Wolin argues that the "deconstructive gesture of overturning and reinscription ends up by threatening to efface many of the essential differences between Nazism and non-Nazism". When Wolin published a Derrida interview on Heidegger in the first edition of The Heidegger Controversy, Derrida argued that the interview was an intentionally malicious mistranslation, which was "demonstrably execrable" and "weak, simplistic, and compulsively aggressive". As French law requires the consent of an author to translations and this consent was not given, Derrida insisted that the interview not appear in any subsequent editions or reprints. Columbia University Press subsequently refused to offer reprints or new editions. Later editions of The Heidegger Controversy by MIT Press also omitted the Derrida interview. The matter achieved public exposure owing to a friendly review of Wolin's book by Thomas Sheehan that appeared in the New York Review of Books, in which Sheehan characterised Derrida's protests as an imposition of censorship. It was followed by an exchange of letters. Derrida in turn responded, in somewhat acerbic fashion, to Sheehan and Wolin, in "The Work of Intellectuals and the Press (The Bad Example: How the New York Review of Books and Company do Business)," which was published in the book Points....

6.9 POLITICS

Derrida engaged with many political issues, movements, and debates: He was initially supportive of Parisian student protesters during the May 1968 protests, but later withdrew. He registered his objections to the Vietnam War in delivering "The Ends of Man" in the United States.

In late 1981 he was arrested by the Czechoslovakian government upon leaving a conference in Prague that lacked government authorization, and charged with the "production and trafficking of drugs", which he claimed were planted as he visited Kafka's grave. He was released (or "expelled" as the Czechoslovakian government put it) after the interventions of the Mitterrand government, and the assistance of Michel Foucault, returning to Paris on January 1, 1982.

He was active in cultural activities against the Apartheid government of South Africa and on behalf of Nelson Mandela beginning in 1983. He met with Palestinian intellectuals

during a 1988 visit to Jerusalem. He was active in the collective "89 for equality", which campaigned for the right of foreigners to vote in local elections. He protested against the death penalty, dedicating his seminar in his last years to the production of a non-utilitarian argument for its abolition, and was active in the campaign to free Mumia Abu-Jamal.

Derrida was not known to have participated in any conventional electoral political party until 1995, when he joined a committee in support of Lionel Jospin's Socialist candidacy, although he expressed misgivings about such organizations going back to Communist organizational efforts while he was a student at ENS.

In the 2002 French presidential election he refused to vote in the run-off between far right leader Jean-Marie Le Pen and Jacques Chirac, citing a lack of acceptable choices. While supportive of the American government in the wake of 9/11, he opposed the 2003 invasion of Iraq (see Rogues and his contribution to Philosophy in a Time of Terror with Giovanna Borradori and Jürgen Habermas).

Beyond these explicit political interventions, however, Derrida was engaged in rethinking politics and the political itself, within and beyond philosophy. Derrida insisted that a distinct political undertone pervades his texts since the very beginning of his career. Nevertheless, the attempt to understand the political implications of notions of responsibility, reason of state, the other, decision, sovereignty, Europe, friendship, difference, faith, and so on, became much more marked from the early 1990s on. By 2000, theorizing "democracy to come," and thinking the limitations of existing democracies, had become important concerns.

6.10 RELATIONSHIPS AND MOURNING

Derrida's relationship with many of his contemporaries was marked by disagreements and rifts. For example, Derrida's criticism of Foucault in the essay "Cogito and the History of Madness" (from Writing and Difference), first given as a lecture which Foucault attended, caused a rift between the two men that was never fully mended. Others, like Emmanuel Levinas and Maurice Blanchot, found in his critical engagement with their work an invitation for further discussion.

Whatever the outcome of these discussions, Derrida was often left in the unappealing position of too often having the opportunity for the last word, as he outlived many of his peers. Death and mourning are foundational to the analysis which led Derrida to his understanding of inheritance, interpretation, and responsibility. Beginning with "The Deaths of Roland Barthes" in 1981, Derrida produced a series of texts on mourning and memory occasioned by the loss of his friends and colleagues, many of them new engagements with their work. Memoires for Paul de Man, a book-length lecture series presented first at Yale and then at Irvine as Derrida's Wellek Lecture, followed in 1986, with a revision in 1989 that included "Like the Sound of the Sea Deep Within a Shell: Paul de Man's War". Ultimately fourteen essays were collected into The Work of Mourning, which was expanded in the French edition Chaque fois unique, la fin du monde (literally, The end of the world, unique each time) to include essays dedicated to Gérard Granel and Maurice Blanchot.

All these formulations have been possible thanks to the initial distinction between different irreducible types of genesis and structure: worldly genesis and transcendental genesis, empirical structure, eidetic structure, and transcendental structure. To ask oneself the following historico-semantic question: "What does the notion of genesis in general, on whose

basis the Husserlian diffraction could come forth and be understood, mean, and what has it always meant? What does the notion of structure in general, on whose basis Husserl operates and operates distinctions between empirical, eidetic, and transcendental dimensions mean, and what has it always meant throughout its displacements? And what is the historico-semantic relationship between genesis and structure in general?" is not only simply to ask a prior linguistic question. It is to ask the question about the unity of the historical ground on whose basis a transcendental reduction is possible and is motivated by itself. It is to ask the question about the unity of the world from which transcendental freedom releases itself, in order to make the origin of this unity appear.

On the phrase "default of origin" as applied to Derrida's work, cf., Bernard Stiegler, "Derrida and Technology: Fidelity at the Limits of Deconstruction and the Prosthesis of Faith," in Tom Cohen (ed.) Jacques Derrida and the Humanities (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Stiegler understands Derrida's thinking of textuality and inscription in terms of a thinking of originary technicity, and in this context speaks of "the originary default of origin that arche-writing constitutes" (p. 239). See also Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus .

It is an opening that is structural, or the structurality of an opening. Yet each of these concepts excludes the other. It is thus as little a structure as it is an opening; it is as little static as it is genetic, as little structural as it is historical. It can be understood neither from a genetic nor from a structuralist and taxonomic point of view, nor from a combination of both points of view.

6.11 POST STRUCTURALISM

Post-structuralism emerged in France during the 1960s as an antinomian movement critiquing structuralism. The period was marked by political anxiety, as students and workers alike rebelled against the state in May 1968, nearly causing the downfall of the French government. At the same time, however, the French communist party's (PCF) support of the oppressive policies of the USSR contributed to popular disillusionment with orthodox Marxism. As a result, there was increased interest in alternative radical philosophies, including feminism, western Marxism, phenomenology, and nihilism. These disparate perspectives, which Foucault later labeled "subjugated knowledges," were all linked by being critical of dominant Western philosophy and culture. Post-structuralism offered a means of justifying these criticisms, by exposing the underlying assumptions of many Western norms.

Two key figures in the early post-structuralist movement were Jacques Derrida and Roland Barthes. In a 1966 lecture "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Science", Jacques Derrida presented a thesis on an apparent rupture in intellectual life. Derrida interpreted this event as a "decentering" of the former intellectual cosmos. Instead of progress or divergence from an identified centre, Derrida described this "event" as a kind of "play."

Post-structuralism encompasses the intellectual developments of continental philosophers and critical theorists who wrote with tendencies of twentieth-century French philosophy. The prefix "post" refers to the fact that many contributors, such as Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, and Julia Kristeva, rejected structuralism and became quite critical of it. In direct contrast to structuralism's claims of an independent signifier, superior to the signified, post-structuralism views the signifier and signified as

inseparable but not united. The Post-structuralist movement is closely related to postmodernism but the two concepts are not synonymous.

While post-structuralism is difficult to define or summarize, it can be broadly understood as a body of distinct reactions to structuralism. There are two main reasons for this difficulty. First, it rejects definitions that claim to have discovered absolute "truths" or facts about the world. Second, very few thinkers have willingly accepted the label 'post-structuralist'; rather, they have been labeled as such by others. Consequently, no one has felt compelled to construct a "manifesto" of post-structuralism. Indeed, it would be inconsistent with post-structuralist concepts to codify itself in such a way.

6.12 STRUCTURALISM Vs. POST-STRUCTURALISM

Structuralism was a fashionable movement in France in the 50s and 60s, that studied the underlying structures inherent in cultural products (such as texts), and utilizes analytical concepts from linguistics, psychology, anthropology and other fields to understand and interpret those structures. Although the structuralist movement fostered critical inquiry into these structures, it emphasized logical and scientific results. Many structuralists sought to integrate their work into pre-existing bodies of knowledge. This was observed in the work of Ferdinand de Saussure in linguistics, Claude Lévi-Strauss in anthropology, and many early 20th-century psychologists.

The general assumptions of post-structuralism derive from critique of structuralist premises. Specifically, post-structuralism holds that the study of underlying structures is itself culturally conditioned and therefore subject to myriad biases and misinterpretations. To understand an object (e.g. one of the many meanings of a text), it is necessary to study both the object itself, and the systems of knowledge which were coordinated to produce the object. In this way, post-structuralism positions itself as a study of how knowledge is produced.

6.13 HISTORICAL Vs. DESCRIPTIVE VIEW

Post-structuralists generally assert that post-structuralism is historical, and classify structuralism as descriptive. This terminology relates to Ferdinand de Saussure's distinction between the views of historical (diachronic) and descriptive (synchronic) reading. From this basic distinction, post-structuralist studies often emphasize history to analyze descriptive concepts. By studying how cultural concepts have changed over time, post-structuralists seek to understand how those same concepts are understood by readers in the present. For example, Michel Foucault's Madness and Civilization is both a history and an inspection of cultural attitudes about madness. The theme of history in modern Continental thought can be linked to such influences as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals and Martin Heidegger's Being and Time.

Structuralists also seek to understand the historical interpretation of cultural concepts, but focus their efforts on understanding how those concepts were understood by the author in his or her own time, rather than how they may be understood by the reader in the present.

6.14 MAJOR WORKS AND CONCEPTS

When the open work was written by Umberto Eco (1962) it was in many (or all) senses post-structuralist. The influence of this work is however complex: Eco worked closely

with Barthes, and in the second Preface to the book (1967), Eco explicitly states his post-structuralist position and the assonance with his friend's position. The entire book is a critique of a certain concept of "structure" and "form," giving to the reader a strong power in understanding the text. The influence of Eco's book is often overlooked.

6.14.1 Barthes, and the need for metalanguage

Although many may have felt the necessity to move beyond structuralism, there was clearly no consensus on how this ought to occur. Much of the study of post-structuralism is based on the common critiques of structuralism. Roland Barthes is of great significance with respect to post-structuralist theory. In his work, Elements of Semiology (1967), he advanced the concept of the "metalanguage". A metalanguage is a systematized way of talking about concepts like meaning and grammar beyond the constraints of a traditional (first-order) language; in a metalanguage, symbols replace words and phrases. Insofar as one metalanguage is required for one explanation of first-order language, another may be required, so metalanguages may actually replace first-order languages. Barthes exposes how this structuralist system is regressive; orders of language rely upon a metalanguage by which it is explained, and therefore deconstruction itself is in danger of becoming a metalanguage, thus exposing all languages and discourse to scrutiny. Barthes' other works contributed deconstructive theories about texts.

6.14.2 Derrida's lecture at Johns Hopkins

The occasional designation of post-structuralism as a movement can be tied to the fact that mounting criticism of structuralism became evident at approximately the same time that structuralism became a topic of interest in universities in the United States. This interest led to a 1966 conference at Johns Hopkins University that invited scholars who were thought to be prominent structuralists, including Derrida, Barthes, and Lacan. Derrida's lecture at that conference, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Human Sciences," often appears in collections as a manifesto against structuralism. Derrida's essay was one of the earliest to propose some theoretical limitations to structuralism, and to attempt to theorize on terms that were clearly no longer structuralist.

The element of "play" in the title of Derrida's essay is often erroneously taken to be "play" in a linguistic sense, based on a general tendency towards puns and humour, while social constructionism as developed in the later work of Michel Foucault is said to create a sense of strategic agency by laying bare the levers of historical change. The importance of Foucault's work is seen by many to be in its synthesis of this social/historical account of the operations of power (see Governmentality).

6.15 THE STRUCTURALIST MODEL ARGUES

1) that the structure of language itself produces "reality"--that we can think only through language, and therefore our perceptions of reality are all framed by and determined by the structure of language.

2) That language speaks us; that the source of meaning is not an individual's experience or being, but the sets of oppositions and operations, the signs and grammars that govern language. Meaning doesn't come from individuals, but from the system that governs what any individual can do within it.

3) Rather than seeing the individual as the center of meaning, structuralism places THE STRUCTURE at the center--it's the structure that originates or produces meaning, not the individual self. Language in particular is the center of self and meaning; I can only say "I" because I inhabit a system of language in which the position of subject is marked by the first personal pronoun, hence my identity is the product of the linguistic system I occupy.

This is also where deconstruction starts to come in. The leading figure in deconstruction, Jacques Derrida, looks at philosophy (Western metaphysics) to see that any system necessarily posits a CENTER, a point from which everything comes, and to which everything refers or returns. Sometimes it's God, sometimes it's the human self, the mind, sometimes it's the unconscious, depending on what philosophical system (or set of beliefs) one is talking about.

There are two key points to the idea of deconstruction. First is that we're still going to look at systems or structures, rather than at individual concrete practices, and that all systems or structures have a CENTER, the point of origin, the thing that created the system in the first place. Second is that all systems or structures are created of binary pairs or oppositions, of two terms placed in some sort of relation to each?

Derrida says that such systems are always built of the basic units structuralism analyzes the binary opposition or pair--and that within these systems one part of that binary pair is always more important than the other, that one term is "marked" as positive and the other as negative. Hence in the binary pair good/evil, good is what Western philosophy values and evil is subordinated to good. Derrida argues that all binary pairs work this way light/dark, masculine/feminine, right/left; in Western culture, the first term is always valued over the second.

In his most famous work, Of Grammatology, Derrida looks particularly at the opposition speech/writing, saying that speech is always seen as more important than writing. This may not be as self-evident as the example of good/evil, but it's true in terms of linguistic theories, where speech is posited as the first or primary form of language, and writing is just the transcription of speech. Derrida says speech gets privileged because speech is associated with presence for there to be spoken language, somebody has to be there to be speaking.

No, he doesn't take into account tape recordings and things like that. Remember, a lot of what these guys are talking about has roots in philosophic and linguistic traditions that predate modern technology so that Derrida is responding to an opposition (speech/writing) that Plato set up, long before there were tape recorders. Just like poor old Levi-Strauss talks about how, in order to map all the dimensions of a myth, he'd have to have "punch cards and an IBM machine," when all he'd need now is a home computer.

Anyway, the idea is that the spoken word guarantees the existence of somebody doing the speaking thus it reinforces all those great humanist ideas, like that there's a real self that is the origin of what's being said. Derrida calls this idea of the self that has to be there to speak part of the metaphysics of PRESENCE; the idea of being, or presence, is central to all systems of Western philosophy, from Plato through Descartes (up to Derrida himself).

Presence is part of a binary opposition presence/absence, in which presence is always favored over absence. Speech gets associated with presence, and both are favored over writing and absence; this privileging of speech and presence is what Derrida calls

6.16 LOGO CENTRISM

You might think here about the Biblical phrase "Let there be light" as an example. The statement insures that there is a God (the thing doing the speaking), and that God is present (because speech=presence); the present God is the origin of all things (because God creates the world by speaking), and what God creates is binary oppositions (starting with light/dark). You might also think about other binary oppositions or pairs, including being/nothingness, reason/madness, word/silence, culture/nature, mind/body. Each term has meaning only in reference to the other (light is what is not dark, and vice-versa), just as, in Saussure's view, signifiers only have meaning or negative value in relation to other signifiers. These binary pairs are the "structures," or fundamental opposing ideas, that Derrida is concerned with in Western philosophy.

Because of the favoring of presence over absence, speech is favored over writing (and, as we'll see with Freud, masculine is favored over feminine because the penis is defined as a presence, whereas the female genitals are defined as absence).

It's because of this favoring of presence over absence that every system (I'm referring here mostly to philosophical systems, but the idea works for signifying systems as well) posits a CENTER, a place from which the whole system comes, and which guarantees its meaning this center guarantees being as presence. Think of your entire self as a kind of system everything you do, think, feel, etc. is part of that system. At the core or center of your mental and physical life is a notion of SELF, of an "I", of an identity that is stable and unified and coherent, the part of you that knows who you mean when you say "I". This core self or "I" is thus the CENTER of the "system", the "langue" of your being, and every other part of you (each individual act) is part of the "parole". The "I" is the origin of all you say and do, and it guarantees the idea of your presence, your being.

Western thought has a whole bunch of terms that serve as centers to systems being, essence, substance, truth, form, consciousness, man, god, etc. What Derrida tells us is that each of these terms designating the center of a system serves two purposes: it's the thing that created the system that originated it and guarantees that all the parts of the system interrelate, and it's also something beyond the system, not governed by the rules of the system. This is what he talks about as a "scandal" discovered by Levi-Strauss in Levi-Strauss's thoughts about kinship systems. (This will be covered in detail in the next lecture).

What Derrida does is to look at how a binary opposition the fundamental unit of the structures or systems we've been looking at, and of the philosophical systems he refers to functions within a system. He points out that a binary opposition is algebraic (a=~b, a equals not-b), and that two terms can't exist without reference to the other light (as presence) is defined as the absence of darkness, goodness the absence of evil, etc. He doesn't seek to reverse the hierarchies implied in binary pairs to make evil favored over good, unconscious over consciousness, feminine over masculine. Rather, deconstruction wants to erase the boundaries (the slash) between oppositions, hence to show that the values and order implied by the opposition are also not rigid.

Here's the basic method of deconstruction: find a binary opposition. Show how each term, rather than being polar opposite of its paired term, is actually part of it. Then the structure or opposition which kept them apart collapses, as we see with the terms nature and culture in Derrida's essay. Ultimately, you can't tell which is which, and the idea of binary opposites loses meaning, or is put into "play" (more on this in the next lecture). This method is called "Deconstruction" because it is a combination of construction/destruction the idea is that you don't simply construct new system of binaries, with the previously subordinated term on top, nor do you destroy the old system rather, you deconstruct the old system by showing how its basic units of structuration (binary pairs and the rules for their combination) contradict their own logic.

6.17 THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY

The structuralists were right when they identified the location of truth in the social practice of a culture, but limited by the conception of culture in anthropological static isolation (dynamic, static or partial "equilibrium"). The truth and error of my view and your view (continuing the metaphor from above) is a really-existing patriarchal society of which we are both a living part and which is undergoing transformation under the impact of the socialisation of women's labour and your struggle for the value of your labour. That is the source of the concepts (of "feminism", "male-chauvinism", "sexist language", etc.), that is the criterion of truth and that is what is changed by the material struggle of our ideas, that is the meaning.

If we were try to interpret the clash of ideas in individual terms - your idea versus my idea - we cannot but rely upon and reinforce the Utilitarian ethic of Universal Egoism (formulated in theoretical terms by John Stuart Mill in 1861). The road to liberation which is founded on you versus me, is the fundamental and dominant modus vivendi of bourgeois society. The displacement of this ethic to that of, for example, collectivism - our idea versus your idea - hardly cures the problem. It goes perhaps, halfway back to structuralism that is all. The politics of identity.

Now, just as Mach played a "confusing but necessary" role in the 1890s, preparatory to the natural scientific revolutions of the turn-of-the-century, Foucault's war on "naïve structuralism", his insistence on halting at the presumption of what lies behind the trace, of all those categories like "influence", "author" and geographical, temporal or social continuity, is a "necessary but confusing" obstacle.

What lies behind the trace is materiality. One cannot go beyond that without slipping into dogmatism. One cannot deny that and avoid scepticism. For example, the victim of a murder-rape is silent, their violator is articulate. Maybe we never hear the words of the victim, hear her testimony or even see her body. But what kind of science is it that asks use to confine ourselves to the traces, if (in this example) they be only the testimony of the rapist? Perhaps we are forced to return an open verdict in this case. Who knows - but something happened! I cannot presume to speak for the silent, but I must hear the silence.

This example is extreme, and perhaps for that reason unfortunate. It is well-known that the dominant ruling classes of any society write the history, they leave their traces on every monument, every document and their names live forever. Must we not surmise what lay behind? whose hands built the monument to Kubla Khan?

6.18 GLOSSARY

1. Assonance = verse
2. Corrosive = sarcastic
3. Disillusionment = disenchantment
4. Dissemination = distribution
5. Dogmatism = stubbornness
6. Empirical = experimental
7. Eulogy = tribute
8. Exalt = praise
9. Exemplify = demonstrate
10. Luminous = brilliant
11. Pretentious = affected
12. Privilege = freedom
13. skepticism = disbelief, cynicism

Prof. Raja Sekhar Patteti

LESSON 7
JACQUES DERRIDA: STRUCTURE SIGN AND PLAY IN THE DISCOURSE OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (PART-II)

OBJECTIVE

In this lesson students study the life and works of Jacques Derrida and look in detail. Pupils can see how Jacques Derrida developed his own unique, spare and clean style in Literature through "Structure Sign and Play in the Discourse of Human Sciences".

STRUCTURE

7.1 INTRODUCTION

Derrida began speaking and writing publicly at a time when the French intellectual scene was experiencing an increasing rift between what could broadly speaking be called "phenomenological" and "structural" approaches to understanding individual and collective life. For those with a more phenomenological bent, the goal was to understand experience by comprehending and describing its genesis, the process of its emergence from an origin or event. For the structuralists, this was precisely the false problem, and the "depth" of experience could in fact only be an effect of structures which are not them self experiential. It is in this context that in 1959 Derrida asks the question: must not structure have a genesis, and must not the origin, the point of genesis, be already structured, in order to be the genesis of something?

In other words, every structural or "synchronic" phenomenon has a history, and the structure cannot be understood without understanding its genesis. At the same time, in order that there be movement, or potential, the origin cannot be some pure unity or simplicity, but must already be articulated—complex—such that from it a "diachronic" process can emerge.

This originary complexity must not be understood as an original positing, but more like a default of origin, which Derrida refers to as inerrability, inscription, or textuality. It is this thought of originary complexity, rather than original purity, which destabilises the thought of both genesis and structure, that sets Derrida's work in motion, and from which derive all of its terms, including deconstruction.

Derrida's method consisted in demonstrating all the forms and varieties of this originary complexity, and their multiple consequences in many fields. His way of achieving this was by conducting thorough, careful, sensitive, and yet transformational readings of philosophical and literary texts, with an ear to what in those texts runs counter to their

apparent systematicity (structural unity) or intended sense (authorial genesis). By demonstrating the aporias and ellipses of thought, Derrida hoped to show the infinitely subtle ways that this originary complexity, which by definition cannot ever be completely known, works its structuring and destructuring effects.

7.2 SUMMARY OF THE STRUCTURE SIGN AND PLAY IN THE DISCOURSE OF HUMAN SCIENCES

Perhaps something has occurred in the history of the concept of structure that could be called an "event," if this loaded word did not entail a meaning which it is precisely the function of structural-or structuralist-thought to reduce or to suspect. But let me use the term "event" anyway, employing it with caution and as if in quotation marks. In this sense, this event will have the exterior form of a rupture and a redoubling.

It would be easy enough to show that the concept of structure and even the word "structure" itself are as old as the episteme -that is to say, as old as western science and western philosophy-and that their roots thrust deep into the soil of ordinary language, into whose deepest recesses the episteme plunges to gather them together once more, making them part of itself in a metaphorical displacement. Nevertheless, up until the event which I wish to mark out and define, structure-or rather the structurality of structure-although it has always been involved, has always been neutralized or reduced, and this by a process of giving it a center or referring it to a point of presence, a fixed origin. The function of this center was not only to orient, balance, and organize the structure-one cannot in fact conceive of an unorganized structure-but above all to make sure that the organizing principle of the structure would limit what we might call the free play of the structure. No doubt that by orienting and organizing the coherence of the system, the center of a structure permits the free play of its elements inside the total form. And even today the notion of a structure lacking any center represents the unthinkable itself.

Nevertheless, the center also closes off the free play it opens up and makes possible. Qua center, it is the point at which the substitution of contents, elements, or terms is no longer possible. At the center, the permutation or the transformation of elements (which may of course be structures enclosed within a structure) is forbidden. At least this permutation has always remained interdicted (I use this word deliberately). Thus it has always been thought that the center, which is by definition unique, constituted that very thing within a structure which governs the structure, while escaping structurality. This is why classical thought concerning structure could say that the center is, paradoxically, within the structure and outside it. The center is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), the totality has its center elsewhere. The center is not the center. The concept of centered structure-although it represents coherence itself, the condition of the episteme as philosophy or science-is contradictorily coherent. And, as always, coherence in contradiction expresses the force of a desire. The concept of centered structure is in fact the concept of a free play based on a fundamental ground, a free play which is constituted upon a fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude, which is itself beyond the reach of the free play. With this certitude anxiety can be mastered, for anxiety is invariably the result of a certain mode of being implicated in the game, of being caught by the game, of being as it were from the very beginning at stake in the game. From the basis of what we therefore call the center (and which, because it can be either inside or outside, is as readily called the origin as the end, as readily arché as telos), the repetitions, the substitutions.

the transformations, and the permutations are always taken from a history of meaning [sens]-that is, a history, period-whose origin may always be revealed or whose end may always be anticipated in the form of presence. This is why one could perhaps say that the movement of any archeology, like that of any eschatology, is an accomplice of this reduction of the structuralality of structure and always attempts to conceive of structure from the basis of a full presence which is out of play.

If this is so, the whole history of the concept of structure, before the rupture I spoke of, must be thought of as a series of substitutions of center for center, as a linked chain of determinations of the center. Successively, and in a regulated fashion, the center receives different forms or names. The history of metaphysics, like the history of the West, is the history of these metaphors and metonymies. Its matrix-if you will pardon me for demonstrating so little and for being so elliptical in order to bring me more quickly to my principal theme-is the determination of being as presence in all the senses of this word. It would be possible to show that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the I center have always designated the constant of a presence-eidos, arche, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject) aletheia [truth], transcendentality, consciousness, or conscience, God, man, and so forth.

The event I called a rupture, the disruption alluded to at the beginning of this paper, would presumably have come about when the structurality of structure had to begin to be thought, that is to say, repeated, and this is why I said that this disruption was repetition in all of the senses of this word. From then on it became necessary to think the law which governed, as it were, the desire for the center in the constitution of structure and the process of signification prescribing its displacements and its substitutions for this law of the central presence-but a central presence which was never itself, which has always already been transported outside itself in its surrogate. The surrogate does not substitute itself for anything which has somehow pre-existed it. From then on it was probably necessary to begin to think that there was no center, that the center could not be thought in the form of a being present, that the center had no natural locus, that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of non-locus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play. This moment was that in which language invaded the universal problematic; that in which, in the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse-provided we can agree on this word-that is to say, when everything became a system where the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences. The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the interplay of signification ad infinitum.

Where and how does this decentering, this notion of the structurality of structure, occur? It would be somewhat naive to refer to an event, a doctrine, or an author in order to designate this occurrence. It is no doubt part of the totality of an era, our own, but still it has already begun to proclaim itself and begun to work. Nevertheless, if I wished to give some sort of indication by choosing one or two "names," and by recalling those authors in whose discourses this occurrence has most nearly maintained its most radical formulation, I would probably cite the Nietzschean critique of metaphysics, the critique of the concepts of being and truth, for which were substituted the concepts of play, interpretation, and sign (sign without truth present); the Freudian critique of self-presence, that is, the critique of consciousness, of the subject, of self-identity and of self-proximity or self-possession; and, more radically, the Heideggerean destruction of metaphysics, of onto-theology, of the determination of being as presence. But all these destructive discourses and all their analogues are trapped in a sort of circle. This circle is unique. It describes the form of the

relationship between the history of metaphysics and the destruction of the history of metaphysics. There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to attack metaphysics. We have no language-no syntax and no lexicon-which is alien to this history; we cannot utter a single destructive proposition which has not already slipped into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest. To pick out one example from many: the metaphysics of presence is attacked with the help of the concept of the sign. But from the moment anyone wishes this to show, as I suggested a moment ago, that there is no transcendental or privileged signified and that the domain or the interplay of signification has, henceforth, no limit, he ought to extend his refusal to the concept and to the word sign itself-which is precisely what cannot be done. For the signification "sign" has always been comprehended and determined, in its sense, as sign-off, signifier referring to a signified, and signifier different from its signified. If one erases the radical difference between signifier and signified, it is the word signifier itself which ought to be abandoned as a metaphysical concept. When Levi-Strauss says in the preface to The Raw and the Cooked that he has "sought to transcend the opposition between the sensible and the intelligible by placing [himself] from the very beginning at the level of signs," the necessity, the force, and the legitimacy of his act cannot make us forget that the concept of the sign cannot in itself surpass or bypass this opposition between the sensible and the intelligible.

The concept of the sign is determined by this opposition: through and throughout the totality of its history and by its system. But we cannot do without the concept of the sign, we cannot give up this metaphysical complicity without also giving up the critique we are directing against this complicity, without the risk of erasing difference [altogether] in the self-identity of a signified reducing into itself its signifier, or, what amounts to the same thing, simply expelling it outside itself. For there are two heterogeneous ways of erasing the difference between the signifier and the signified: one, the classic way, consists in reducing or deriving the signifier, that is to say, ultimately in submitting the sign to thought; the other, the one we are using here against the first one, consists in putting into question the system in which the preceding reduction functioned: first and foremost, the opposition between the sensible and the intelligible. The paradox is that the metaphysical reduction of the sign needed the opposition it was reducing. The opposition is part of the system, along with the reduction.

And what I am saying here about the sign can be extended to all the concepts and all the sentences of metaphysics, in particular to the discourse on "structure." But there are many ways of being caught in this circle. They are all more or less naive, more or less empirical, and more or less systematic, more or less close to the formulation or even to the formalization of this circle. It is these differences which explain the multiplicity of destructive discourses and the disagreement between those who make them. It was within concepts inherited from metaphysics that Nietzsche, Freud, and Heidegger worked, for example. Since these concepts are not elements or atoms and since they are taken from syntax and a system, every particular borrowing drags along with it the whole of metaphysics. This is what allows these destroyers to destroy each other reciprocally-for example, Heidegger considering Nietzsche, with as much lucidity and rigor as bad faith and misconstruction, as the last metaphysician, the last "Platonist." One could do the same for Heidegger himself, for Freud, or for a number of others. And today no exercise is more widespread.

What is the relevance of this formal schema when we turn to what are called the "human sciences"? One of them perhaps occupies a privileged place-ethnology. One can in fact assume that ethnology could have been born as a science only at the moment when a de-centenng had come about: at the moment when European culture-and, in consequence, the

history of metaphysics and of its concepts-had been dislocated, driven from its locus, and forced to stop considering itself as the culture of reference. This moment is not first and foremost a moment of philosophical or scientific discourse, it is also a moment which is political, economic, technical, and so forth. One can say in total assurance that there is nothing fortuitous about the fact that the critique of ethnocentrism-the very condition of ethnology-should be systematically and historically contemporaneous with the destruction of the history of metaphysics. Both belong to a single and same era.

Ethnology-like any science-comes about within the element of discourse. And it is primarily a European science employing traditional concepts, however much it may struggle against them. Consequently, whether he wants to or not-and this does not depend on a decision on his part-the ethnologist accepts into his discourse the premises of ethnocentrism at the very moment when he is employed in denouncing them this necessity is irreducible; it is not a historical contingency. We ought to consider very carefully all its implications. But if nobody can escape this necessity, and if no one is therefore responsible for giving in to it, however little, this does not mean that all the ways of giving in to it are of an equal pertinence. The quality and the fecundity of a discourse are perhaps measured by the critical rigor with which this relationship to the history of metaphysics and to inherited concepts is thought. Here it is a question of a critical relationship to the language of the human sciences and a question of a critical responsibility of the discourse. It is a question of putting expressly and systematically the problem of a discourse which borrows from a heritage the resources necessary of that heritage itself. A problem of economy and strategy.

If I now go on to employ an examination of the texts of Levi-Strauss as an example, it is not only because of the privilege accorded to ethnology among the human sciences, nor yet because the thought of Levi-Strauss weighs heavily on the contemporary theoretical situation. It is above all because a certain choice has made itself evident in the work of Levi-Strauss and because a certain doctrine has been elaborated there, and precisely in a more or less explicit manner, in relation to this critique of language and to this critical language in the human sciences.

In order to follow this movement in the text of Levi-Strauss, let me choose as one guiding thread among others the oppostion between nature and culture. In spite of all its rejuvenations and its disguises, this opposition is congenital to philosophy. It is even older than Plato. It is at least as old as the Sophists. Since the statement of the opposition - Physis/nomos, physis/techne [nature/culture, nature/art or making] - it has been passed on to us by a whole historical chain which opposes "nature" to the law, to education, to art, to technics - and also to liberty, to the arbitrary, to history, to society, to the mind, and so on.

From the beginnings of his quest and from his first book, The Elementary Structures of Kinship, Levi-Strauss has felt at one and the same time the necessity of utilizing this opposition and the impossibility of making it acceptable. In the Elementary Structures, he begins from this axiom or definition: that belongs to nature which is universal and spontaneous, not depending on any particular culture or on any determinate norm. That belongs to culture, on the other hand, which depends on a system of norms regulating society and is therefore capable of varying from one social structure to another. These two definitions are of the traditional type. But, in the very first pages of the Elementary Structures, Levi-Strauss, who has begun to give these concepts an acceptable standing, encounters what he calls a scandal, that is to say, something which no longer tolerates the nature/culture opposition he has accepted and which seems to require at one and the same time the

predicates of nature and those of culture. This scandal is the incest-prohibition. The incest-prohibition is universal; in this sense one could call it natural. But it is also a prohibition, a system of norms and interdicts; in this sense one could call it cultural.

Let us assume therefore that everything universal in man derives from the order of nature and is charactenzed by spontaneity, that everything which is subject to a norm belongs to culture and presents the attributes of the relative and the particular. We then find ourselves confronted by a fact, or rather an ensemble of facts, which, in the light of the preceding definitions, is not far from appeanog as a scandal: the prohibition of incest presents without the least equivocation, and indissolubly linked together, the two characteristics in which we recognized the contradictory attributes of two exclusive orders. The prohibition of incest constitutes a rule, but a rule, alone of all the social rules, which possess at the same time a universal character.

Obviously, there is no scandal except in the interior of a system of concepts sanctioning the difference between nature and culture. In beginning his work with the factum of the incest-prohibition, Levi-Strauss thus puts himself in a position entailing that this difference, which has always been assumed to be self-evident, becomes obliterated or disputed. For, from the moment that the incest-prohibition can no longer be conceived within the nature/culture opposition, it can no longer be said that it is a scandalous fact, a nucleus of opacity within a network of transparent significations. The incest-prohibition is no longer a scandal one meets with or comes up against in the domain of traditional concepts; it is something which escapes these concepts and certainly precedes them probably as the condition of their possibility. It could perhaps be said that the whole of philosophical conceptualization, systematically relating itself to the nature/culture opposition, is designed to leave in the domain of the unthinkable the very thing that makes this conceptualization possible: the origin of the prohibition of incest.

I have dealt too cursorily with this example, only one among so many others, but the example nevertheless reveals that language bears within itself the necessity of its own critique. This critique may be undertaken along two tracks, in two "manners." Once the limit of nature/culture opposition makes itself felt, one might want to question systematically and rigorously the history of these concepts. This is a first action. Such a systematic and historic questioning would be neither a philological nor a philosophical action in the classic sense of these words. Concerning oneself with the founding concepts of the whole history of philosophy, de-constituting them, is not to undertake the task of the philologist or of the classic historian of philosophy. In spite of appearances, it is probably the most daring way of making the beginnings of a step outside of philosophy. The step "outside philosophy" is much more difficult to conceive than is generally imagined by those who think they made it long ago with cavalier ease, and who are in general swallowed up in metaphysics by the whole body of the discourse that they claim to have disengaged from it.

In order to avoid the possibly sterilizing effect of the first way, the other choice-which I feel corresponds more nearly to the way chosen by Levi-Strauss-consists in conserving in the field of empirical discovery all these old concepts, while at the same time exposing here and there their limits, treating them as tools which can still be of use. No longer is any truth-value attributed to them; there is a readiness to abandon them if necessary if other instruments should appear more useful. In the meantime, their relative efficacy is exploited, and they are employed to destroy the old machinery to which they belong and of which they themselves are pieces. Thus it is that the language of the human sciences criticizes itself.

Levi-Strauss thinks that in this way he can separate method from truth, the instruments of the method and the objective significations aimed at by it. One could almost say that this is the primary affirmation of Levi-Strauss; in any event, the first words of the Elementary Structures are: "One begins to understand that the distinction between state of nature and state of society (we would be more apt to say today: state of nature and state of culture). while lacking any acceptable historical signification, presents a value which fully just) fies its use by modern sociology: its value as a methodological instrument." Levi-Strauss will always remain faithful to this double intention: to preserve as an instrument that whose truth-value he criticizes.

On the one hand, he will continue in effect to contest the value of the nature/culture opposition. More than thirteen years after the Elementary Structures, The Savage Mind faithfully echoes the text I have just quoted: "The opposition between nature and culture which I have previously insisted on seems today to offer a value which is above all methodological." And this methodological value is not affected by its "ontological" non-value (as could be said, if this notion were not suspect here): "It would not be enough to have absorbed particular humanities into a general humanity; this first enterprise prepares the way for others . . . which belong to the natural and exact sciences: to reintegrate culture into nature, and finally, to reintegrate life into the totality of its physiochemical conditions."

On the other hand, still in The Savage Mind, he presents as what he calls bricolage what might be called the discourse of this method. The bricoleur, says Levi-Strauss, is someone who uses "the means at hand," that is, the instruments he finds at his disposition around him, those which are already there, which had not been especially conceived with an eye to the operation for which they are to be used and to which one tries by trial and error to adapt them, not hesitating to change them whenever it appears necessary, or to try several of them at once, even if their form and their origin are heterogenous and so forth. There is therefore a critique of language in the form of bricolage, and it has even been possible to say that bricolage is the critical language itself. I am thinking in particular of the article by G[erard] Genette, "Structuralisme et Critique litteraire," published in homage to Levi-Strauss in a special issue of L'Arc, where it is stated that the analysis of bricolage could "be applied almost word for word" to criticism, and especially to "literary criticism."

If one calls bricolage the necessity of borrowing one's concept from the text of a heritage which is more or less coherent or ruined, it must be said that every discourse is bricoleur. The engi~eer, whom Levi-Strauss opposes to the bricoleur, should be one to construct the totality of his language, syntax, and lexicon. In this sense the engineer is a myth. A subject who would supposedly be the absolute origin of his own discourse and would supposedly construct it "out of nothing," "out of whole cloth," would be the creator of the verbe, the verbe itself. The notion of the engineer who had supposedly broken with all forms of bricolage is therefore a theological idea; and since Levi-Strauss tells us elsewhere that bricolage is mythopoetic, the odds are that thee engineer is a myth produced by the bricoleur.

From the moment that we cease to believe in such an engineer and in a discourse breaking with the received historical discourse, as soon as it is admitted that every finite discourse is bound by a cenain bricolage, and that the engineer and the scientist are also species of bricoleurs then the very idea of bricolage is menaced and the difference in which it took on its meaning decomposes.

This brings out the second thread which might guide us in what is being unraveled here. Levi-Strauss describes bricolage not only as; intellectual activity but also as a mythopoetical activity. One reads in The Savage Mind, "Like bricolage on the technical level, mythical reflection can attain brilliant and unforeseen results on the intellectual level. Reciprocally, the mythopoetical character of bricolage has often been noted."

But the remarkable endeavor of Levi-Strauss is not simply to put forward, notably in the most recent of his investigations, a structural science or knowledge of myths and of mythological activity. His endeavor also appears-I would say almost from the first-in the status which he accords to his own discourse on myths, to what he calls his "mythologicals." It is here that his discourse on the myth reflects on itself and criticizes itself. And this moment, this critical period, is evidently of concern to all the languages which share the field of the human sciences. What does Levi-Strauss say of his "mythologicals"? It is here that we rediscover the mythopoetical virtue (power) of bricolage. In effect, what appears most fascinating in this critical search for a new status of the discourse is the stated abandonment of all reference to a center, to a subject, to a privileged reference, to an origin, or to an absolute arche'. The theme of this decentering could be followed throughout the "Overture" to his last book, The Raw and the Cooked. I shall simply remark on a few key points.

1. From the very start, Levi-Strauss recognizes that the Bororo myth which he employs in the book as the "reference-myth" does not merit this name and this treatment. The name is specious and the use of the myth improper. This myth deserves no more than any other its referential privilege: In fact the Bororo myth which will from now on be designated by the name reference-myth is, as I shall try to show, nothing other than a more or less forced transformation of other myths originating either in the same society or in societies more or less far removed. It would therefore have been legitimate to choose as my point of departure any representative of the group whatsoever. From this point of view, the interest of the reference-myth does not depend on its typical character, but rather on its irregular position in the midst of a group.

2. There is no unity or absolute source of the myth. The focus or the source of the myth are always shadows and virtualities which are elusive, unactualizable, and nonexistent in the first place. Everything begins with the structure, the configuration, the relationship. The discourse on this acentric structure, the myth, that is, cannot itself have an absolute subject or an absolute center. In order not to short change the form and the movement of the myth, that violence which consists in centering a language which is describing an acentric structure must be avoided. In this context, therefore, it is necessary to forego scientific or philosophical discourse, to renounce the episteme which absolutely requires, which is the absolute requirement that we go back to the source, to the center, to the founding basis, to the principle, and so on. In opposition to epistemic discourse, structural discourse on myths- mythological discourse-must itself be mythomorphic. It must have the form of that of which it speaks. This is what Levi-Strauss says in The Raw and the Cooked, from which I would now like to quote a long and remarkable passage:

In effect the study of myths poses a methodological problem by the fact that it cannot conform to the Cartesian principle of dividing the difficulty into as many parts as are necessary to resolve it. There exists no veritable end or term to mythical analysis, no secret unity which could be grasped at the end of the work of decomposition. The themes duplicate

themselves to infinity. When we think we have disentangled them from each other and can hold them separate, it is only to realize that they are joining together again, in response to the attraction of unforeseen affinities. In consequence, the unity of the myth is only tangential and projective; it never reflects a state or a moment of the myth. An imaginary phenomenon implied by the endeavor to interpret, its role is to give a synthetic form to the myth and to impede its dissolution into the confusion of contraries. It could therefore be said that the science or knowledge of myths is an anaclastic, taking this ancient term in the widest sense authorized by its etymology, a science which admits into its definition the study of the reflected rays along with that of the broken ones. But, unlike philosophical reflection, which claims to go all the way back to its source, the reflections in question here concern rays without any other than a virtual focus. . . . In wanting to imitate the spontaneous movement of mythical thought, my enterprise, itself too brief and too long, has had to yield to its demands and respect its rhythm. Thus is this book, on myths itself and in its own way, a myth.

This statement is repeated a little farther on: "Since myths themselves rest on second-order codes (the first-order codes being those in which language consists), this book thus offers the rough draft of a third-order code, destined to insure the reciprocal possibility of translation of several myths. This is why it would not be wrong to consider it a myth: the myth of mythology, as it was." It is by this absence of any real and fixed center of the mythical or mythological discourse that the musical model chosen by Levi Strauss for the composition of his book is apparently justified. The absence of a center is here the absence of a subject and the absence of an author: "The myth and the musical work thus appear as orchestra conductors whose listeners are the silent performers. If it be asked where the real focus of the work is to be found, it must be replied that its determination is impossible. Music and mythology bring man face to face with virtual objects whose shadow alone is actual. . . . Myths have no authors."

Thus it is at this point that ethnographic bricolage deliberately assumes its mythopoetic function. But by the same token, this function makes the philosophical or epistemological requirement of a center appear as mythological, that is to say, as a historical illusion.

Nevertheless, even if one yields to the necessity of what Levi-Strauss has done, one cannot ignore its risks. If the mythological is mythomorphic, are all discourses on myths equivalent? Shall we have to abandon any epistemologica; requirement which permits us to distinguish between several qualities of discourse on the myth? A classic question, but inevitable. We cannot reply-and I do not believe Levi-Strauss replies to it-as long as the problem of the relationships between the philosopheme or the theorem. on the one hand, and the mytheme or the mythopoem(e), on the other, has not been expressly posed. This is no small problem. For lack of expressly posing this problem, we condemn ourselves to transforming the claimed transgression of philosophy into an unperceived fault in the interior of the philosophical field.

Empiricism would be the genus of which these faults would always be the species. Trans-philosophical concepts would be transformed into philosophical naivetes. One could give many examples to demonstrate this risk: the concepts of sign, history, truth, and so forth.

What I want to emphasize is simply that the passage beyond philosophy does not consist in turning the page of philosophy (which usually comes down to philosophizing badly), but in continuing to read philosophers in a certain way. The risk I am speaking of is

always assumed by Levi-Strauss and it is the very price of his endeavor. I have said that empiricism is the matrix of all the faults menacing a discourse which continues, as with Levi-Strauss in particular, to elect to be scientific. If we wanted to pose the problem of empiricism and bricolage in depth, we would probably end up very quickly with a number of propositions absolutely contradictory in relation to the status of discourse in structural ethnography. On the one hand, structuralism justly claims to be the critique of empiricism.

But at the same time there is not a single book or study by Levi-Strauss which does not offer itself as an empirical essay which can always be completed or invalidated by new information. The structural schemata are always proposed as hypotheses resulting from a finite quantity of information and which are subjected to the proof of experience. Numerous texts could be used to demonstrate this double postulation. Let us turn once again to the "Overture" of The Raw and the Cooked, where it seems clear that if this postulation is double, it is because it is a guestion here of a language on language:

Critics who might take me to task for not having begun by making an exhaustive inventory of South American myths before analyzing them would be making a serious mistake about the nature and the role of these documents. The totality of the myths of a people is of the order of the discourse. Provided that this people does not become physically or morally extinct, this totality is never closed. Such a criticism would therefore be equivalent to reproaching a linguist with writing the grammar of a language without having recorded the totality of the words which have been uttered since that language came into existence and without knowing the verbal exchanges which will take place as long as the language continues to exist.

Experience proves that an absurdly small number of sentences allows the linguist to elaborate a grammar of the language he is studying. And even a partial grammar or an outline of a grammar represents valuable acquisitions in the case of unknown languages. Syntax does not wait until it has been possible to enumerate a theoretically unlimited series of events before becoming manifest, because syntax consists in the body of rules which presides over the generation of these events. And it is precisely a syntax of South American mythology that I wanted to outline. Should new texts appear to enrich the mythical discourse, then this will provide an opportunity to check or modify the way in which certain grammatical laws have been formulated, an opportunity to discard certain of them and an opportunity to discover new ones. But in no instance can the requirement of a total mythical discourse be raised as an objection. For we have just seen that such a requirement has no meaning.

Totalization is therefore defined at one time as useless, at another time as impossible. This is no doubt the result of the fact that there are two ways of conceiving the limit of totalization.

And I assert once again that these two determinations coexist implicitly in the discourses of Levi-Strauss. Totalization can be judged impossible in the classical style: one then refers to the empirical endeavor of a subject or of a finite discourse in a vain and breathless quest of an infinite richness which it can never master. There is too much, more than one can say. But non-totalization can also be determined in another way: not from the standpoint of the concept of finitude as assigning us to an empirical view, but from the standpoint of the concept of free play. If totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not because the infinity of a field cannot be covered by a finite glance or a finite discourse, but because the nature of the field-that is, language and a finite language-excludes totalization.

This field is in fact that of free play, that is to say, a field of infinite substitutions in the closure of a finite ensemble.

This field permits these infinite substitutions only because it is finite, that is to say, because instead of being an inexhaustible field, as in the classical hypothesis, instead of being too large, there is something missing from it: a center which arrests and founds the free play of substitutions. One could say-rigorously using that word whose scandalous signification is always obliterated in French-that this movement of the free play, permitted by the lack, the absence of a center or origin, is the movement of supplementarily. One cannot determine the center, the sign which supplements it, which takes its place in its absence-because this sign adds itself, occurs in addition, over and above, comes as a supplement. The movement of signification adds something, which results in the fact that there is always more, but this addition is a floating one because it comes to perform a vicarious function, to supplement a lack on the part of the signified. Although Levi-Strauss in his use of the word supplementary never emphasizes as I am doing here the two directions of meaning which are so strangely compounded within it, it is not by chance that he uses this word twice in his "Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss," at the point where he is speaking of the "superabundance of signifier, in relation to the signifieds to which this superabundance can refer":

In his endeavor to understand the world? Man therefore always has at his disposition a surplus of signification (which he portions out amongst things according to the laws of symbolic thought-which it is the task of ethnologists and linguists to study). This distribution of a supplementary allowance [ration supplementaire]-if it is permissible to put it that way-is absolutely necessary in order that on the whole the available signifier and the signified it aims at may remain in the relationship of complementarily which is the very condition of the use of symbolic thought.

(It could no doubt be demonstrated that this ration supplementaire of signification is the origin of the ratio itself.) The word reappears a little farther on, after Levi-Strauss has mentioned "this floating signifier, which is the finite thought":

In other words-and taking as our guide Mauss's. precept that all social phenomena can be assimilated to language-we see in mana, Wakau, oranda and other notions of the same type, the conscious expression of a semantic function, whose role it is to permit symbolic thought to operate in spite of the contradiction which is proper to it. In this way are explained the apparently insoluble 1 antinomies attached to this notion. At one and the same time force and action, quality and state, substantive and verb; abstract and concrete, omnipresent and localized-mana is in effect all these things. But is it not precisely because it is none of these things that mana is a simple form, or more exactly, a symbol in the pure state, and therefore capable of becoming charged with any sort of symbolic content whatever? In the system of symbols constituted by all cosmologies, mana would simply be a valeur symbolique zero, that is to say, a sign marking the necessity of a symbolic content supplementary [my italics] to that with which the signified is already loaded, but which can take on any value required, provided only that this value still remains part of the available reserve and is not, as phonologists put it, a group-term.

7.3 LEVI-STRAUSS ADDS THE NOTE

Linguists have already been led to formulate hypotheses of this type. For example: "A zero phoneme is opposed to all the other phonemes in French in that it entails no differential

chararacters and no constant phonetic value. On the contrary, the proper function of the zero phoneme is to be opposed to phoneme absence." (R. Jakobson and J. Lutz, "Notes on the French Phonemic Pattern" Word, vol. 5, no. 2 [August, 1949], p. 155). Similarly, if we schematize the conception I am posing here, it could almost be said that the function of notions like mana is to be opposed to the absence of signification, without entailing by itself any particular signification.

The superabundance of the signifier, its supplementary character, is thus the result of a finitude, that is to say, the result of a lack which must be supplemented.

It can now be understood why the concept of free play is important in Levi-Strauss. His references to all sorts of games, notably to roulette, are very frequent, especially in his Conversations, in Race and Histotory, and in The Savage Mind. This reference to the game or free-play is always caught up in a tension.

It is in tension with history, first of all. This is a classical problem, objections to which are I now well worn or used up. I shall simply indicate I what seems to me the formality of the problem: by reducing history, Levi-Strauss has treated as it deserves a concept which has always been in complicity with a teleological and eschatological metaphysics, in other words, paradoxically, in complicity with that philosophy of presence to which it was believed history could be opposed. The thematic of historicity, although it seems to be a somewhat late arrival in philosophy, has always been required by the determination of being as presence. With or without etymology, and in spite of the classic antagonism which opposes these significations throughout all of classical thought, it could be shown that the concept of episteme has always called forth that of historia, if history is always the unity of a becoming, as tradition of truth or development of science or knowledge oriented toward the appropriation of truth in presence and self-presence, toward knowledge in consciousness-of-self. History has always been conceived as the movement of a resumption of history, a diversion between two presences. But if it is legitimate to suspect this concept of history, there is a risk, if it is reduced without an express statement of the problem I am indicating here, of falling back into an historicism of a classical type, that is to say, in a determinate moment of the history of metaphysics. Such is the algebraic formality of the problem as I see it. More concretely, in the work of Levi-Strauss it must be recognized that the respect for structurality, for the internal originality of the structure, compels a neutralization of time and history. For example, the appearance of a new structure, of an original system, always comes about-and this is the very condition of its structural specificity-by a rupture with its past, its origin, and its cause. One can therefore describe what is peculiar to the structural organization only by not taking into account, in the very moment of this description, its past conditions: by failing to pose the problem of the passage from one structure to another, by putting history into parentheses. In this "structuralist" moment, the concepts of chance and discontinuity are indispensable. And Levi-Strauss does in fact often appeal to them as he does, for instance, for that structure of structures, language, of which he says in the "Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss" that it "could only have been born in one fell swoop":

Whatever may have been the moment and the circumstances of its appearance in the scale of animal life, language could only have been born in one fell swoop. Things could not have set about signifying progressively. Following a transformation the study of which is not the concern of the social sciences, but rather of biology and psychology, a crossing over came about from a stage where nothing had a meaning to another where everything possessed it.

This standpoint does not prevent Levi-Strauss from recognizing the slowness, the process of maturing, the continuous toil of factual transformations, history (for example, in Race and History). But, in accordance with an act which was also Rousseau's and Husserl's, he must "brush aside all the facts" at the moment when he wishes to recapture the specificity of a structure. Like Rousseau, he must always conceive of the origin of a new structure on the model of catastrophe -an overturning of nature in nature, a natural interruption of the natural sequence, a brushing aside of nature.

Besides the tension of free play with history, there is also the tension of free play with presence. Free play is the disruption of presence. The presence of an element is always a signifying and substitutive reference inscribed in a system of differences and the movement of a chain. Free play is always interplay of absence and presence, but if it is to be radically conceived, free play must be conceived of before the alternative of presence and absence; being must be conceived of as presence or absence beginning with the possibility of free play and not the other way around. If Levi-Strauss, better than any other, has brought to light the free play of repetition and the repetition of free play, one no less perceives in his work a sort of ethic presence, an ethic of nostalgia for origins, an ethic of archaic and natural innocence, of a purity of presence and self-presence in speech-an ethic, nostalgia, and even remorse which he often presents as the motivation of the ethnological project when he moves toward archaic societies-exemplary societies in his eyes. These texts are well known.

As a turning toward the presence, lost or impossible, of the absent origin, this structuralist thematic of broken immediateness is thus the sad, negative, nostalgic, guilty, Rousseauist facet of the thinking of free play of which the Nietzschean affirmation-the joyous affirmation of the free play of the world and without truth, without origin, offered to an active interpretation-would be the other side. This affirmation then determines the non-center otherwise than as loss of the center. And it plays the game without security. For there is a sure free play: that which is limited to the substitution of given and existing, present, pieces. In absolute chance, affirmation also surrenders itself to genetic indetermination, to the seminal adventure of the trace.

There are thus two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, of free play. The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering, a truth or an origin which is free from free play and from the order of the sign, and lives like an exile the necessity of interpretation. The other, which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms free play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism, the name man being the name of that being who, throughout the history of metaphysics or of onto theology-in other words, through the history of all of his history-has dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of the game.

The second interpretation of interpretation, to which Nietzsche showed us the way, does not seek in ethnography, as Levi-Strauss wished, the "inspiration of a new humanism" (again from the "Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss").

There are more than enough indications today to suggest we might perceive that these two interpretations of interpretation-which are absolutely irreconcilable even if we live them simultaneously and reconcile them in an obscure economy-together share the field which we call, in such a problematic fashion, the human sciences.

For my part, although these two interpretations must acknowledge and accentuate their difference and define their irreducibility, I do not believe that today there is any question

of choosing-in the first place because here we are in a region (let's say, provisionally, a region of historicity) where the category of choice seems particularly trivial; and in the second, because we must first try to conceive of the common ground, and the difference of this irreducible difference. Here there is a sort of question, call it historical, of which we are only glimpsing today the conception, the formation, the gestation, the labor. I employ these words, I admit, with a glance toward the business of childbearing-but also with a glance toward those who, in a company from which I do not exclude myself, turn their eyes away in the face of the as yet unnameable which is proclaiming itself and which can do so, as is necessary whenever a birth is in the offing, only under the species of the non-species, in the formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity.

7.4 SAMPLE QUESTIONS

1) Examine the Structure Sign and Play in the Discourse of Human Sciences in detail?

2) Examine Derridian Deconstruction as the central frame work of Post structuralism?

3) Examine the essay Structure Sign and Play as the initiation for Derridian discourse?

7.5 SUGGESTED READINGS

1. Jacques Derrida. 'Structure, Sign and Play in the discourse of Human sciences' from K.M. Newton's Twentieth century Literary Theory : A Reader. Macmillan. 1988.
2. Roland Barthes. The Pleasures of the Text. Hill & wang. 1975.
3. Christopher Norris. Deconstruction : Theory and Practice. Routledge. 1991.
4. Christopher Norris. Derrida.   Fontana. 1987.

7.6 GLOSSARY

1. Accomplice = partner in crime
2. Anticipated = predictable
3. Coherent = logical.
4. Genesis = origin
5. Legitimacy = authority
6. Implicit = understood
7. Reduction = decrease
8. Rift = gap
9. Syntax = sentence structure
10. Vicarious = explicit

Prof. Raja Sekhar Patteti

LESSON 8
TOWARDS A FEMINIST POETICS
- ELAINE SHOWALTER

OBJECTIVES

The objective of the lesson is
- To understand the feministic approach to literary criticism
- To understand the phases of feminist literature
- To examine the changes in the temperament of women writing over the generations
- To examine the agenda of the progressive criticism

STRUCTURE

8.1   Biography
8.2   Two Distinct Varieties of Feminist criticism
    8.2.1   The Woman as Reader or Feminist Critique
    8.2.2   The Woman as Writer or Gynocritics
8.3   Three phases
    8.3.1   The Feminine phase (1840–1880)
    8.3.2   The Feminist phase (1880–1920)
    8.3.3   The Female phase (1920—)
8.4   Observations
8.5   Conclusion
8.6   Works cited
8.7   Questions

8.1 BIOGRAPHY

Elaine Showalter (January 21, 1941) is an American literary critic, feminist, and writer on cultural and social issues. She is one of the founders of feminist literary criticism in United States academia, developing the concept and practice of <u>Gynocritics</u>. She is well known and respected in both academic and popular cultural fields. She has written and edited numerous books and articles that focused on a variety of subjects, from feminist literary criticism to fashion, sometimes sparking widespread controversy, especially with her work on illnesses. Showalter has been a television critic for *People* magazine and a commentator on BBC radio and television.

Showalter is a specialist in <u>Victorian literature</u> and the Fin-de-Siecle (turn of the 19th century). Her most innovative work in this field is in madness and hysteria in literature, specifically in women's writing and in the portrayal of female characters.

Showalter's best known works are *Towards a Feminist Poetics* (1979), *The Female Malady: Women, Madness, and English Culture 1830–1980* (1985), *Sexual Anarchy: Gender at Culture at the Fin de Siecle* (1990), *Hystories: Hysterical Epidemics and Modern Media* (1997), and *Inventing Herself: Claiming a Feminist Intellectual Heritage* (2001). In 2007 Showalter was chair of the judges for the prestigious British literary award, the Man Booker International Prize.

Showalter's book *Inventing Herself* (2001) is a survey of feminist icons. It is the culmination of a long-time interest in communicating the importance of understanding feminist tradition. Showalter's early essays and editorial work in the late 1970s and the 1980s survey the history of the feminist tradition within the literary theory and criticism. The field of feminist literary theory and criticism was emerging as a serious scholarly pursuit in universities in the 1970s. Showalter's writing reflects a conscious effort to convey the importance of mapping the history of feminist theory. She wishes to amass a knowledge base to inform a path for future feminist academic pursuit as a substantiate theory.

8.2 TWO DISTINCT VARIETIES OF FEMINIST CRITICISM

Showalter traces a trajectory of modern (mid 19th to 20th century) feminist theory. She states that from 1840-1880, the "feminine era, women's rights were characterized by the struggle to equal men's achievements. The period from 1880-1920, the feminist era, showed how women's writing protested male dominated values and argued for female freedom. In the current period (1920-present), the "female" era, women no longer try to equal or imitate men, as they did in the first phase; women also no longer protest because protest still insists upon recognizing the male dominated system and women's inferior position in it. Rather, in this most current phase, women live autonomously, a women's cultural movement not dependent upon a history of patriarchy.

Elaine Showalter's "Towards A Feminist Poetics" is a central text which historicized the feminist critical movement in America and gave it a shape and direction. She has proposed a separate and independent model of feminist literary theory. Her theory rejects the certainty of male models and dominant literary theories. It also recalls the history of women's writing to the present.

She divides her female model in to two types:
1) Feminist critique exposing woman as a reader.
2) Gynocritics presenting women as a writer.

Feminist critique is oriented toward critiquing the past and male writing. G.M. Hopkins, echoing many others, says that women cannot write creatively because they lack the male generative power. He also remarks that women are more attracted to masculinity than writing. Alexander Pope thinks that Clarissa's polite response to the outrage against Belinda in *Rape of the Lock* (1712) is more acceptable than Belinda's quite understandable outrage.

The feminist critics raise their voice against the act of violence against Belinda and at her powerlessness. They want to point out the model of woman that Pope has constructed to ideally suit to serve male ends. The feminist critique as a sort of feminist criticism envisions the women as the readers of those male produced texts. The feminists thus, try to trace out the images and stereotype of the women exposed in the male texts. This is also called traditional feminist criticism where women are the consumers of the production in literary writing.

Showalter is concerned by stereotypes of feminism that see feminist critics as being 'obsessed with the phallus' and 'obsessed with destroying male artists'. Showalter wonders if such stereotypes emerge from the fact that feminism lacks a fully articulated theory. Another problem for Showalter is the way in which feminists turn away from theory as a result of the attitudes of some male academics: theory is their property. Showalter writes: "From this perspective, the academic demand for theory can only be heard as a threat to the feminist

need for authenticity, and the visitor looking for a formula that he or she can take away without personal encounter is not welcome". In response, Showalter wants to outline a poetics of feminist criticism.

8.2.1 The Woman as Reader or Feminist Critique:

The first type is concerned with woman as the consumer of male-produced literature. The hypothesis of a female reader changes our apprehension of a given text. It awakens us to the significance of its sexual codes. This kind of analysis shall be called *feminist critique*.

Like other kinds of critique, it is a historically grounded inquiry which probes the ideological assumptions of literary phenomena. The subjects include the images and stereotypes of women in literature, the omissions of and misconceptions about women in criticism. It also includes the exploitation and manipulation of the female audience, especially in popular culture and film.

One of the problems of the feminist critique is that it is male–orientated. If we study stereotypes of women, the sexism of male critics, and the limited roles women play in literary history, we are not learning what women have felt and experienced, but only what men thought women should be. The critique also has a tendency to naturalize women's victimization by making it the inevitable and obsessive topic of discussion.

8.2.2 The Woman as Writer or Gynocritics:

Showalter coined the term 'gynocritics' to describe literary criticism based in a feminine perspective. Gynocritics focuses not on male texts, sexuality and creativity but on women's texts, sexuality, creativity and traditions. She is more inclined to gynocritics in order to develop a literature of their own. Showalter wishes the program of gynocritics to create a female framework for the study and exploration of women's literature. Instead of adapting male models and theories, new models of female experience have to be developed. Gynocritics begins at the point when women free themselves from the linear absolutes of male literary history. It strengthens when they stop trying to fit women between the lines of the male tradition, and focus instead on the newly visible world of female culture.

This does not mean that the goal of gynocritics is to erase the differences between male and female writing. Gynocritics may not promise gender equality. It aims to understand the specificity of women's writing not as a product of sexism but as a fundamental aspect of female reality. Its prime concern is to see woman as producer of textual meaning, with the history themes, genres, and structures of literature by women. Its subjects include the psychodynamics of female creativity. It studies linguistics and the problem of a female language in literary text. It reviews the trajectory of the individual or collective female literary career. It proposes to develop a female structure for the analysis of women's literature, to develop new models based on women's experience. It focuses on the newly visible world of female culture. It projects how feminine values penetrate and undermine the masculine systems and hopes for a separate female society.

Showalter acknowledges the difficulty of defining the unique difference of women's writing. She says that gynocritics may never succeed in understanding the special differences of women's writing, or realize a distinct female literary tradition. But, with grounding in

theory and historical research, Showalter sees gynocriticism as a way to learn something solid, enduring, and real about the relation of women to literary culture.

Showalter then provides an exemplary feminist critique of Thomas Hardy's *The Mayor of Casterbridge* (1886) to demonstrate that one of the problems of the feminist critique is that it is male-oriented. In some sense, every feminist critique, even when criticizing patriarchy, is focused toward the male. To begin to trace out this radically female-centered theory, Showalter notes excerpts from feminist historians and sociologists. She then moves on to an engaging discussion of the experiences of Elizabeth Barrett Browning and other female authors. She discusses that the works of women authors have been influenced by conditions that have nothing whatever to do with art.

With reference to *The Mayor of Casterbridge*, Showalter identifies a couple of problems with the dominant themes of literary criticism, which are male-oriented, devoted to exposing what men thought women were and should be. One may need years of apprenticeship in a male-created critical tradition in order to carry out this type of criticism. It tends to naturalize women's oppression by focusing on it and gives victimization an allure. However, a great deal of interesting work has been carried out in this tradition. Certainly hermeneutics, ideological criticism, psychoanalytic criticism and New Historicism all provide good tools for this study.

8.3 THREE PHASES

From these experiences, Showalter then begins a rough sketch of some of the elements that have characterized women's writing: awakening, suffering, unhappiness, and matrophobia, among others. She concludes with her classification of women's writing into three phases that "establishes the continuity of the female tradition from decade to decade, rather than from Great Woman to Great Woman."

Thus, Showalter traces the history of women's literature, suggesting that it can be divided into three phases:

8.3.1 The Feminine phase (1840–1880): Showalter sees the first phases taking place from roughly 1840 to 1880. She calls this "the Feminine phase" and declares that it is characterized by "women [writing] in an effort to equal the intellectual achievements of the male cultur The distinguishing sign of this period is the male pseudonym… [which] exerts an irregular pressure on the narrative, affecting tone, diction, structure, and characterization." During this phase, women wrote about their subcultures and attempted to adopt the standards and equal the achievements of male culture. It has already appeared, to create sub-genres which were the domain of female representation and consumption. These women included women's perspective and concerns obliquely and subvertly (and, consciously and unconsciously, as the practice of criticism in this area shows). This phase she dates till 1880 or so, but it is important to remark that women have been, and still are, writing as if they are in this phase.

8.3.2 The Feminist phase (1880–1920): The second, Feminist phase follows from 1880 to 1920, wherein "women are historically enabled to reject the accommodating postures of femininity and to use literature to dramatize the ordeals of wronged womanhood." This phase is characterized by "Amazon Utopias," visions of perfect, female-led societies of the future. This phase was characterized by women's writing that protested against male standards and values, and advocated women's rights and values, including a demand for autonomy. The

feminist phase is a conscious rebellion. It was the time of the agitation for the vote for women, a time of great feminist action, and writers supported and in some cases led these political and sociological movements. This prompted, by the way, a backlash in the male and female community, as many women take the men's side as a means of protecting themselves or because they simply have not seen the problems. Take, for instance, Queenie Leavis' sharp attack on Virginia Woolf for Woolf's bitter, angry and very astute polemic, *The Three Guineas*, written in the early 30's.

8.3.3 The Female phase (1920—) is one of self-discovery. Showalter says, "women reject both imitation and protest—two forms of dependency—and turn instead to female experience as the source of an autonomous art, extending the feminist analysis of culture to the forms and techniques of literature". Significantly, Showalter does not offer a characteristic sign or figure for the Female phase, suggesting a welcome diversity of experience that is too broad to be encompassed in a single image. The third phase is the female: the establishment of woman's role and nature as genuine, viable, creative, independent, and different.

Rejecting both imitation and protest, Showalter advocates feminist criticism from a cultural perspective in the current Female phase, rather than from perspectives that traditionally come from an andocentric perspective. Feminists in the past have worked within these traditions by revising and criticizing female representations, or lack thereof, in the male traditions (that is, in the Feminine and Feminist phases). In her essay *Feminist Criticism in the Wilderness* (1981), Showalter says, "A cultural theory acknowledges that there are important differences between women as writers: class, race nationality, and history are literary determinants as significant as gender. Nonetheless, women's culture forms a collective experience within the cultural whole, an experience that binds women writers to each other over time and space".

8.4 OBSERVATIONS

Gynocritics begins at the point where we free ourselves from the linear absolutes of male literary history, stop trying to fit women between the lines of the male tradition, and focus instead on the newly visible world of female culture…. Gynocritics is related to feminist research in history, anthropology, psychology, and sociology, all of which have developed hypotheses of a female subculture including not only ascribed status and the internalized constructs of femininity, but also the occupations, interactions, and consciousness of women.

Anthropologists study the female subculture in the relationships between women, as mothers, daughters, sisters and friends; in sexuality, reproduction, and ideas about the body; and in rites of initiation and passage, purification ceremonies, myths and taboos. Michelle Rosaldo writes in Women, Culture and Society,

The very symbolic and social conceptions that appear to set women apart and to circumscribe their activities may be used by women as a basis for female solidarity and worth. When men live apart from women, they in fact cannot control them, and unwittingly they may provide them with the symbols and social resources on which to build a society of their own.

Thus in some women's literature, feminine values penetrate and undermine the masculine systems that contain them; and women have imaginatively engaged the myths of

the Amazons, and fantasies of a separate female society, in genres from Victorian poetry to contemporary science fiction. She goes on to argue that attention to women writers of the past means attention to the sociological sub-structures that they inhabited, the economic, moral and psychological pressures they faces, and the strategies for survival and for self-expression which they adopted: only then can women's literature of the past be read clearly.

8.5 CONCLUSION

Showalter wants women to go beyond studying and/or deconstructing female stereotypes and to go beyond the ways women have been subjected to secondary status and male systems of thinking. In other words, one of the shifts is to move from speaking of women as victims or as struggling against a male system: to move from this to focusing on women's autonomous experience; not separated from the world of men, but independent from it.

On the whole, we may conclude that her views on feminist poetics are intelligent, largely devoid of rhetorical extremities, and confidently provocative. Showalter speaks with calmly convincing authority, as one who firmly believes in the verity of what she's saying. She is both earnest, in that she sees change needing to occur immediately, and patient, in that she expects that, given time enough, the wisdom and truth of her cause will prevail.

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8.7 QUESTIONS

1. What is the theme of "Towards a Feminist Poetics?"
2. Through her writings, what does Showalter say about the stereotypical role of women and their relationships with men?
3. What is Gynocriticism? Critically elucidate your study in lucid arguments.

Dr. M. Syam Sundar

LESSON 9
INTRODUCTION TO DIALOGIC IMAGINATION
-- M.M. BAKHTIN

OBJECTIVE

- To understand plurality of meaning in the text
- To decipher Structuralism and Dialogism
- To explore the discourse in the novel

STRUCTURE

9.1 BIOGRAPHY

Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin (1895–1975), a Russian philosopher and a literary scholar, was born in Orel, Russia, to a noble family. His father was the manager of a bank and worked in several cities. Bakhtin spent his early childhood years in Orel, Lithuania. Then in 1913, he joined the historical and philological faculty at the local university of Odessa. He later transferred to Petersburg University. It is here that Bakhtin was greatly influenced by the classicist F. F. Zelinski, whose works contain the beginnings of concepts elaborated by Bakhtin. He wrote influential works of literary, rhetorical theory and criticism. He made significant contributions to the vocabulary of literary criticism, such as dialogism, polyphony and carnivalization.

At Nevel city, the first "Bakhtin Circle" was formed. The group comprised of intellectuals like Valentin Volosinov and P. N. Medvedev. They all shared a love for the discussion of literary, religious, political topics, in particular, German philosophy. Bakhtin's first work was published in "Art and Responsibility" (1919). He married Elena Aleksandrovna Okolovič in 1921. Bakhtin's first major work, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Art* was published in 1929. He introduces the concept of "dialogism." Later, Bakhtin spent six years working as a bookkeeper in the town of Kustanai, during which time Bakhtin wrote several important essays, including "Discourse in the Novel."

After the amputation of his leg in 1938, Bakhtin's health improved and he became a more prolific writer. From 1940 until the end of World War II, Bakhtin lived in Moscow where he submitted a dissertation on François Rabelais. In 1946 and 1949 the defense of this dissertation divided the scholars of Moscow into two groups: those who accepted the original and unorthodox manuscript, and those who were against the manuscript's acceptance. The book's depiction of the role of the carnival, the temporary suspension of social order and licentious behavior, was the cause of many arguments that ceased only when the government intervened. Bakhtin was denied a doctorate and granted a lesser degree by the State Accrediting Bureau. Later, Bakhtin was invited the Mordovian Pedagogical Institute where he took on the position of chairman of the General Literature Department. Bakhtin became head of the Department of Russian and World Literature in 1957 when the Mordovian Pedagogical Institute became a University. In 1961 Bakhtin's deteriorating health forced him to retire. Bakhtin moved back to Moscow in 1969 and died in 1975.

Bakhtin's works and ideas gained enormous popularity only after his death. The details of Bakhtin's life have been reconstructed and their accuracy is in question. Together with the Russian Formalists and the semiotician Yuri Lotman, Bakhtin helped to shape the field of literary theory in the twentieth century. His work was largely unknown until the post-Stalinist period of the late 1950s, when Russian scholars rediscovered Bakhtin's work, and his fame quickly grew. Because he had been exiled during the dark days of Stalinism it was even more surprising that he was still alive. In his later life Bakhtin was lionized by Soviet intellectuals and, after his death in 1975, critics such as Julia Kristeva and Tzvetan Todorov brought Bakhtin to the attention of the Francophone world, and from there his popularity in the United States, the United Kingdom, and many other countries continued to grow. In the late 1980s Bakhtin's work experienced a surge of popularity in the West, in part due to the championing of his ideas by critics like Katarina Clark and Michael Holquist. He continues to be regarded as one of the most important theorists of literature and culture of the twentieth century.

9.2 MAJOR WORKS

9.2.1 Toward a Philosophy of the Act

Toward a Philosophy of the Act was first published in 1986. Bakhtin provided an outline in the introduction. There are four parts in the work, of which, only the first part is available. The essay deals with the analysis of the performed acts or deeds that comprise the actual world; the second part deals with aesthetic activity and the ethics of artistic creation; the third with the ethics of politics; and the fourth with religion. The work reveals a young Bakhtin who is in the process of developing his moral philosophy by decentralizing the work of Kant.

9.2.2 Problems of Dostoyevsky's Poetics: Polyphony and Unfinalizability

Problems of Dostoyevsky's Art is considered to be Bakhtin's seminal work, and it is here that Bakhtin introduces three important concepts. First, is the concept of the unfinalizable self. Second, is the idea of the relationship between the self and others, or other groups. Third, Bakhtin found in Dostoevsky's work a true representation of "polyphony", that is, many voices. Each character in Dostoevsky's work represents a voice that speaks for an individual self, distinct from others. In subsequent years, *Problems of Dostoyevsky's Art* was translated into English and published in the West, Bakhtin added a chapter on the concept of "carnival" and the book was published with the slightly different title, *Problems of*

Dostoyevsky's Poetics. According to Bakhtin, *carnival* is the context in which distinct individual voices are heard, flourish and interact together.

9.2.3 Rabelais and His World: Carnival and Grotesque

Bakhtin's was denied doctorate due to its content on the French Renaissance writer François Rabelais. It was published in 1965 with the title *Rabelais and His World.* A classic of Renaissance studies, *Rabelais and His World*, discusses the openness of *Gargantua and Pantagruel.* Bakhtin attempts two things: he seeks to recover sections of *Gargantua and Pantagruel*; and conducts an analysis of the Renaissance social system in order to discover the balance between language that was permitted and language that was not. It is by means of this analysis that Bakhtin pinpoints two important subtexts: the first is *carnival* (carnivalesque) which Bakhtin describes as a social institution, and the second is *grotesque realism* which is defined as a literary mode. Thus, in *Rabelais and His World* Bakhtin studies the interaction between the social and the literary.

9.2.4 Speech Genres and Other Late Essays

In *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays* Bakhtin moves away from the novel and concerns himself with the problems of method and the nature of culture. There are six essays that comprise this compilation: "Response to a Question from the *Novy Mir* Editorial Staff", "The *Bildungsroman* and Its Significance in the History of Realism", "The Problem of Speech Genres", "The Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences: An Experiment in Philosophical Analysis", "From Notes Made in 1970-71," and "Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences."

9.3 THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION

The Dialogic Imagination was first published in 1975 is a compilation of four essays concerning language and the novel. The four essays are "Epic and Novel" (1941), "From the Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse" (1940), "Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel" (1937–1938), and "Discourse in the Novel" (1934–1935). With these essays, Bakhtin introduces the concepts of *heteroglossia*, *dialogism* and *chronotope*, making a significant contribution to the realm of literary scholarship. Bakhtin explains the generation of meaning through the "primacy of context over text" (heteroglossia), the hybrid nature of language and the relation between utterances (intertextuality). Heteroglossia is "the base condition governing the operation of meaning in any utterance." To make an utterance means to "appropriate the words of others and populate them with one's own intention." Bakhtin's deep insights on dialogicality represent a substantive shift from views on the nature of language and knowledge by major thinkers such as Ferdinand de Saussure and Immanuel Kant.

The Dialogic Imagination comprises four essays that examine the novel as a living genre, one that resists classification in terms of its form, function, and placement in literary history. The word "dialogic" in the title distinguishes between dialogue (two or more people communicating interactively through language) and monologue (one person speaking, thinking, or writing in solitude). Bakhtin views language as a duality; it is both an established structure of meaning that exists prior to a language user and a unique production of meaning made immediate by a language user. Meaning is constantly created and recreated through dialogic processes. Bakhtin believes that the novel is uniquely dialogic in contrast to other genres that tend to be monologic. Imaginatively and practically, novels engage in

conversations with other works of literature, those that predate them and those yet to be written. Additionally, a dialogic relationship exists between author and reader.

The four essays in *The Dialogic Imagination* are works of literary theory unified by their focus on the novel as a distinct and developing genre. Bakhtin concerns himself with the unique nature of the novel, its relationship to other genres, and its origins and development. Compared with other genres whose patterns are established and fixed, such as the epic, the novel according to Bakhtin is a fluid, developing form, one that resists generic categorization. Frequently in these essays, Bakhtin uses the novel as a vehicle for his exploration of ideas about the nature of language and its relationship to social structures.

9.3.1   The Epic and the Novel

The first of *The Dialogic Imagination*'s four essays, "Epic and Novel," was written in 1941 and first published in 1970 (and in expanded form in the 1975 collection). It offers a succinct and relatively straightforward introduction to one of Bakhtin's most important ideas, in effect defining one genre, the novel, by contrasting it with another, the epic. According to Bakhtin, what distinguishes the epic is the complete separation of its world from contemporary reality (the time of its narration) and by means of this separation, the creation of a valorized past: absolute, closed, complete, uncontaminated by the present, above all unchanging, and therefore both inhuman and a historical.

The focus of this is on the study of the novel, and what it means to study the novel. It is a new genre and its skeleton is flexible, and not hard. The novel has the potential to continue to grow and shape itself beyond what it is now. This may be compared to older genres such as the epic and tragedy, which are old and stable. To extend the metaphor, their skeletons are hard, thus they cannot grow beyond what they are. One may even go so far as to say that their skeletons are brittle, that extension too far will quickly shake a work beyond the reaches of the genre.

The novel gets on poorly with other genres, as it exposes their inner workings and makes use of their forms, incorporating them into it (similarly to digital media). This absorption not only furthers the genre of the novel, but it also changes and recontextualizes the original genres as well. Similarly to arguments made about adaptation, as well as transmedia, when the novel as a form makes use of other genres, those genres must then be understood in context of how they have been adapted and extended by the novel.

On the subject of adaptation, Bakhtin describes the process of novelization, which serves to make the original genre more open, flexible, and self reflective. It is interesting to compare the idea of simulation and adaptation, as this poses a very similar threat. The novel has the power to expose patterns, show inner lives, and reveal new perspectives in a work, and the existence of a novelized work (whether the original is theatre, epic, film, comic, or so on) requires that the original be considered in context of these perspectives. In a sense, the novel exposes a new canon. Bakhtin focuses on the broader reaches that the novel has over literature: "In many respects the novel has anticipated, and continues to anticipate, the future development of literature as a whole. In the process of becoming the dominant genre, the novel sparks renovation of all other genres, it infects them with its spirit of process and inconclusiveness." What is interesting about this is that digital media, and simulation especially, has the capacity to do this very thing. It too has the capacity to reveal new perspectives and change how other media and genres understand themselves.
Bakhtin reveals three properties of the novel as a genre.

1. Its stylistic three dimensionality, which is linked with the multi-languaged consciousness realized in the novel;
2. The radical change it effects in the temporal coordinates of the literary image;
3. The new zone opened by the novel for structuring literary images, namely the zone of maximal contact with the present (with contemporary reality) in all its open-endedness.

The epic has three properties as well: its subject is the absolute past, its source is national tradition, and it is separated from reality by an epic distance. While the epic is about the past, the novel is about the moment. Within the novel time is free and flexible, but is fixed and absolute in the epic. The epic world is finished and fixed, it cannot be re-thought without breaking the epic form.

Epic authority and distance is destroyed by the elements of humor and laughter, revealing the reality and human nature, which breaks the image of pure greatness and potential. The epic presents an image of wholeness, but the comic reveals the inconsistencies and incompleteness. The novel has been the agent of this change, picking up other genres and dragging them to reality.

9.3.2 From the Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse

"From the Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse" is a less traditional essay in which Bakhtin reveals how various different texts from the past have ultimately come together to form the modern novel. Bakhtin discusses the origin and nature of the novel arguing that "mere literary styles" are not enough to analyze and define the novel, and instead we should focus on the relationships between the distinct elements that distinguish the novel from other genres. Mikhail Bakhtin offers a study of novelistic discourse that emphasizes the history, culture, and construction of language used in modern novels.

Bakhtin structures his essay into three sections, each of which outlines a specific aspect of his argument on the study of novelistic discourse. He begins his essay by outlining the history of the novel, as well as the history of an introduction to the study of novelistic discourse. He mentions several other traditional approaches to the study, explaining the flaws associated with each. In the second section of his essay, Bakhtin analyzes several different works of ancient Greece and argues that these works should not be "contained within the narrow perimeters of a history confined to mere literary styles". Bakhtin concludes his essay by reviewing the major points of his argument, and stating that novelistic discourse should not be narrowed by the study of linguistic tendencies, style, and abstract languages but it should be viewed, rather, as "a complex and centuries-long struggle of cultures and languages". In addition, Bakhtin states, novelistic discourse should be closely related to language and especially the changes that take place within language.

In his essay Bakhtin argues that instead of analyzing the style of a novel, one should instead analyze the intricacies of the language employed within the novel. He argues that in analyzing particular stylistic aspects of a novel, one emerges with a much limited view of a work. " We wish only to emphasize that the novelistic word arose and developed not as the result of a narrowly literary struggle among tendencies, styles, abstract world views – but rather in a complex and centuries-long struggle of cultures and languages". In stating this, Bakhtin seems to be saying that the history of different languages and cultures and the works they created contribute to the current form of the novel today. In addition, Bakhtin concludes

his essay by stating, "The prehistory of the novelistic word is not to be contained within the narrow perimeters of a history confined to mere literary styles".

9.3.3   Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel

The essay applies the concept of chronotope in order to further demonstrate the distinctive quality of the novel. The word *chronotope* literally means "time space" and is defined by Bakhtin as "the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature." For the purpose of his writing, an author must create entire worlds and, in doing so, is forced to make use of the organizing categories of the real world in which he lives. For this reason *chronotope* is a concept that engages reality.

Bakhtin's chronotope is all about the relations and implications of space-time. For Bakhtin, the chronotope defines genre and generic distinctions. Analyzing the various forms of chronotope leads to producing a problematics of narrative types. Bakhtin begins by analyzing the Greek romance. For Bakhtin, time is specifically significant in this genre because it never effects change for the hero. There are superhuman and subhuman chronotopes that impinge upon and interact with our specifically human durations. Bakhtin next moves to the biography and autobiography, most notably Plato's works. He then discusses Rabelais, whose works present an interesting form of the chronotope.

9.3.4   Discourse in the Novel

The final essay is one of Bakhtin's most complete statements concerning his philosophy of language. It is here that Bakhtin provides a model for a history of discourse and introduces the concept of heteroglossia. The term *heteroglossia* refers to the qualities of a language that are extralinguistic, but common to all languages. These include qualities such as perspective, evaluation, and ideological positioning. In this way most languages are incapable of neutrality, for every word is inextricably bound to the context in which it exists.

Defining the novel as a diversity of voices and speech types, Bakhtin here contrasts it not with the epic but with poetry. Unlike poetry, novelistic discourse "cannot forget or ignore." Against the monologism of poetry and its "Ptolomaic" conception of language, he posits the novel's essential dialogism, its Galilean "decentering" of meaning and liberating sense of "linguistic homelessness." This liberation gives rise both to the centripetal forces that seek to limit meaning and to a speaker's yearning not just to speak but to be heard and responded to—important ideas that Bakhtin discusses elsewhere. Rather than excluding or limiting heteroglossia ("another's speech in another's language," serving two speakers, each with his or her own intentions), the novel intensifies it. Indeed, Bakhtin explains the development of the novel as "a function of the deepening of its dialogic essence," which leaves "fewer and fewer neutral, hard elements" outside its relativizing gaze.

Bakhtin turns his attention to the stages in the novel's development. One of his most interesting observations concerns the difference he finds in the way the Baroque novelists of the eighteenth century approached heteroglossia and incorporated it in their work, whether condescendingly from above or more enthusiastically from below. Another is the part played in the novel's development by the English comic novel with its parodic recycling and stylization of literary language.

9.4 CRITICAL CONTEXT

The critical context for Bakhtin's theory of dialogism is, appropriately, double and must therefore itself be understood dialogically. It must be placed within the contexts of not only the specific intellectual setting in which it was formulated but also the poststructuralist period of the 1980's, when Bakhtin's posthumously translated works began to exert such a great influence in the West on critics. Much of what is included in *The Dialogical Imagination* was written in response to Russian Formalism, at the time the most influential school of literary thought in the Soviet Union.

Bakhtin's debt to the Formalists is undeniable, but it is their differences that are most significant. Where the Formalists stressed the distinction between literary language and everyday speech, Bakhtin noted the similarities and dialogic relations. For their methodological precision he substituted a far more speculative approach, concluding that no text (or utterance) can be reduced to the sum of its literary devices. Bakhtin's emphasis on the openness of literature and language made him suspect not only to the Formalists but also to the Soviet authorities, whose revolutionary Socialist experiment (toward which Bakhtin was sympathetic) had already degenerated into repressive monologue. It is this same openness, coupled with his having anticipated so many of the most important ideas of later narratologists, that has made him so attractive a figure in the 1980's.

Bakhtin's challenge to the naive assumptions upon which traditional theories are based is especially remarkable when one considers when and under what trying circumstances he conceived them. Yet they are no more remarkable than the evenhanded way in which he has coupled these challenges, as well as an insistence on the novel's (and language's) essential indeterminacy, to an equally strong commitment to the novel's social and communicative functions—a commitment that calls into question many of the most fashionable claims of such influential critics as Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida.

9.5 QUESTIONS

1. How is the language of poetry different from that of novel? Why is the former the more privileged literary form than the latter?
2. Discuss the major themes of Bakhtin'n *The Dialogic Imagination.*
3. What does it mean when Bakhtin describes discourse as stratified?

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Dr. M. Syam Sundar

LESSON 10
THE MAIN ASPECTS OF INDIAN AESTHETICS
- M. HIRIANNA

OBJECTIVE

The objective of the lesson is to understand the nature and features of Indian aesthetics while exploring M. Hirianna's views on Indian aesthetics compiled in "The Main Aspects of Indian Aesthetics". It further helps in learning the difference between Art and Philosophy; Art and Nature; Art and Morality.

STRUCTURE

10.1 INTRODUCTION

Aesthetics is a branch of philosophy concerned with the study of the concept of beauty. It deals with the enjoyment of a work of art. The literary critics who carry on aesthetics are called *Alankarikas*.

10.2 BIOGRAPHY OF THE AUTHOR

Mysore Hiriyanna (1871–1950) was one of the few insightful Indian scholars who contributed a great deal to the Sanskrit studies, aesthetics, Vedanta and philosophy with original exposition and commentary. He was born in Mysore on May 7, 1871. Having obtained his M.A from the Madras Christian College, he joined as a librarian at the Mysore Oriental Library, and at a later stage of his career he went on to become the curator of the institute. In an intervening period, he served as an Assistant Master and later as the Head Master at the Mysore Normal School. He joined the newly established Mysore University as a lecturer in Sanskrit and was promoted as a professor of Sanskrit and Philosophy during 1918 - 1927.

His prominent works include Indian Conception of Values, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, quest after Perfection and Art Experience. His books are held in hundreds of libraries; even outside India. His works show clarity, precision and brevity. He is recognized in learned circles both in India and abroad as an outstanding authority on traditional Indian philosophy. Deeply versed in Sanskrit classics and equally proficient in English literature,

Hiriyanna worked with single-minded devotion to the cause of Indian philosophy and literary studies. Though Hiriyanna did not claim anything like a philosophy of his own, he had a distinctive perception of both the general spirit and the specific concepts and doctrines of Indian philosophy. Hiriyanna, by all accounts, was a philosopher par excellence.

10.3 AESTHETICS AND PHILOSOPHY

Separation of aesthetics from philosophy is not a defect, instead it has several advantages. It is free from ideological constraints and the danger of formulating several theories. Thus the aestheticians have freedom to postulate *Vyangyartha*. This theory of meaning sheds new light on the nature of art. Where such a theory is not necessary, they select one or the other views held by the philosophic schools according to the needs. Such eclecticism is more detached and better than adopting a particular philosophic point of view.

This does not mean that there is a dull uniformity in the Indian theory of art. Hiriyanna says, "There is as much diversity in it as in any Western treatment of the subject." This diversity is based upon purely artistic considerations and hence genuine.

Reality (as represented in art) is a unity in diversity. The aim of art is to secure for us the highest experience of life; but not to discover the nature of reality. Aesthetics is closely connected with psychology logic is irrelevant to its purpose. Bypassing logic, art is a short-cut to the ultimate value of life. Art is concerned less with facts than values.

10.4. NATURE AND ART

- G.E.Moore in his Principia Ethics states that beauty found in actual objectivity of art. There are two views in this regard (1) The Idealistic view (2) The Pessimistic view.

The Idealistic View: - According to the idealists, nature as a whole is beautiful, but seen in parts, it may not be so, it may even appear ugly. For those who take a synoptic view of nature, art may be superfluous, but it is not so for many. According to *Vedanta* when man realises the highest truth, he sees the glory of being everywhere and is in brahmananda. Till then he can have complete beauty only in art. Even the parts in nature which appear beautiful need not continue to be so with changes in time and our attitude towards them. Hence we require the creations of art.

The Pessimistic View: - According to the pessimists, beauty in nature is inevitably associated with ugliness. The letter cannot be eliminated without the former. Hence art is the sole means of satisfying the quest for pure joy. Art is the need for escaping from the struggles and problems of everyday life.

Thus there is a need for art in either case. Art is thus a device for the provisional attainment of the final ideal of life.

10.5 ART EXPERIENCE

- The aim of art is to secure for men a unique form of experience, an ultimate value which is sought for its own sake and not as a means to anything else. It may not be attained in actual life unless self-perfection is achieved. The characteristics of art experience are two.

i) The first is unselfishness. It is not the outward unselfishness resulting from the sociable nature of man and calculated by selfish considerations. Such unselfishness is not complete. The selflessness of art experience is spontaneous and complete. Man grows so selfless that he forgets his private self. It is a disinterested contemplation of beauty. Any personal aim in it fails the pursuit.

ii) The second characteristic is a byproduct of the first. It yields a kind of joy which is pure and untainted by the least pain. It is transcendental in nature. It is higher than that day-to-day life characterized by mental tension.

Art experience is identified with the ultimate goal of life brahmananda. It is the state of bliss attained when the soul unities with God. It is described as brahmananda sahodara. Like the ideal experience, art experience also affords the same escape from worldly concerns. It does more, for it represents a state of supreme joy. According to both it is one of the only two such values recognized *Atmananda* (spiritual bliss) and *Rasanubhava* (aesthetic enjoyment).

10.6 THE CONTENT OF ART

 - The artist secures for us art experience through form and content. In poetry, the content is constituted by the figurative ideas and sentiments. The form is in the musical language through which ideas and sentiments are expressed. Since form sub serves the content, Hiriyanna wants to focus on the content. There are two kinds of views on this: (1) The *Alankarika* view and (2) The *Rasadhvani* View.

(1) **The *Alankarika* view:** - This view holds that the content of art is its meaning. It must be drawn from actual life and has to be judiciously idealized. The purpose of idealization is twofold. Firstly, having its source in the artist's imagination, it appeals to the same faculty in the spectator (not to his intellect). Secondly the particular things of common experience are transformed into general ones and thus induce a detached attitude in the spectator. Reality is not falsified (fictionalized) through idealization. To mistake art objects for real (as an illusion), is a lapse from the truly aesthetic attitude. At the same time, they cannot also be unreal (false) because they will cease to interest him. Thus art objects assume a unique character. They are neither real nor unreal. This reminds us of *Chitra Turaga nyaya* of Shri Sankuka where cognition of art objects takes place on four planes – (a) real (b) un real (c) doubtful and (d) similitude. A horse in a painting is regarded as a real horse; not a real horse; may or may not be a horse like a horse. Art objects are similar to those in life but not the same. Hariyanna says we do not take a logical view of art objects. We neither nor disbelieve in their reality. We merely entertain them.

(2) **The *Rasadhvani* View:** - The *Alankarika* view was held for a long time. There came a change in the ninth century with the *Rasadhavani* school of *Anandavardhana* and by *Abhinavagupta*. It holds that content does not mean merely meaning which is the outer ornament of art. Emotion is important; art appeals to the imagination which implies emotion. The emotional character of the situation depicted by the artist constitutes the true content of art and the type of experience to which it gives rise in the spectator is called Rasa. The excellences of meaning require significance only in relation to the emotion which it is intended to sub serve. If they are out of harmony with the emotion depicted, they produce the opposite of artistic feelings in the spectator.

The earlier *Alankarika* view (chitra turaga nyaya) also prevailed along with the new *Rasadhvani* view. But the *Chitra* is considered inferior as it appeals to the intellect rather than to the soul.

10.7 THE METHOD OF ART

- Words like love, fear, hatred merely convey the idea of the corresponding feelings but do not communicate the feelings to the listener. They may be conveyed only through proper portrayal of select aspects of its causes and consequences. To Anandavardhana and Abhinava Gupta, it is 'indirection' or Dhvani (suggestion). This school holds that Dhvani is the sole method of the best type of art. This is the result of recognizing Rasa as the aim par excellence of the artist. Thus the method of art is us unique as its aim.

The method of *Dhvani* is extended to *Alankaras* and vastu. Dhvani is preferred in *Alankaras* where direct communication is possible. The difference between *Alankaras* (based on imagination) and *Rasa* (based on emotion) is not always definite. One may easily pass into the other. Hence the decision in any particular case depends on the personalized view taken. *Dhavni* is extended to *Vastu* – (the poetic representations) which can be regarded neither as *Rasa* nor as *Alankara*. On this basis the subject of first-rate art is dividing into three kinds (i) emotion when resulting experience is *Rasadhvani*, (ii) imaginative situation in *Alankara-dhvani* and (iii) matter of fact representation in *Vastu-dhvani*.

Before the method of *Dhvani* formulated, various schools mistook the method of art to be logical. For instance Mahima Bhatta regarded the process of *Dhvani* as nothing but inferential. Mukula Bhatta represented the secondary senses of words as derived through the *pramana* (evidence), known as *Arthapathi.* Hiriyanna dismisses both the views as *Dhvani* lacks the element of necessity which is an essential to a logical process.

10.8 ART & MORALITY

- Art experience is essentially disinterested and disinterestedness is the very root of all morality. So art can be connected with morality. Ethical attitude is oriented towards some purpose whereas the sole purpose of art is transcendence of all-purpose. In a word ethical attitude is active, while active experience is not.

As for unselfishness of art experience, two points crop up:
(1) Aesthetic attitude is induced by an external stimulus. The unselfishness of aesthetic attitude (representing morality) is short lived because it is lost with the removal of the external stimulus. Unselfishness characterizing ethical attitude springs from inside and is quite spontaneous, and lasts longer. Morality springing from within has an enduring influence on life.

(2) The disinterestedness of aesthetic attitude results from the contemplation of imaginary / fictitious situations created by the artist (but not of actual life). Hence the detachment. But the sphere of morality is actual life. So even if art experience induces perfect selflessness, its influence on the moral side of man may be very little.

Some critics say that art has nothing to do with morality and it is ethically neutral. If that is so "it ceases to be a human value its recognition of evil as a fact of life becomes meaningless. It cannot appeal to the whole being of man. Hiriyanna stresses that if we take a

comprehensive view of man's nature and his aims, it seems that art cannot be altogether divorced from morality. Otherwise art tends to be escapist. Though art is for its own sake, in the result, it is a criticism of life' values. (Matthew Arnold holds the same view). This explains the double standards of judging a character in art. For instance, we refer to Iago in Othello as a perfect artistic creation but at the same time condemn him as the wicked creature. Art is closely associated with religion (in many countries) not merely to make the latter attractive but also to prevent the former from deterioration by separating art from morality. Art, correctly conceived, cannot be merely a selfish escape from life. It must influence life permanently.

Art has nothing directly to do with morality. It should influence the character indirectly. It should not degenerate into mere didacticism. Art influences through the characters of the general significance of the plot. The worldview of the characters should be moral. An Indian saying says, "That is true poem which treats of the doings of the good and the great". The great epics *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata* are the best examples for this. Hiriyanna concludes the discussion, "Art should not have a moral aim but must necessarily have a moral view, if it should fulfill its purpose. This is not to make art didactic, for morality does not form either its content or its purpose according to this view.

In addition to the general moral view, a hero endowed with a moral ideal may be created as an integral part of the structure of the plot. This is the meaning of the critics saying that any of the *Purusharthas* (Principal objects of human life) may be the content of art. When *Artha* (money) or *Kama* (sensual enjoyment) forms the content, a general moral view is expected to prevail. When *Dharma* (religion) becomes the content, there is this additional emphasis on morality. In Bhavabhuli's *Uttaramacharita* a general moral view pervades the whole work with every character being noble. But above all Rama's sense of public duty, at the cost of private obligations in abandoning Sita is pivotal to the play. It comes to the foreground without affecting the artistic function of the play which is to evoke the emotion of love with pathos.

Thus art must have a moral influence on the spectator without his knowing that he is being so influenced. The artist has to restrict the scope of his themes to the higher aspects of life to reflect morality. Otherwise art will not only cause to exert any moral influence but it may tend to be a means of corrupting character and degrading ideals.

10.9 CONCLUSION

Hirianna provides coherent explanations of the core concepts, often relating them to more well-known philosophical ideas. He reveals the philosophical foundation of Indian aesthetics to the best possible extent. He thus brings out the main aspects of Indian aesthetics quite lucidly.

10.10 SUGGESTED QUESTIONS

1. Write a brief note on M.Hiriyanna's aspects of Indian Aesthetics.
2. Write a critique on M.Hiriyanna's 'The Main aspects of Indian Aesthetic's.
3. Examine few important Aesthetic Concepts proposed by M. Hiriyanna.

10.11 GLOSSARY

1. Aesthetics = the branch of philosophy that studies the principles of beauty, especially in art
2. Eclecticism = the fact of not following one style or set of ideas but choosing from or using a wide variety
3. Diversity = a range of many people or things that are very different from each other
4. Transcendental = going beyond the limits of human knowledge, experience or reason, especially in a religious or spiritual way
5. Idealization = the act of considering or representing somebody/something as being perfect or better than they really are.

Dr. Janaiah Saggurthi

LESSON 11
DALIT LITERATURE: PAST, PRESENT & FUTURE
- ARJUN DANGLE

11.1 BIOGRAPHY

Arjun Dangle, born in Mumbai in 1945, is an important name in the politics and literature of Maharashtra. He is a founder member of the militant Dalit youth organisation, The Dalit Panthers. He has also been the president of the State Unit of the Bharatiya Republican Party of India. Dangle's collection of poems - 'Chhavani Halte Ahe' won the Maharashtra State Award in 1978. He has also published a collection of short stories -'Hi Bandhavarhi Manse' and his *Dalit Sahitya- Ek Abhyas*, a critical work is a standard reference book in many universities of Maharashtra. He has recently published 'Dalit Vidroha' a collection of essays on politics and literature.

Arjun Dangle has portrayed the past and present sufferings of Dalits through his works. He has depicted the true picture of Indian Dalits in his Marthi poem 'Kranti'. It has been translated in English as 'Revolution' by Jayant Karve and Eleanor Zelliot. The poem takes us to the past four decades and it will help others to understand the suffering and feelings of Dalits in India. His poetry, essays and short stories, published to critical acclaim, have been translated into several Indian and foreign languages.

11.2 OBJECTIVE

Dalit Literature: Past, Present & Future is an essay published in *Poisoned Bread* (1992), authored by Arjun Dangle. *Poisoned Bread* was the first anthology of Dalit Literature, a collection of the works of more than eighty Dalit writers. Being silenced for centuries by caste prejudice and social oppression, the Dalits of Maharashtra have, in the last sixty years, found a powerful voice in Marathi Literature. The revolutionary social movement launched by their leader Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar, was paralleled by a wave of writing that exploded in poetry, prose, fiction and autobiography of a raw vigour, maturity, depth and richness of content and shocking in its exposition of the bitterness of their experiences. One is jolted too, by the quality of writing of a group denied access for long ages to any literary tradition. This important collection is the first anthology of Dalit Literature. The writers more than eighty of them presented her in English translations are nearby all of the most prominent figures in Marathi Dalit Literature, who have contributed to this unique phenomenon.

11.3 INTRODUCTION

Dalit literature forms an important and distinct part of Indian Literature. One of the first Dalit writers was Madura Chennaiah, the 11th century cobbler-saint who lived in the

reign of Western Chalukyas and who is also regarded by some scholars as the father of Vachana poetry. Another poet who finds mention is Dohara Kakkaiah, a Dalit by birth, six of whose confessional poems survive. Modern Dalit Literature: In the modern era, Dalit literature received its first impetus with the advent of legendary leaders like Mahatma Phule and Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar in Maharashtra, who brought forth the issues of Dalits through their works and writings. This started a new trend in Dalit writing and inspired many Dalits to come forth with writings in Marathi, Hindi and Punjabi.

Dalit Literature is distinct part of Indian Literature: Literature about the Dalits, the oppressed class under Indian Caste System forms an important and distinct part of Indian Literature. Though Dalit narratives have been a part of the Indian Social narratives since 11th century CE onwards, with works like Cekkilar's Periya Puranam documenting Dalit life. Dalit Literature emerged into prominence and as a collective voice after 1960, starting with Marathi and soon appeared in Hindi, Kannada, Telugu and Tamil Languages, through self narratives like poems, short stories and most importantly autobiographies known for their fierce and often stark realism, and for its contribution to the Dalit Politics.

11.4 'POISONED BREAD'

Silenced for centuries by caste prejudice and social oppression, the Dalits of Maharashtra have, in the last sixty years, found a powerful voice in Marathi Literature. The revolutionary social movement launched by their leader Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar, was paralleled by a wave of writing that exploded in poetry, prose, fiction and autobiography of a raw vigour, maturity, depth and richness of content and shocking in its exposition of the bitterness of their experiences. One is jolted too, by the quality of writing of a group denied access for long ages to any literary tradition. This important collection is the first anthology of Dalit Literature. When published in 1992, 'Poisoned Bread' was the first anthology of Dalit Literature. The writers more than eighty of them presented her in English translations are nearby all of the most prominent figures in Marathi Dalit Literature, who have contributed to this unique phenomenon.

Dangle, a well-known Marathi Dalit writer, has remarked about features of Dalit aesthetics in his Poisoned Bread, an edited work of Marathi Dalit literature. In it he has presented the elements of Dalit literature. The writer has presented his viewpoint regarding the writings of Dalit and non-Dalit writers. Further, he has tried to explain how Dalit literature and its aesthetics are different from the mainstream literature:

"Dalit is not a caste but a realization . . . . It matures with a sociological point of view and is related to the principles of negativity, rebellion and loyalty to science, thus finally ending as revolutionary.

As a result of this realization, experiences are not simply stated but their meaning is also explained. . . .

The difference between the two kinds of writers (Dalit and non-Dalit writers) is not just because of their castes but also due to differing experiences and their ways of interpreting them". (Dangle 264-65)

The orthodox Hindus have looked upon Dalits with disgust and hatred. So they do not overcome of their superior complex being upper castes. As a result they cannot consider

literature written by Dalits as worthy for reading. According to shallow-minded upper castes, Dalit literature does not fulfil the aesthetics criteria of mainstream literature. The basic difference one can notice in the literature of the non-Dalit writers and the Dalit writers is that the first presents the romantic view of the life and the later realistic view of the life. Arjun Dangle in his article Dalit Literature: Past, Present and Future, has noted that 'this literature of the Dalits is intimately related to social reality and is not imaginary or entertainment-oriented.' (Dangle 255) Similarly, in an interview Harish Mangalam, a Dalit writer and a critic remarks:

Non-Dalit writers describe the beloved's cheeks by comparing them with roses and liken the beloved's lips to rose petals. (Trivedi *Tongues* 161)

Further he said that unlike the non-Dalit writers' imaginative concept of beauty, the Dalit writers present it with realistic approach:

The beloved's cheeks were like hardened lumps of jaggery and her lips were like wrinkled black clay. (Trivedi *Tongues* 161-62)

The non-Dalit writers use imagination to present beauty of beloved. Unlike, the mainstream writers, the Dalit writers use reality to present beauty of beloved. Daya Pawar, a famous Marathi Dalit writer has criticised the indifferent mentality of the non-Dalits. Remark of Pawar is quoted by Sharankumar Limbale in his critical work:

Our entire society is not on the same cultural level. Due to the mentality formed by different cultural categories, caste system and customs in society, social life and world-views were divided. Because of the pressure of false morality, even the process of tasting a literary creation did not remain uncontaminated. (*Towards* 100)

The indifferent attitudes of the upper caste writers are because of their superiority complex. They cannot bring themselves to the level of Dalit writers because to be inferior is alien to them. Further, to bring themselves to the low level is below their dignity. Hence, they observe and judge Dalit writings with a viewpoint of upper caste mentality. As a result, they cannot justify Dalit literature and Dalit aesthetics.

11.5 CONCLUSION

After 60 years of independence, India shines, for whom? The Indian economy of our country is very strong but each one of us needs to ask a question to self- Has India succeeded in making weaker section strong? Of course not, it is because to make very decorative policies for the uplifting of dalits is the policy of many governments. The provision in budget made for dalits and adivashies are for name sake. The crores of rupees of dalits are diverted for some other purposes.

After six decades of independence, we are not seeing the actually change in life of these weaker sections of the society. On one hand, non-dalits are against the dalit reservation, saying it's given for a longer period of time and on the other hand upper castes are demanding reservation for their more comfort and luxury. For example-Maratha caste in Maharashtra, of this category ample numbers of representatives are there in all fields of life. Their numbers are more than the requirement and an ideology behind giving reservation is the representation of that particular community or the groups of people those who are far

away from the main-stream of life. Now, government has started giving reservation to Jain, Muslim and Sheikh considering them as a minority group of people. Everywhere in the world reservation is provided on the basis of caste or race and not on the basis of religion. Dalit Literature is showing the true face of Indian Society. Equality is there on paper for the name sake and even today in many corners of India dalits are living the life of slave. Dalit Literature is full of suffering, trouble, torture and humiliation. The literature created by Arjun Dangle focuses on the social, political and economical status of dalits - yesterday and today.

His writing is based on their experience and the observation of the society. The little of his any literary creation enables the listener/reader to understand the book very soon. A kind of experience Dalit gets; and their experiences are the source of their writing. He has gone through unexpected and unwanted experiences and he feels upcoming generation should not be the victim of the system. All his efforts of writing are bringing a positive change in Indian Society.

Mr. Dangle has a great hope that a day will come and caste will be vanished from the Indian Society. Every day, Dalits are harassed, humiliated and so many atrocity cases are registered in various police stations of Maharashtra. If, this is the truth, in context of a very forward State of India then the situations of dailits in Bihar, U.P., Gujrat, Punjab and other states of South India is beyond our imagination. Maharashtra could be a secular state but not the safe state for dalits and the latest and the best example of it is the 'KHAIRLANJI SCANDAL' (HATYA KAND). The Dalits in India are expected to be treated as human beings by non-dalits. The great literary man is expressing his inner feelings in the form of literature and his criticism on Indian Society is for reconstructing India in a well-manner.

11.5 WORKS CITED

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3. Arjun Dangle, 'No Entry for the New Sun', (Translation from Modern Marathi Dalit Poetry) 1992, Orient Black Swan Publication.
4. Arjun Dangle, 'Corpse in the Well', Translation from Modern Marathi Dalit Autobiographies. 1992, Orient Black Swan Publication.
5. Arjun Dangle, 'Revolution', (Translation from Modern Marathi Dalit Poetry) 1992 Orient Black Swan Publication.

11.6 QUESTIONS

1. Discuss the central theme of Arjun Dangle's essay "Dalit Literature: Past, Present & Future".
2. Why and how Dalit literature brought in to light the suppression caused to the Dalit communities of India

Dr. M. Syam Sundar

LESSON 12
TOWARDS CULTURAL HISTORY - IN THEORY AND PRACTICE --- CATHERINE BELSEY

OBJECTIVES

- To describe the concept of cultural history
- To discuss cultural history and its importance in understanding a text
- To evaluate cultural history as a literary discourse and theory
- To understand the prescribed article

STRUCTURE

12.1 INTRODUCTION

Cultural studies is a field of theoretically, politically, and empirically engaged cultural analysis that was initially developed by British academics in the late 1960s and 1970s, and has been subsequently taken up and transformed by scholars from many different disciplines around the world.

Carl Jacob Burckhardt (May 25, 1818 – August 8, 1897) was a Swiss historian of art and culture, and an influential figure in the historiography of both these fields. He is known as one of the major progenitors of cultural history. He is regarded as the great discoverer of the age of the Renaissance; he first showed how a period should be treated in its entirety, with regard not only for its painting, sculpture and architecture, but for the social institutions of its daily life as well. Burckhardt is also known to posterity as the father of cultural history.

While earlier historians had concentrated on political and military history, Burckhardt discussed the total life of the people, including religion, art and literature. He thought all things are sources - not only books, but the whole of life and every kind of spiritual manifestation.

The field of cultural studies encompasses a range of theoretical and methodological perspectives and practices. Although distinct from the disciplines of cultural anthropology

and ethnic studies, cultural studies draws upon and has contributed to each of these disciplines. Cultural studies concentrates upon the political dynamics of contemporary culture, its historical foundations, defining traits, and conflicts. Cultural studies researchers generally investigate how cultural practices relate to wider systems of power associated with or operating through social phenomena, such as ideology, class structures, national formations, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender and generation. Cultural studies critically views cultures not as fixed, bounded, stable and discrete entities, but rather as constantly interacting and changing sets of practices and processes.

Cultural history combines the approaches of anthropology and history to look at popular cultural traditions and cultural interpretations of historical experience. It examines the records and narrative descriptions of past matter encompasses the continuum of events occurring in succession leading from the past to the present and even into the future pertaining to a culture. Cultural history records and interprets past events involving human beings through the social, cultural, and political milieu of or relating to the arts and manners that a group favours. Cultural history studies and interprets the record of human societies by denoting the various distinctive ways of living built up by a group of people under consideration. It involves the aggregate of past cultural activity, such as ceremony, class in practices, and the interaction with locales.

Cultural studies is an academic discipline popular among a diverse group of scholars. It combines political economy, geography, sociology, social theory, literary theory, film/video studies, cultural anthropology, philosophy, and art history/criticism to study cultural phenomena in various societies. Cultural studies researchers often concentrate on how a particular phenomenon relates to matters of ideology, nationality, ethnicity, social class, and/or gender.

12.2 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Catherine Belsey's main area of work is on the implications of poststructuralist theory for aspects of cultural history and criticism. Her books include *Critical Practice* (1980), *Desire: Love Stories in Western Culture* (1994) and *Shakespeare and the Loss of Eden: The Construction of Family Values in Early Modern Culture* (1999). Professor Belsey chairs the Centre for Critical and Cultural Theory, a research forum for discussion and debate on current views of the relation between human beings and culture. She is a British literary critic, Visiting Professor of English at the University of Derby, Fellow of the English Association and Fellow of the Learned Society of Wales. She chaired the Centre for Critical and Cultural Theory at Cardiff University (1988-2003) before moving to Swansea University (2006-14). Her book *Critical Practice* (1980) was an influential poststructuralist text in suggesting new directions for literary studies. She has consistently aligned herself with international innovations in the theory and practice of criticism.

12.3 THE PRESCRIBED ARTICLE

"Towards Cultural History - in Theory and Practice" is a highly significant article published in the year 1989 by Catherine Belsey. The article is divided into five sections. Each section is a well thought out proposition of ideas on cultural, historical, political and literary issues that determine people understanding their past as well as literary texts.

12.3.1 Section I

She begins her article with the question: is there a place for English in a postmodern world? She tries to answer this question from long-standing assumptions; she writes "English as it has traditionally been understood, as the study of great literary works by great authors, has no useful no useful part to play in a pedagogy committed to a policies of change" (159).

Much of the work of English institution has been a process of exclusion and how limitations on our knowledge imposed by conventional judgements and reading practices. The entire section is an attempt to dismantle the exclusive historical perspectives that are highlighted.

12.3.2 Section II

Cultural history is necessary to point to the any sort of work. It is not right to isolate literary text from its culture of which it formed a part. This section focuses on the transformation of English into cultural history through the writings of Raymond Williams, who above all established a tradition of radical critical from within the institution of English.

Belsey also argues that the cultural construction of women as of other marginal tends to include rather less emphasis on the possession of truth. It is altogether understanding traditional attributes to people and their confinement of disillusionment of truth. According to post structuralism, truth is a linguistic tyranny, which arrests the proliferation of meanings and values.

12.3.3 Section III

This section deals with the objective of a politically radical history. If truth is the ultimate objective, it can be found in the meanings not exactly in images and representations.

Then the aim is to identify the meanings in circulation in earlier periods, to specify the discourses, conventions and practices by which meanings are fixed. She also points out that where there is a history of subjection to norms there is also a history of resistance.

12.3.4 Section IV

English has been concerned with the study of signifying practice on par with philosophy, history and sociology. Now English departments are finding modes of address to readers and conditions in which they are intelligible. Cultural history needs to appropriate and develop those strategies. She says that there is a great deal of work to be done on the specificity of modes of address and the history of the subject. The wok is then history of meanings and struggles for meaning, and in every place where meaning can be found. Its purpose is to change the subject involving ourselves as practitioners in the political and pedagogic process of making history.

12.3.5 Section V

The concept of cultural history is largely theoretical, yet it is not completely abstract. It proposes a kind new journey to interpret and understand a text in the light of theory of

cultural history. Belsey points out that as the educational institution it already exists produces alternative knowledges as its difference, so that we can all as individuals do cultural history.

12.4 SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

The article is an account of analysis that developed by Catherine Belsey on Cultural History. It all began with *Critical Practice*, the 1980 New Accents volume that introduced Catherine Belsey to an international audience and laid out what were to become some of the signature features of her work: namely, a passionate embrace of theoretical inquiry, a strong antipathy to the moralizing and the empiricism that imbued one strand of twentieth-century British criticism, and an intellectual voraciousness that refused to be tethered to a particular genre or period. This essay appears in Shakespeare Studies it is in part because Belsey has written extensively about early modern drama, and particularly about Shakespeare, but that has never been her sole interest. Her books discuss the poetry of John Donne and John Milton, the fiction of Conan Doyle, the romances of Thomas Malory, Alfred Lord Tennyson, and Chretien de Troyes, and the plays of Bertold Brecht, among many others. Her critical range of reference is equally capacious; Aristotle, Sidney, Kant, Hegel, Freud, Lacan, Althusser, Machery, Leavis, Stanley Fish, Saussure. She has things to say about all of them, and does, in a voice at once judicious and, just occasionally, acerbic.

In this article, the special value of Belsey's work arises from its enduring and energetic commitment to the insights of a particularly exciting moment in the development of Western literary theory, namely, the flourishing of post structuralism in the late 1970s and 1980s. This period of intellectual ferment, contestation, and discovery has left its mark on all her work.

12.5 CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Structuralism is a theoretical paradigm in sociology, anthropology, linguistics and semiotics positing that elements of human culture must be understood in terms of their relationship to a larger, overarching system or structure. It works to uncover the structures that underlie all the things that humans do, think, perceive, and feel. Post-structuralism is grounded in the concept of over-determination, even when the concept does not appear explicitly in textual presentations. Over-determination as an epistemology implies the absence of a break between discourse and the objects of discourse. It implies that theory is not separate from reality nor is reality separate from theory. We see what we are taught to see in the concepts we learn. The concepts we learn are complexly shaped by the stream of reality of which we are elements. Post-structuralism recognizes the power of discourse to shape reality. In other words, at any given moment and theoretical understanding, we experience only limited aspects of the world and some of what we experience is based on falsehoods embedded in some of the discourses we have learned.

What is Literature? The general answer is that literature reflects society; it tells truth about the period in which it was produce, about world, about nature of human being, about its belief. Literary texts are written in personal experiences by the author and taught in the same way Keeping in view the background of author. Cultural history is history of experience of all.

In *Critical Practice* (1980), Belsey reveals a problem in the "obvious mode of reading". "Common sense", Belsey contends, reflects a narrow view of how readers approach

text. Critical theory appears to offer no clear alternative at first glance, and a close reading of post-Saussurean writers only illuminates the obscure impossibility of elucidating a theory based on language as the pervasive and inescapable modus operandi. A rejection of empiricism does, however, give life to an indirect, yet empowering method for the interpretation of text. In order to do so, Belsey surveys the theoretical landscape of common sense, namely, the ideological implications and various attacks on the orthodoxy of expressive realism. Post- Saussurean linguistics interrogate the foundations of expressive realism, a theory that projects the "reality of experience" of one exceptional provider of knowledge and further expresses that reality through discourse.

Belsey's engagement with the theoretical turn was distinctive in several ways. First, she wrote about it pedagogically. Though she defended difficulty in critical language as sometimes necessary to the exposition of complex and unfamiliar ideas, she herself wrote and still writes a remarkably lucid prose, one that undergraduates can, with a little justified effort, understand. Her goal seemed always to make new ideas usable, to have them affect "critical practice," which was, after all, the title she chose for her New Accents volume. While some were building word fortresses, Belsey was engaged in opening up the treasury of theoretical reflection to anyone who wanted to make use of its riches. I remember very clearly using Critical Practice in the undergraduate classroom, working through what was at stake in substituting the word "subject" for the word "self" or asking whether there really was an intrinsic difference between a "declarative" and an "interrogative" text or if there were only different ways of reading. We have subsequently drifted into a post-theory moment in the academy, and that is a loss, not because everything has stood the test of time in the writings of Foucault, Lacan, or Macherey, but because the naturalization of critical practice is the surest way to intellectual stagnation.

New Historicism and Cultural Materialism have become two of the most powerful and appealing movements in modern criticism. Their initial conquest of Renaissance studies has escalated into a global colonisation of English and American literary history. A wealth of innovative work has emerged on everything from the Canterbury Tales to the Cantos, bringing intense theoretical controversy in its wake. This Reader pulls the diversity and polemical vigour of this new critical constellation into focus for the first time. The Introduction identifies the key concerns of both approaches, unpacks their theoretical assumptions and clarifies their chief points of convergence and antagonism. The first group of essays locates the intellectual sources of New Historicism and Cultural Materialism in figures such as Foucault, Benjamin, Althusser and Derrida. The second mounts a theoretical debate between prominent exponents and opponents of both kinds of criticism, including Stephen Greenblatt, Catherine Belsey, Alan Sinfield and Catherine Gallagher. The final group carries this debate forward through a wide range of critical readings, which illustrate the impact of New Historicism and Cultural Materialism on the novels, plays and poems of authors ranging from Aeschylus to Ezra Pound.

Across the humanities and the social sciences, disciplinary boundaries have come into question as scholars have acknowledged their common preoccupations with cultural phenomena ranging from rituals and ceremonies to texts and discourse. Literary critics, for example, have turned to history for a deepening of their notion of cultural products; some of them now read historical documents in the same way that they previously read "great" texts.

Anthropologists have turned to the history of their own discipline in order to better understand the ways in which disciplinary authority was constructed. As historians have

begun to participate in this ferment, they have moved away from their earlier focus on social theoretical models of historical development toward concepts taken from cultural anthropology and literary criticism.

Much of the most exciting work in history recently has been affiliated with this wide-ranging effort to write history that is essentially a history of culture. The essays presented here provide an introduction to this movement within the discipline of history. The essays in Part One trace the influence of important models for the new cultural history, models ranging from the path-breaking work of the French cultural critic Michel Foucault and the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz to the imaginative efforts of such contemporary historians as Natalie Davis and E. P. Thompson, as well as the more controversial theories of Hayden White and Dominick LaCapra. The essays in Part Two are exemplary of the most challenging and fruitful new work of historians in this genre, with topics as diverse as parades in 19th-century America, 16th-century Spanish texts, English medical writing, and the visual practices implied in Italian Renaissance frescoes. Beneath this diversity, however, it is possible to see the commonalities of the new cultural history as it takes shape. Students, teachers, and general readers interested in the future of history will find these essays stimulating and provocative.

12.6 CONCLUSION

To study cultural history is nothing but questioning methodological orthodoxies and engage the challenge of writing history in multi-faceted ways. Coursework It is also exploring the impact of Critical and Social Theory, Cultural Anthropology, and Literary analysis on the making of Cultural History and its methodology. Learning different analytical frameworks and interpretive skills, applying them to different mediums (text, image, film), and historicizing the formation of cultural history. The rich corpus of interpretive tools that cultural historians have produced over past few decades serves as an effective languages of intellectual exchange and inquiry and brings together an active scholarly community that works across a broad range of geographical areas and thematic subfields: gender history, legal history, military history, history of race and ethnicity, labor history, intellectual history, transnational and comparative colonial history.

12.7 SAMPLE QUESTIONS

1. What is importance of cultural history in understanding a literary work?

2. "Cultural history is thus a history of experience only". Elucidate.

3. What is the role of Catherine Belsey in contributing and practicing theory of literature?

12.8 SUGGESTED READINGS

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12.9 GLOSSARY

1. Posterity: People of the future
2. Progenitor: ancestor
3. Manifestation: An event, action or thing that is a sign that something exists
4. Encompass: to include a large number of things or a range of things
5. Milieu: the social environment that we live in
6. Proliferation: Propagation, creation
7. Discourse: written or spoken communication or debate
8. Pedagogic: relating to teaching
9. Acerbic: Sharp, bitter
10. Paradigm: a pattern or model
11. Ferment: a state of political or social excitement and confusion
12. Contestation: the action or process of disputing or arguing
13. Tethered: Tied, restrained, controlled
14. Marginal: insignificant, negligible
15. Illustrate: to demonstrate, to exemplify
16. Assumption: a belief or feeling that something is true or happening
17. Discrete: distinct, diverse, different, separate
18. Provocative: intended to make people angry or upset
19. Orthodox: Traditional, conventional
20. Ethnicity: the fact of belonging to a particular race

Dr. N. Srinivasa Rao

LESSON 13
BEGINNING FILM STUDIES
-- ANDREW DIX

OBJECTIVES

- To understand film studies as an academic discipline
- To discuss the prescribed lessons on film studies
- To evaluate the importance of film studies as a literary discourse

STRUCTURE

13.1 INTRODUCTION

Since the modern film was an invention in the late 19th century and it became an industry in the early 20th century, a systematic study of film did not exist before 20th century. Film studies is an academic stream which is dedicated the creation of film theory. Therefore, it is not a study to discuss the technical aspects of film creation like Direction, cinematography, script writing, editing etc. Film studies, as an academic discipline was a new concept in the twentieth century.

Film studies are concerned with exploring the narrative, artistic, cultural, economic, and political implications of the cinema. In searching for these social-ideological values, film studies take a series of critical approaches for the analysis of production, theoretical framework, context, and creation. In this sense the film studies discipline exists as one in which the teacher does not always assume the primary educator role; the featured film itself serves that function. Also, in studying film, possible careers include critic or production. Film theory often includes the study of conflicts between the aesthetics of visual Hollywood and the textual analysis of screenplay. Overall, the study of film continues to grow, as does the industry on which it focuses. Academic journals publishing film studies work include Screen, Cinema Journal, Film Quarterly, and Journal of Film and Video. The prominent persons that have influenced the study of film range from teachers to movie producers but can be subsumed into two major categories: persons in film production and persons in film criticism.

Early film schools focused on the production and subjective critique of film rather than on the critical approaches. Since the time film was created, the concept of film studies as a whole grew to analyze the formal aspects of film as they were created. Established in 1919 the Moscow Film School was the first school in the world to focus on film. In the United States the USC School of Cinematic Arts, established in 1929, was the first cinematic based

school, which was created in agreement with the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences. They were also the first to offer a major in film in 1932 but without the distinctions that are assumed in film studies. Universities began to implement different forms of cinema related curriculum, however, without the division between the abstract and practical approaches.

A movement away from Hollywood productions in the 1950s turned cinema into a more artistic independent endeavor. It was the creation of the auteur theory, which asserted film as the director's vision and art that prompted film studies to become truly considered academically worldwide in the 1960s. In 1965, film critic Robin Wood, in his writings on Alfred Hitchcock, declared that Hitchcock's films contained the same complexities of Shakespeare's plays. With stable enrollment, proper budgets and interest in all humanities numerous universities contained the ability to offer distinct film studies programs.

There were no individuals that created the criteria for film studies; rather the growing community of the film industry and academics began to criticize, document and analyze films, eventually conforming the concepts of film studies that pertain to artistic academia. With the success in first half of the twentieth century, prominent persons in the film industry could become an endowment source for schools focusing primarily on film, creating the location for film studies as a discipline to form. An example is George Lucas' US$175 million donation to the USC School of Cinematic Arts in 2006.

Today film studies exists worldwide as a discipline with specific schools dedicated to it. The aspects of film studies have grown to encompass numerous methods for teaching history, culture and society. Many liberal arts colleges and universities contain courses specifically geared toward the analysis of film. Also exemplifying the increased diversity of film studies is the fact that high schools across the United States offer classes on film theory.

Many programs conjoin film studies with media and television studies, taking knowledge from all parts of visual production in the approach. With the growing technologies films are now concretely used to teach a reflection of culture and art around the world as a primary medium. Due to the ever growing dynamic of film studies, a wide variety of curricula have emerged for analysis of critical approaches used in film. Although each institution has the power to form the study material, students are usually expected to grasp a knowledge of conceptual shifts in film, a vocabulary for the analysis of film form and style, a sense of ideological dimensions of film, and an awareness of extra textual domains and possible direction of film in the future.

13.2 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Dr. Andrew Dix is a Lecturer in The School of Arts, English and Drama of Loughborough University, Leicestershire, UK. His interests extend across the range of American literature and film, and include African American and Native American cultures, U.S. fiction from the mid-nineteenth century to the present, the literature and cinema of U.S. sport, adaptation in film, film star studies, and the relationships between cinema and globalization.

His recent book, co-authored with his colleagues Brian Jarvis and Paul Jenner, is *The Contemporary American Novel in Context* (2011). Currently he is working on three books. Firstly, the second edition of his wide-ranging, critical introduction to cinema, *Beginning*

Film Studies (Manchester University Press), second, a monograph for Routledge entitled *Stardom in Contemporary Global Hollywood*, which aims to trace and evaluate shifts in Hollywood's star system during the current era of globalization and will feature case studies of, among other film performers. Third, also for Routledge, *An introduction to American Studies* that aims to be the most up-to-date and systematic survey of the history, practices and effects of this interdisciplinary subject.

Dr Dix is currently teaching eight undergraduate modules in American literature, film and culture. He is also supervising PhD theses on the environmental imagination in current U.S. writing and on post-9/11 fiction from both sides of the Atlantic. His previous PhD students have worked on such topics as stardom in Hollywood animation and the politics of pastoral in the American South, literary and cinematic mappings of American sport, topics in American film, star studies, and cinema and globalization.

13.3 ABOUT THE BOOK

Andrew Dix's *Beginning film studies* (2008) offers the most lucid, thorough and up-to-the-minute introduction to this popular subject. Written with verve and wit, it reviews a wealth of significant trends in the discipline's past and present, and looks ahead to new directions for film studies. The discussions are enlivened by references to film cultures as diverse as 'classical' Hollywood, the French 'New Wave' and India, to stars like Johnny Depp, genres such as noir, romance and action; it also examines more 'geographical' turns such as production and consumption. Each chapter concentrates on the essential elements, and each contains full bibliographies, stop and think sections and lists of appropriate websites.

Comprehensive and entertaining, it is sure to take its place alongside the popular and bestselling titles already published in this area.

Both comprehensive and compact, *Beginning film studies* is a much needed introduction to the study of film, combining depth with clarity and scholarship with a lightness of touch. Written with vitality and wit, it charts for new readers to the field the complex landscape of twentieth and twenty-first century film studies. As well as evaluating significant trends in the discipline's past and present, it suggests directions for film studies in the future when other forms of visual culture will increasingly challenge cinema. The book is wide-ranging, moving outwards from detailed consideration of film stylistics to explore questions of narrative authorship, genre and ideology.

According to Walter Benjamin (1892-1940), cinema's innovatory techniques such as slow motion and the close up explode what he calls our prison–world, disclosing a hitherto unsuspected complexity and dynamism (1). The book also aimed at introducing key questions, concepts and methodologies in current film studies. Particularly, it tries to provide readers with a knowledge of conceptual shifts in twentieth-century film studies, a vocabulary for the analysis of film form and styles. It also throws light on a sense of the ideological dimensions of film and an awareness of key 'post-textual' or 'extra-textual' domains of film studies and a prospectus of possible directions for film studies in the twenty-first century.

Details of the above said subject areas are covered in the chapters of the book. The book assesses the benefits of these doctrines and others while welcoming the fact of their relaxation to the point whereby film studies at present is welcoming to a wide range of

research projects. The organisation of chapters can be regarded as a set of concentric circles, at the centre of the smallest of which is found the film text itself.

Chapters 1-3 assume that knowledge of film's stylistic options as they emerged over the course of the twentieth century. These sections aim to give the reader a language in which to describe and evaluate maters mise-en-scene, editing and soundtrack. While first three chapters focus closely on cinematic stylistics, chapters 4-8 move outwards, continuing to promote a detailed engagement with the film text itself. They are concerned respectively with film narrative, film authorship, film genre, film stars and ideologies – class, gender, sexual, and racial representation of films. Chapters 9 and 10 decentre the film text thoroughly along the lines of some contemporary writers.

13.4 THE PRESCRIBED CHAPTERS OF THE BOOK

Chapters 7 and 8 of the book are titled "Star Studies" and "Film and Ideology" respectively. They critically evaluate evolution of stardom and ideological perspectives of film studies.

13.4.1 Star Studies

The chapter 'Star studies' deals with, social, cultural, political economies of film stardom and the making and meaning of star personas: seeing stars, national and transnational stars and analysing stars. It provides a lively introduction to the major approaches and key developments within this key area of film studies. It identifies a number of dominant themes, explains major theories, concepts and methodologies, and explores the diversity of approaches that have helped shape the international study of stars and stardom. It examines the stars and star systems of Hollywood, and many European countries, from the early-twentieth century to the first decade of the twenty-first century, multiple functions of stars: as an elite workforce within the film industry, as actors and performers, as role models and cultural representatives, as icons and images, as transnational and national symbols, and as commodities.

The scope of star studies is wide, historically and geographically, but this book helpfully focuses on salient features of the discipline providing a cogent overview of star studies, while suggesting some useful avenues for further research. It also provides an essential theoretical and historical companion to the individual star volumes in the series.

Although the study of film was already well established, Star Studies did not become the focus of serious, sustained academic research until the 1970s. It is established that film stars contribute fundamentally to the creation of meaning in a film text. It is for this reason that Star Studies has had a comparatively shorter, although not less productive, history than other areas of research within Film Studies. The chapter therefore discusses the role, significance and value of Hollywood film stars within both our present society and the contemporary Hollywood film industry. However, in order to fully appreciate the current state of the institution of Hollywood stardom, it will also be necessary to briefly discuss its foundations and development, as well as the various ways in which stardom has routinely been analysed within the academic field of Film Studies. Film stardom is a phenomenon like the concept of a genre that investigated not through a single critical optic but by a multi-stranded approach, here measuring the star's effects upon the several domains of industrial production, textual composition, ideological formation and audience response. This chapter

begins by placing the star system in shifting production contexts from its beginnings in Hollywood and elsewhere.

It also recognises audience's powerful involvement in the star system and assesses ways used to conceptualize this engagement that have ranged from psychoanalytic accounts of the spectators to ethnographic surveys of fans. Given the centrality of Hollywood to our thinking about stars, Max Linder, the French comic performer is regarded as 'the world's first film star'. Linder's name appeared in French film publicity as early as 1909 a year before evidence of an incipient star system in the United States. The first American film star is often taken to be Florence Lawrence. However, film historians including Janet Stagier and Richard deCordova have shown convincingly that , though Lawrence was promoted early star in America she was not actually the first. Some months before her unveiling, other studios disclosed the names of other stars. Internationally, star systems in the first half of the twentieth century took different forms.

The commercial exploitability and flexibility of the stars have increased rapidly in recent decades. From 1950s Hollywood has witnessed a relative autonomising of the star compared with the earlier periods. At the level of film production, the star is now perceived not as fixed item of capital under ownership of one person or organisation, instead as package offered to various users. In his influential book *Stars* Richard Dyer suggests that a star's image is composed by four kinds of media text: Promotion, Publicity, films, and criticism and commentaries.

The matter of star persona is culturally important to be discussed simply in the vocabulary of acting. We know how political economy approach articulates film stardom manufacture of commodities from movies to perfumes.

Another major tradition in star studies draws upon semiotics and ideology critique in attempting to reveal the social significance of particular stars. Theorists indebted to the tradition of ideology critique have argued that film stars take on a pedagogic function, instructing in socially preferred forms of being. Without being role models in any banal or explicit sense, their personas are a particularly vivid part in ideological reproduction. John O. Thompson has developed an effective means of recognizing and evaluation of star personas.

He argues that star studies might profitably adopt an exercise used in the phonological branch of linguistics.

The psychoanalytic account of star spectatorship is less empowering of women as viewing subjects, restricting them to such unattractive options as passive or even masochistic identification. Jackie Stacey's important study *Star Gazing* (1994) continues to use a psychoanalytic language, it also registers its distance from this conceptual paradigm. Bruce Babington identifies that Hollywood has unquestionable status as the paradigmatic site of stardom. The hegemony of mainstream US cinema is such that its stars have achieved more global reach than figures from other national film industries. All nations try to construct different versions of film stardom.

13.4.2 Film and Ideology

There is a strong, yet ever-changing relationship can be seen between ideology and film. Film has become an effective means of ideological transmission as well as

transformation. Films reflect class struggle, the struggle for class, feminism, gender issues, nationalism and ideology.

Ideology is sometimes identified as a body of ideas reflecting the social needs of an individual, group, class, and culture. In other words, ideology refers to a systematic worldview which defines our concepts of self and the relations of the self to the state or any form of the collectivism. Ideology means belief systems and the principles inside these systems, even if these ideas are unrecognized and thereby perhaps unquestioned. We may know we are being controlled, but we accept the idea that the "good" of the system overrides the "bad," or we accept the notion that the system serves our needs well enough, even thought the ones we are working for make all the money. We go along with it, in effect consenting to the controls imposed on us by the State and Civilization.

Usually, every movie presents us with ways of behaving negative and positive and therefore offers us an implied or explicit morality or ideology. Every film has a slant based on the director's sense of right and wrong an ideological perspective that privileges certain characters, institutions, and cultures. Recognize that films are products marketed to the public and that film-making may include a predisposition that many, if not most, people will respond in roughly parallel or identical ways to the material. Films are market derived art. As our national character changes, the individual must also change, reinvent or perish. Films in a particular way immortalize some characters and abstract concepts like love, masculinity, and individualism, myth, sacrifice, and heroic quest of national leaders. They also portray nationalism as a sacred place above the notion of family and love. This is logical propaganda given the demands of the world war.

In the 1960s, Americans were ready for fatal and antihero cowboy stories. These heroes may be noble but they are ill-equipped to survive in the modern world. "Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid" (1969) epitomizes the cowboy's failed metamorphosis, his failure to adjust to changing times. In "Pat Garrett and Billy the Kid" (1973), Billy (played by Kris Kristofferson) says to his former friend Pat Garrett: "Times have changed, but not me." This fatalistic hero, as a marketable product, would perhaps have been unacceptable from the 1920s through the 1950s. Yet in the era of Vietnam, such antiheroes reflect the cynicism of the times and become viable products.

When women arrive on the scene, this mythic drama between individuals and authority plays out again in a film that also consider to be a western, "Thelma and Louise" (1991).This film is basically a remake of "Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid," but now we have two women attempting to navigate the landscape of "organized men" who are out to destroy them. While the death of Thelma and Louise is depicted as the inevitable result of their rebellion against masculine rule, they defy conscription and exalt freedom, even in death. Such a story (with female protagonists) obviously is a product of the 1990s. The film suggests to men that women are fed up with the scripts of the past. Once again such a story would have been unacceptable during earlier and different times of American film marketing.

13.4.3 Major Categories of general ideology in films:

Neutral: escapist films and light entertainment with emphasis on action, pleasure, and entertainment values for their own sake. Superficial treatment of right and wrong: Honey I Shrunk the Kids (1989) is an example of Star Studies. These films in themselves reflect a value system where fun and entertainment are forms of consumerism.

Implicit: the protagonist and the antagonist represent conflicting values, but these are not dwelled upon. Obviously, the director slants the message in a particular direction, but consent maybe transparent in that we accept the system particular world views as normal or the way the world works. That is, various ideologies get played up without question (without audiences seeing the whole picture); thus the film subtly serves the interests of the dominant classes and transmits dominant moral and intellectual codes.

Explicit: movies obviously constructed to teach or persuade: Patriotic films and antiwar films.

Most films fall into the Implicit category with the understanding that implicit presentations of ideas and values has increased potency, achieved in part by mass repetition or "Culture Incorporated" suggesting the mass media replays the same message, over and over, in many different forms.

Marxist critics have analysed the part played by film in class-divided societies. Important early contributions here include Kracauer's assessment of the ideological effects of popular cinemagoing. Some of the canonical texts of film theory tend to present cinema as a kind of perfected machine for the reproduction of bourgeois ideology, and, by extension, class-divided society. They also say that cinema has ability to disrupt the spectator's usual ideological quietude. What the cinema in fact registers is vague, unformulated, untheorised, unthought out dominant ideology.

In 1989 a special issue of the radical film journal *Camera Obscura* appeared under the title of 'The Spectatrix'. This verbal coinage indicates how feminist film theorists go beyond conventional methods of viewing films on screen, images of women. Recent decades have seen a dispersal of feminist work in contrast to the psychoanalytic movement of the 1970s and early 1980s.

Interest in gay and lesbian representation in cinema is currently supported by an institutional apparatus of university courses, conferences, dedicated journals and film festivals. By contrast, work on the subject that appeared in the 1970s and early 1980s was piecemeal, individualistic sometimes even idiosyncratic.

Starting in the 1960s, some film critics began criticising auteur theory's focus on the authorial role of the director. Pauline Kael and Sarris disputed in the pages of *The New Yorker* and various film magazines. One reason for the backlash is the collaborative aspect of shooting a film, and in the theory's privileging of the role of the director (whose name, at times, has become more important than the movie itself).

The auteur theory was also challenged by the influence of New Criticism, a school of literary criticism. The New Critics argued that critics made an "intentional fallacy" when they tried to interpret works of art by speculating about what the author meant, based on the author's personality or life experiences. New Critics argued that information or speculation about an author's intention was secondary to the words on the page as the basis of the experience of reading literature.

13.5 CONCLUSION

The advent of digital technology in the area of filmmaking and cinematic praxis has not only changed the art and poetics of film production but has also penetrated the sphere of historical, philosophical, institutional, and theoretical discourse. The pervasive digitalization of cinema in contemporary times, therefore, should go beyond technological and democratized advancement affecting film practices. This is an engaging moment in cinematic discourse that is birthing contending theoretical stakes and vicissitudes from media critics, film historians, academicians, film practitioners, and cultural theorists. The utilization of digital technology, may it be in commercial cinema, independent films or other media texts, has been a pivotal nexus that generated a reframing of representational and theoretical positions both in the field of cinematic poetics and knowledge production.

Cultural scholars, film historians, media critics, film practitioners, and academicians have contributed for growth and specialisations of film studies. Scholarly works on the subject of digital cinema and other modes of investigation related to the film studies has grown exponentially in this decade. They aim to provide a venue for scholars and specialists in the field of cinematic and cultural discourse in order to re-examine and revaluate existing fields of inquiry, theoretical foundations and researches. It is without a doubt that the digitalization of cinema has spurred contending debates and differing positionalities among film audiences, scholars, film historians and media practitioners.

Digital divide, as a terminology and concept, does not simply refer to the aesthetic chasm sparked by the arrival of digital technology in cinema but rather as a moment of rupture that has stimulated historical and ideological critiques from varying vantage points and counter-points. The digitalization of cinema has created a protuberance on how the development of film as historical artifacts and social discourse should be understood and analyzed. It has been a site and sight of endless departures ranging from aesthetic experimentations, reframing of film historizations to the rethinking of existing modes of film production. The digitalization of cinema is an inherent reality that should be faced by scholars and practitioners of the field in order to traverse and envision the futures of cinema.

13.6 SAMPLE QUESTIONS

1. Narrate the evolution of film studies as an academic discipline.
2. Explain the importance of 'star studies' and 'stardom' in film studies.
3. Evaluate the role of films in establishing and propagating ideology of dominant cultures.

13.7 SUGGESTED READINGS

1. Nelmes, Jill. *Introduction to Film Studies.* 5th Edition. London: Routledge. 2011. Print
2. Dix, Andrew. *Beginning Film Studies*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008. Print
3. Monaco, James .*How to Read a Film: Movies, Media and Beyond.* 4th Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Print

13.8 GLOSSARY

1. Aesthetics   : the study of beauty and taste
2. Critique   : a method of systematic analysis of a discourse
3. Endowment   : a quality or ability possessed or inherited by someone
4. Conjoin   : combine
5. Pastoral   : rustic, rural
6. Lucid   : clear, logical
7. Verve   : vitality
8. Enliven   : inspire, vitalize
9. Noir   : a genre of film or fiction characterized by cynicism, fatalism
10. Compact   : compressed, dense
11. Stylistics   : the study of the distinctive styles in particular literary genres
12. Doctrine   : principle, policy, dogma, a set of guidelines
13. Mise-en-scene   : the arrangement of scenery and stage properties in a play/film
14. Transnational   : extending or operating across national boundaries
15. Cogent   : convincing, logical
16. Conceptualize   : form a concept or idea of something.
17. Incipient   : initial, beginning
18. Semiotics   : the study of signs and symbols and their use or interpretation
19. Pedagogic   : relating to teaching
20. Banal   : ordinary, common, conventional
21. Hegemony   : domination, control, supremacy
22. Slant   : slope, tilt
23. Epitomize   : characterize, symbolize
24. Metamorphosis : the process of transformation, change
25. Conscription   : compulsory enlistment for state service, into the armed forces
26. Exalt   : praise, laud
27. Canonical   : included in the list of sacred books officially accepted as genuine
28. Bourgeois   : belonging to the middle class, typically with materialistic attitudes
29. Piecemeal   : partial measures taken over a period of time, bit by bit
30. Idiosyncratic   : eccentric
31. Backlash   : reaction, criticism
32. Praxis   : accepted practice or custom
33. Vicissitude   : a change of circumstances or fortune, alteration
34. Stardom   : the state or status of being a very famous or talented entertainer

Dr. N. Srinivasa Rao

MODEL QUESTION PAPER
M.A. DEGREE EXAMINATION
Fourth Semester
English
Paper I — Literary Criticism - II

Time : Three hours   **Maximum : 70 marks**
Answer ONE question from each Unit.
All questions carry equal marks.

1 .   (a) Discuss the reasons for the rise of modernism in the West and its impact on literary
        works.

Or

(b) What are archetypes of literature according to Northrop Frye?

2.   (a) How does Fanon establish the premise "Decolonization is always a violent
       Phenomenon" ?

Or

(b) To what extent does Derrida's essay "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of
      Human Sciences" bring out the major theoretical principles of deconstruction?

3. (a) How does showalter bring out the theoretical framework for Gynocriticism?

Or

(b) Elucidate the ideas of Lee Paterson about Historical criticism Vs Claims of
      humanism?

4. (a) Write about Indian aesthetics as elucidated by Hiriyanna.

Or

(b) What are the chief concerns of Dalit literature?

5. (a) What is the significance of cultural history according to Belsey?

Or

(b) Consider the scope and importance of "Film Studies" in India.